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Abstract
This study reviews the attempt to decentralise the administration of 
primary education in Balochistan, Pakistan in the period from 1992 to 1997. It 
critically examines the institutions that managed public, primary education at 
provincial and district levels and analyses their functions to determine where 
the locus of control existed for categories of public service delivery. Government 
officers placed in twenty-six administrative units (districts) were entrusted with 
the responsibility for government schools and were expected to foster 
partnerships with NGOs and communities to develop community schools. The 
thesis assesses the extent to which the process was, in fact, carried through. It 
investigates the constraints that the Province faced in adopting donor led 
objectives.
The study design involved interviews at the regional level, textual analyses 
of government and NGO documents, and two detailed case studies in very 
different rural districts. The data suggest that no clear education policy 
framework existed in Balochistan prior to 1997. The lack of policy direction for 
primary education was found to be a contributing factor to the Province’s weak 
institutional capacity for providing it. Concurrently, decentralisation plans were 
found to be incongruent with central and district power and political structures. 
Delegated authority and budgetary control needed for local management did not 
exist at the district level. Rare local initiatives taken by district managers 
showed promising signs of decentralised management but they could not be 
sustained without appropriate local administrative capacity.
The thesis ends by discussing, in light of local experience, the elusive 
nature of decentralisation and its shortcomings in guiding practical policy. Why 
do major donors favour decentralisation in primary education administration 
when capacity is so weak? This contrast provides an important rationale for 
revisiting the centralisation-decentralisation debate and analysing whether the 
concept of decentralisation should be considered as the definitive model for 
primary education management reform in centralist developing countries.
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Chapter 1
Decentralisation: Selection of a Theoretical 
Framework
We have made great progress in seizing power 
from the hands of capitalists and traditionalists, 
but we must face the fact that, to the 
mass of the people, power is still something 
wielded by others—even i f  on their behalf.
Julius K. Nyerere, 
Decentralisation 
1972
Criticisms of post-colonial governments in the 1940s to 1970s were that 
much of the disappointment that followed independence and the poor economic 
performance of developing countries lay in the reliance in over-centralisation of 
administration and authority. The legacy left by colonial powers included a 
narrow cadre of educated ruling elites; weak local government structures plus 
the lack of skilled people to run them; and single party rule that encouraged 
centralisation through Marxist models, which bred national planning. The 
further effects of independence manifested themselves in administration 
through corruption, slowness of decision-making and to broader economic 
inefficiencies including the incapacity of developing countries to make 
significant reforms (Leaf 1998).
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The reaction to this legacy is where this study begins. Rondinelli, a classic 
theorist on decentralisation, wrote on what he considered to be disillusionment 
with the 'basic premises of development theory' in the 1970s. It was at this time 
he asserts, that 'planners and policymakers began to recognise that development 
requires a basic transformation in social, economic, and political structures that 
enables poor people to help themselves to increase their productivity and 
incomes' (Rondinelli 1983:12). The trickle-down policies developed by central 
governments were not showing favourable results in terms of alleviating 
absolute poverty, expanding economies and modernisation. Furthermore, 
Rondinelli points out that human resource potential could not be maximised 
given that policy development had been separated from policy implementation. 
He also claimed that social development was unwieldy and prone to frequent 
change making it difficult for central authorities to prescribe policy for 
communities who were assumed to be more informed or in better touch with 
their own reality.
Nearly two decades later, theorists have reflected on the effects of 
development decentralisation strategies. It has been suggested that many of the 
outcomes have not measured up to the intent of the strategies (Riddell 1997; 
Crook and Manor 1998). Centralising forces have continued to plague policy 
formulation and implementation, as is pointed out in the theory in the following 
section.
1.1 Decentralisation and Development: A Theoretical
Remedy?
The theoretical debate on decentralisation in public administration 
generally falls into two camps—proponents of the reform and the critics. 
However, the following discussion highlights this debate according to theme.
Shaffer's View on Centralising Tendencies
Decentralisation has been viewed as just one among many strategies for 
making administrative improvements. Likewise, its effectiveness has been
16
questioned. Serious reservations have been expressed as to whether the reform 
as an ideology supports local autonomy or, conversely, strengthens central 
control. The discussion concerning centralisation or rather centralising 
tendencies is compelling in terms of social effects or results of decentralisation 
and is the focus of discussion in this section.
In abstract terms, centralisation has been identified as an inevitable function 
of states governing territories. In a posthumous exposition of Schaffer’s work, 
Smith (1986) contends that state institutions are responsible for public policies 
that give to space a 'significant perception of specific comparative location’. 
Recipients of government services and allocations are divided into spatial 
categories where rules manifested in public policy create spatial distinctions of 
access and eligibility (p.456).
Underdevelopment increases the significance of rationing and 
procurement by the state, and formal definitions of spatial concepts 
come to be used as criteria of inclusion and exclusion: arid zones, 
depressed areas, hill farming, community development, regional 
planning, district development and so on. The significance of such 
classification, defining people as members of eligible or ineligible 
groups, is not just that it has a spatial dimension. It is a centrally 
created dimension, and so contributes to the process of 
centralisation that is so ubiquitous, especially in the political 
systems of the Third World (Ibid:456).
Other ingredients to centralisation, in Schaeffer’s opinion, are expressed in 
terms of bureaucratic and organisational functions that lead to centralisation. 
Bureaucratic, allocating processes, institutional ideologies, procedures, and 
language produce centralising outcomes. Administrative language expresses 
professional and international standards enshrined in centralised rules. 
Organisational processes tend inevitably to strengthen the governmental centre. 
Contractors, clients, claimants, beneficiaries and so on with whom organisations 
deal must use official, institutional language to bear any meaning for those at 
the centre. Organisations are inherently centrist given their ‘co-ordination’ role. 
By definition, they exist because work is too difficult and diffuse for any one 
individual to control. Centralisation is evidenced in the way that institutions 
develop structures of pay, careers, training and promotion: a distribution of 
power between age groups and generations which inevitably tends to allocate
17
resources and status towards the centre located in the urban capital. ‘This 
emphasises the political significance of centrality. Headquarters and branches 
are the visible statement of the centralising process which organisation of itself 
inevitably tends to mean’ (Schaffer 1984:47-48).
These notions broadly reflect Max Weber’s classical concept of bureaucracy. 
Weber distinguishes bureaucracy from other organisational forms in his 
presentation of hierarchy, division of labour, and rules and regulations. 
Hierarchy entails a clear hierarchical chain of responsibility. The division of 
labour denotes the specialisation of tasks performed by different members of the 
organisation, and rules and regulations specify the rights and responsibilities, 
which are assigned to different positions in the organisation and how the task of 
each position is to be carried out (Lauglo and McLean 1985:20). The authors here 
argue the implications for centralisation.
These key aspects of bureaucracy all imply a concentration of 
control at the top of the hierarchy. That control is exerted in order 
to co-ordinate the activities of the organization so that they serve 
the organization’s purpose with maximum efficiency (Ibid:20).
In terms of local administration, the state intervenes in many ways, and 
therefore has a direct role in perpetuating centralisation. On one hand, for 
instance, it sponsors local decentralisation through the formation of 'local 
councils’ that are in theory 'autonomous local authorities'. On the other hand, 
poorly qualified staff and the lack of available resources in many of these 
councils require 'a strengthening of central assistance that brings centralisation 
back into the picture’ (Schaffer 1982:3). The lack of resources is purported not to 
be the sole instigating factor in strengthening centralisation, but that it is 
coupled with a lack of commitment.
Centralisation in developing countries is not just a function of 
scarcity. It is in part a function of commitment. Those who 
recommend administrative reorganisation and have to 
implement it, the central government politicians and civil 
servants, have the most to lose if access, participation and 
responsiveness are strengthened by decentralisation. There is 
thus a generally disappointing record as far as the 
implementation of decentralisation schemes is concerned 
(Smith 1986:460).
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In sum, administration sets up dimensions of space that are divided. 
Dichotomies of 'top-bottom*; 'centre-periphery'; 'powerful-powerless' are typical 
fallout in organisations. Centralisation is the weightier reality of these space 
divisions and is thus characterised in a negative light given the exclusion that 
often accompanies it. Decentralisation, on the other hand, should not necessarily 
be idealised as the elixir for all matters of exclusion, but should rather be viewed 
as a means of balancing power or authority struggles that generally arise in 
organisations.
The following section analyses the concept of decentralisation through 
commonly used definitions that are included in policies currently being 
established in the developing world. Decentralisation is often ambiguously 
defined and yet, in a spatial context raises important questions about the 
centralising tendencies of its strategies, i.e. ‘Does the existence of area 
organisations imply development according to unique local criteria identified by 
local decision-makers? Or does it represent an area dimension within national 
development planning, with national planners determining area priorities 
according to the needs of national goals’ (Ibid: 461).
Ambiguities with Terms
The discourse concerning the nature of decentralisation would perhaps be 
richer if we had stronger empirical evidence by which to grade/measure its 
results. Manor (1999) suggests that while experimentation with development 
and decentralisation has occurred over a wide range of countries, the evidence is 
'imperfect and incomplete'. He also warns that in terms of country experiences, 
'the findings may need to be revised after these experiments have more time to 
develop and make an impact' (Manor 1999:2). As a term, decentralisation has 
come to mean many things and therefore, as a concept, is ambiguous with 
borders not well defined (Prud'homme 1994). To gain a better understanding of 
the proposition that the nature of decentralisation is elusive, this section will 
attempt to piece together a variety of definitions and arguments that call in to 
question its theoretical validity.
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It is interesting to note that most contemporary sources dealing with the 
subject of decentralisation and development generally recycle the same 
definitions. This noticeable pattern raises suspicion as to whether any new 
thinking is taking place in which practical experience informs theory. The 
definitions relayed below are examples of these frequently cited sources. They 
are included here to establish, as many others have before, a baseline by which 
to critique and measure decentralisation that will be observed later in this study.
The classical definition of decentralisation is 'the transfer of planning, 
decision-making or management functions from the central government and its 
agencies to field organisations, subordinate units of government, semi- 
autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional development 
organisations, specialised functional authorities or non-government 
organisations' (Rondinelli, 1986:2). Decentralisation is further distinguished or 
classified into four sub-categories along political, spatial, market, and 
administrative parameters as shown in Figure 1.1. There exist at least four 
'institutional arrangements' under the umbrella of Administrative 
decentralisation (circled in Figure 1.1) including categories of deconcentration, 
delegation, devolution and the transfer of functions to local governments. These 
subdivisions or sub-classifications are repeated by a number of theorists, 
Rondinelli's being the most widely used. However, they also add to the confusion 
over what decentralisation is supposed to be.
20
Figure 1.1 Classification of Decentralisation
= most common form of decentralisation
Administrative
Seeks to redistribute authority, 
responsibility and financial 
resources for providing public 
services among different levels 
of government... and is defined 
as the transfer of responsibility 
for planning, management, and 
the raising and allocation of 
resources from the central 
government and its agencies to 
field units of government 
agencies, subordinate units or 
levels of government or semi- 
autonomous public authorities 
or corporations, area-wide 
regional or functional 
authorities. (SRI-5)
Political
Political decentralisation refers 
to giving more political power in 
decision-making to citizens or to 
their elected representatives. 
Political decentralisation is 
usually associated with 
representative government, 
citizen participation, and de- 
mocratisation. (SR2-2)
Spatial
A process of encouraging the 
diffusion of population and 
services among villages, towns 
and cities of different sizes to 
prevent or reverse high levels 
of concentration in one or two 
large metropolitan areas.'
(SRI-3) The objective of 
spatial decentralisation in 
education policies is to 
distribute investments in 
educational services and 
facilities more widely among 
cities and towns, and to 
strengthen local 
administrative capacity to 
raise revenues to maintain 
them. (SRI-4)
Market
Allows services to be provided 
by businesses, community 
groups, co-operatives, private 
voluntary associations, 
individuals, and non­
governmental organisations. 
Market decentralisation is a 
process of creating conditions in 
which public goods and services 
are provided primarily through 
the revealed preferences of 
individuals by market 
mechanisms. Some economists 
contend that under conditions of 
reasonably free choice, the 
provision of some public goods 
such as education is more 
economically efficient when a 
large number of local 
institutions are involved than 
when only the central 
government or the public sector 
is the provider. Market-oriented 
options include •
❖ private sector provision of 
services
❖ public-private partnerships
❖ performance contracting 
with the private sector
❖ market surrogates 
(SRI-11116)
Centralising Tendencies?
21 Source: Rondinelli 1995
Bray (1994) claims that ‘when trying to disentangle the many alternative 
meanings of decentralisation, one important initial distinction is between 
territorial and functional decentralisation’. He further suggests that Rondinelli’s 
work has been concerned with territorial decentralisation, i.e. 'with the 
distribution of powers between different tiers of government’ (p.819). His 
variations of territorial decentralisation, though, are the same as Rondinelli's 
derivatives of administrative decentralisation and include devolution, delegation 
and deconcentration (See Figure 1.2). Alternatively, functional decentralisation 
could mean a ‘dispersal of control over particular activities, and is often a 
‘vertical’ form of decentralisation’ (Ibid:819).
Figure 1.2: Forms of Administrative Decentralisation
Devolution v ---------------------------W -------Delegation v Deconcentration
The most extreme form of 
decentralisation. Powers are 
formally held by local bodies, 
which do not need to seek 
approval for their actions. 
They may choose to inform 
the centre of their decisions, 
but the role of the centre is 
merely one of collection and 
exchange of information. 
(Bray 1994:819)
Central governments 
transfer responsibility for 
decision-making and 
administration of public 
functions such as education 
to semi-autonomous 
organisations not wholly 
controlled by the central 
government, but ultimately 
accountable to it.
a)Public Corporations or 
Enterprises
b)Special Authorities and 
Districts
(Rondinelli 1995:SRl-7)
Often considered the 
weakest form of 
decentralisation. It is 
defined as the 
redistribution of decision­
making authority and 
financial and management 
responsibilities for 
providing services and 
facilities among different 
levels of the central 
government
a)Field Administration
b)Local Administration 
(Rondinelli 1995:SRl-5)
Source: Bray 1994 and Rondinelli 1995
The literature suggests that deconcentration is a more common practice and 
that it differs from decentralisation on the basis of a political variation. Whereas 
decentralisation connotes entities 'separated by law from the national centre in 
which local representatives are given formal power to decide on a range of public 
matters,' deconcentration constitutes delegated authority within the centrally 
directed hierarchy of public administration (Mawhood 1993:1). Another 
dimension to deconcentration is that it occurs when a central authority creates 
field units or rather 'introduces extra tiers of government without handing over
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significant decision-making powers' (Bray 1984:5-6). It is suggested, however, 
that this is not such a negative state if it can lead to greater local sensitivity and 
influence.
Decentralisation has also been defined as 'any change in the organisation 
of government which involves the transfer of powers or functions from the 
national level to any sub-national level(s), or from one sub-national level to 
another, lower one' (Conyers 1984). In the wave of idealism in the early 1980s, 
decentralisation was losing its charm. Besides being tagged as a ‘fad' or a 
‘panacea,' the notion was also being questioned in much the same way that is 
illustrated in Figure 1.3. Here, Conyers points out a series of antithetical 
statements about the nature of decentralisation. Her third point is particularly 
compelling. According to a popular corpus of theory espousing the merits of 
decentralisation, such a movement would result in the improvement of 
management or increased participation. Conyers suggests, however, that these 
‘objectives’ are not usually achieved by decentralisation. Of course this a broad 
claim that implicates her willingness to define decentralisation noted above.
Figure 1.3: Antitheses to Decentralisation __________________________
1. Decentralisation can be seen as a means o f achieving a wide range o f objectives, but 
should not be seen as a solution and a panacea to all problems;
2. The extent to which decentralisation will achieve any objective depends on its degree 
and form;
3. Most objectives which decentralisation is intended to achieve, such as improvements in 
the management o f rural development programs and increased popular participation, 
cannot be achieved by decentralisation;
4. Decentralisation can itself create new problems, the nature and extent o f which depend 
on its degree and form and on factors specific to the country in question; and
5. Any attempt to unravel the complexities of the issue is further complicated by the 
difficulty o f distinguishing between changes resulting (or not resulting) from 
decentralisation and those attributable to other factors.
Source: Conyers 1982
Theoretically, decentralisation is easy to rationalise. This study finds that
Rondinelli and a multitude of other specialists on the subject have elaborated
the merits of decentralisation many times over. Figure 1.4 below highlights
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fourteen archetypes, representative of the literature, that help (theoretically) to 
rationalise such a reform.
______Figure 1.4: Desirable Effects of Decentralisation________________________
1 Delegates greater authority for development planning and management to 
officials in the field and closer to the problems;
2 De-bureaucratises administration;
3 Opens the flow of communication in both directions allowing for better co­
ordinated planning;
4 Promotes implementation of national policies to areas where central government 
plans are often unknown or ignored by rural people or are undermined by local 
elites;
5 Allows for greater representation of stockholders at the local level;
6 Induces capability-building among local governments and private institutions;
7 Unburdens central managers of tasks that could be conducted by local managers;
8 Creates a condition whereby activities could be better co-ordinated among 
central planners by and between local institutions;
9 Institutionalises participation of citizens in development planning and 
management;
10 Offsets the control of elites over development activities;
11 Allows for more experimentation and testing of innovations--allows for more 
creativity and flexibility;
12 Allows local leaders to locate services more effectively in communities and 
allows for better monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of 
development projects;
13 Increases political stability of countries by giving local groups more of a stake in 
developmenFcTecision making;
14 Increases the number of public goods and services and the efficiency with which
______they are delivered by decreasing diseconomies of scale._____________________
Source: Rondinelli 1983:14-16
It is not clear, though, 'how' these goals might be achieved or 
operationalised thus adding further to the ambiguity of the concept of 
decentralisation. Rondinelli does offer, however, the suggestion that by 
improving personnel management capabilities through preparation of job 
descriptions, effective operating procedures, salary and wage guidelines, transfer 
and promotion policies, and performance evaluations, local governments can 
fulfil their potential as decentralised units of governance and as efficient 
providers of local public services (Rondinelli 1995).
One difficulty with the term ‘decentralisation’ as illustrated in Figure 1.4 
is that it has been over-used and applied repeatedly in the literature to mean 
many different things.
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Decentralisation is a word that has been used by different people to 
mean good many different things. Most of us--and most 
governments--like the idea of decentralisation. It suggests the hope 
of cracking open the blockages of an inert central bureaucracy, 
curing managerial constipation, giving more direct access for the 
people to the government and the government to the people, 
stimulating the whole nation to participate in national development 
plans (Mawhood 1993:1).
Not only have definitions of decentralisation been over-generalised, but the term 
has also been substituted and used interchangeably with any number of sub-tier 
categories already displayed. A pointed distinction between these notions is that 
while decentralisation is a broad term, it should not be used to cover all 
categories. ‘Mixing of phrases and inter-changing terms has brought some 
confusion into thinking on the subject and, in particular, has allowed 
centralising policies in government to be depicted as something different than 
what they really are* (Ibid:2).
The vagueness that lies in definitions for decentralisation can also be 
illustrated in another way. In theory, administrative reform is often portrayed 
in polarised conditions of centralisation and decentralisation. Usually a shift is 
recommended from a centralised condition to a decentralised condition. This 
theoretical shift focuses on an 'all or nothing1 approach that misses the 
possibility and potential of the middle ground (Bray 1984:18). It is argued that 
decentralisation and centralisation cannot be strictly identified at the opposite 
ends of a continuum, but rather that all forms of government contain a mix (p.5). 
Policy development and implementation of administrative reforms that would 
lead a country in the direction of decentralisation require more than simplified 
definitions of 'either/or' proportions, however.
The concepts of centralization and decentralization1 are complex 
and slippery. It is rarely possible without argument to place 
specific administrative systems on a continuum with centralized 
at one end and decentralized at the other, and attempts to
1 The British English spelling of ‘decentralisation’ and other words are assumed 
throughout the writing of this thesis. The trans-positioning of the letter ‘s’ and ‘z’ varies 
according to the expression of the authors quoted in the text.
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measure the degree of decentralization in particular systems have 
exposed more difficulties than solutions (Bray, 1994:820).
Other confusion over the definitions of decentralisation exists. One example 
is that while most of the literature states that it should be the result of a need 
expressed from 'below,' it generally emanates through a mandate from the ‘top’ 
(Rondinelli 1983:182). Another example is that the process of decentralisation 
typically requires the reorientation and strengthening of some organisations at 
the centre. Thus, the centre cannot be forgotten in policy formulation. The 
tendency, however, is that the central agencies which usually allocate the 
resources are typically more powerful to leverage reforms than the institutions 
on the periphery. The problem is that they often have little understanding of 
their own roles, much less an understanding of the roles of decentralised units 
to which they are devolving responsibility (Schmidt 1989:139). This point is 
emphasised in a discussion on the implementation of decentralisation by Jain.
The process of decentralisation-centralisation is oftentimes very 
confusing as different organisation and groups have different 
interpretations of what they are supposed to do. It is particularly 
confusing for groups at the centre such as the Ministry of Education 
who may think that decentralisation means that they can abdicate 
their responsibilities (Jain 1995:25).
Despite the arguments made concerning the vagueness of the term 
‘decentralisation’, as a management reform ideology it continues to inspire the 
hope of policy makers and is still a favoured strategy found in international 
policy in administrative development. As a political phenomenon, 
decentralisation is widespread. Out of the seventy-five developing and 
transitional countries with populations greater than five million, sixty-three 
claim to be undertaking some form of transfer of political power to local units of 
government (Dillinger 1994:1).
Decentralisation as a reform strategy, however, is often perceived 
incorrectly as a solution to a wide range of administrative, political, economic 
and social problems which vary from country to country, but which in most 
countries appear to place an enormous developmental burden on decentralisation 
(Smith 1986:461). The question of whether decentralisation is an end or a means 
to an end adds to the difficulty of defining decentralisation. Schaffer sees
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decentralisation becoming an end in itself with the desired outcome being a more 
democratic and participatory society. In the author’s opinion, one of the most 
pervasive grey areas concerning decentralisation aside from centralising 
tendencies is whether community participation is a cause or an effect. The next 
section raises questions about the net impact of decentralisation upon the 
intended beneficiaries.
Decentralisation and Communities: Access and Exclusion
The consideration of community participation as a function of 
decentralisation extends the challenge of first finding a suitable definition of the 
reform and secondly whether the reform is ideal for development (see Michener 
1998 for an overview of types of participation). Participatory development has 
been viewed as a mechanism for handing development over to the people but as 
a practice has been questioned with regard to achieving this goal. Rahman 
(1995) suggests that community participation is a long way from being practiced 
to an extent that would lead to significant structural reforms that would 
‘transfer resources away from those vested interests that control dominant 
social and political structures towards underprivileged people’ (p.26).
Before we can analyse participation, a working definition of ‘community’ 
should be established. Worsley (1987:100) introduces three classical definitions 
in sociology literature. The first he describes as ‘community as locality’. Here the 
interpretation of the term comes closest to its geographical meaning of a ‘human 
settlement within a fixed and bounded local territory’. Secondly, he suggests 
that ‘community’ has been used to denote, a ‘network of interrelationships’. In 
this usage, community relationships can be characterised by conflict as well as 
by mutuality and reciprocity. In the third usage, community can be seen to refer 
to a particular type of social relationship; one that possesses certain qualities. It 
infers the existence of a ‘community spirit’ or ‘community feeling’. The first 
definition is the one that is used in this thesis.
There are many ways of conceptualising community participation. Moser 
(1983) finds that first, participation is a ‘means to an end’, and secondly it is an 
‘end in itself. The first approach leads to what is also called ‘efficiency-oriented’
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or ‘weak’ participation where development objectives are achieved by 
consultation with, and contributions of, communities, but not by involving them 
in the decision making process, or in control of resources. The second approach 
leads to ‘strong’ or ’empowering’ participation: a process with no quantitative 
outcome, but designed to increase control by marginal groups of both resources 
and the decisions made by more powerful actors.
The first approach assumes that it is possible to improve the quality of life 
of the poor without political conflict, and the second assumes that social 
£ transformation is a process whereby changes in political relationships will be 
the result of participation. However, Moser (1986:4) also states that ‘authentic 
participation can only occur when there is a redistribution of power’, and that 
this implies the existence of a third category of ‘strong’ or ‘red’ participation with 
structural change as its objective. Related to this approach is ‘spontaneous’ 
participation that leads to social movements that, in turn, challenge dominant 
power structures (Midgley, Hall et al. 1986) and organised socialist revolution.
In addition, there is the possibility that communities may become so 
marginalised that their autonomous actions do not constitute a political 
challenge to the government or ruling elites, and fall outside the remit of 
development agencies. This leads to a fourth category of participation where 
communities initiate action out of need, but without the design, mobilisation or 
animation of external agents. This has been called the ‘incremental mode’ 
(Midgely 1986), the ‘self reliance of the poor‘(Stiefel and Wolfe 1994), ‘authentic’ 
participation (Hall 1986:100), ‘self mobilisation’ (Estrella and Gaventa 1998) 
and ‘substitution’ of the community for a dysfunctional state (Sinha 2000).
The notion of ‘rethink’ (Oakley 1984) is another term used to denote the 
fourth category of participation. This notion was cultivated through a backlash 
to colonisation, industrialisation and resulting dependencies induced on 
developing nations. Emphasis is placed on an empowering process, which 
through organisation gives people the strength to create a space for themselves, 
and to build up material assets to support their own self reliant development (pp. 
7-10).
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Does decentralisation lead to empowerment and participation? Hurst (1985) 
argues that it does not. His position goes against the advocates for decentralised 
reform who claim that shifts of control away from the centre ‘must mean an 
increase in democratic participation, sounder decisions, and more commitment to 
implementation’ (p.79). Hurst’s reasoning suggests that the shift of power from 
one level of authority to another does not mean that the new body of authority 
will be ‘more representative’ of the community and ‘responsive’ than the previous 
body of control.
Notions of participation and community development often cloud the 
discourse on decentralisation. Contemporary development efforts are notorious 
for prescribing some form of participation or community support among their 
general objectives often characterising them as decentralising efforts. For 
instance, Malen (1990) has conceptualised school-based management as a 
‘formal alteration of governance structures, a form of decentralisation that 
identifies the individual school as the primary unit of improvement and relies on 
the redistribution of decision-making authority as the means through which 
improvements might be stimulated or sustained’ (Ibid: 1). The question remains, 
however, whether community mobilisation and local participation in 
development are prerequisites for decentralisation, outcomes or neither.
Decentralisation is a complex subject with many dimensions. As a 
variable factor in the design of governmental and administrative 
machinery, it needs to be measured. As such it should be treated 
as a matter of formal organisational relationships, separable from 
the concept of local or community autonomy (Smith 1979:222).
In terms of the ‘formal relationships’ alluded to in the above quote and the 
linkages between the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’, some field specialists would 
argue that participatory strategies designated by the State are not purely 
motivated whether included as a part of a decentralisation package or otherwise 
administered.
State-directed participation is a contradiction in terms. This is 
because the nature of popular involvement becomes so limited as to 
virtually defy use of the term ‘participation’. In effect the concept 
becomes purely instrumental, useful to government for making the 
pursuit of pre-established goals more efficient (Midgley 1986:99).
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In this respect, the possibility of access to local authorities through 
decentralisation means including local mobilisation of NGOs, parent groups, etc. 
would seem to be negligible. Access was a central theme for Schaffer who stated: 
'It is certainly the case that decentralisation seems inescapably to be required in 
some sense or other as a means to improving access' (Schaffer 1982:32). Specific 
organisational responses, according to Schaffer, must be made according to two 
key factors related to service provision.
1. eligibility to participate in schemes and services;
2. the services to be assigned to decentralised organisations (p.3)
These factors were suggested as necessary if decentralisation was to improve 
access and participation.
Eligibility
Radical theorists working on the topic of social transition such as Freire 
(1970) have dealt with power and individual rights to participation in 
‘transforming their own realities’. These theories, it is argued have merit but are 
not realisable unless theories or policies advocating macro-scale social 
transformations are developed which would facilitate ‘popular grassroots 
mobilisations’ (Rahman 1995:25). If decentralisation is required to stimulate 
social transformation on a macro-scale, it has a long way to go as a reform to 
achieve what has usually been considered a lofty purpose.
Schemes for decentralisation have tended to assume that the 
establishment of democratic process will automatically endow 
political power; and that this power will be utilized to redress 
inequality and injustices. In reality, the acquisition of power 
may have to precede establishment of political institutions if 
these are to serve the interests of the most in need (Smith 
1986:465).
One interesting conclusion drawn from the discussion of various initiatives 
promoting community empowerment and even eligibility is that they have 
contradictory results. The structural adjustment packages mandated by the 
World Bank and supported through other agencies have resulted largely in ‘non-
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participatory’ outcomes. As Rahman claims, they in fact have turned out to be 
‘poverty augmenting’ by nature. Additionally, he claims that small-scale 
participatory development efforts are generally observed to be providing a ‘safety 
net’ effect and ‘do not promise fundamental movement toward people’s liberation’ 
(Rahman 1995:32).
In terms of semantics, eligibility is sometimes confused with participation. 
For instance, it has been recommended that the authorities should not perceive 
people as a 'target group, membership of which is determined by institutional 
fiat’ (Smith 1986:463). Rather they should be considered as participants. 
Mistakenly considering people as target groups or beneficiaries ostensibly sets 
up power structures where eligibility to services is controlled. Rahman suggests 
a further danger to labelling. He questions community organisations and/or 
NGOs use of labels such as ‘the poor’ and ‘poverty’ cautioning that these 
classifications define service provision in terms of ‘meeting a social liability’ 
rather than ‘nourishing a social asset’. ‘It looks at people as objects of sympathy 
and invites some sacrifice from the rest of the society to mitigate their suffering 
rather than invoking the cooperation of that society towards releasing people’s 
creativity for development’ (Rahman 1995:30).
Assigning Services to Organisations
Formal manifestations of decentralised administration ideally would take 
the arrangement of offices and agencies whose output would include delivery of 
public goods and services to dependent client groups. In theory, these 
institutions are a part of the policy process that allocates scarce resources to 
those deemed to be in need. Generally, however, people who have a greater 
interest in centralisation than decentralisation staff these agencies. As Schaffer 
points out, 'It is an element of the paradox to expect decentralising reforms from 
the beneficiaries of present centralisations’ (Schaffer 1982b). Issues of central 
control, financial dependence and administrative weakness will continue to 
debilitate ‘schemes’ of administrative reform if not duly addressed in local 
organisations to which responsibilities and powers are to be decentralised 
(p.462). These and many other problems can be identified with service agents at 
the local level.
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However, structural features of administration for service delivery at the 
local level should not be considered in isolation of behavioural, attitudinal nor 
cultural factors. Rondinelli (1983) in a comparative study of decentralisation in 
Asia pointed out that these dynamics featured prominently in his assessment. 
He claimed that some of the most important factors ‘were the commitment of 
local officials to decentralizing development, the quality of local leadership, the 
attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional 
customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralized administrative 
arrangements’ (p.200).
Services to be assigned to decentralised organisations, then, would depend 
largely on the context of the country undergoing a management reform. 
Rondinelli (1990) describes what is called a ‘contingency approach’ to
administration in the context social sector reform—the education sector being 
emphasised. He describes this approach as a management strategy with ‘a 
particular pattern of management processes and organizational structures that 
enables an organization to accomplish specific tasks in a given environment' 
(p.33-35).
Below are four 'elements' that should be considered in defining a 
management strategy:
1. environment (least controlled)
2. tasks
3. management processes
4. organisational structures
The contingency approach to project design is comprised of four phases that 
include 1) Management Requirement Analysis; 2) Management Capacity 
Analysis; 3) Feasibility Analysis; and 4) Implementation Planning. Perhaps this 
contingency method or approach to design is one way that might enable a better 
analysis of service delivery at the local level which in turn could provide some 
better definitions for organisational decentralisation.
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In sum, the composite units of society represented in theory as ‘locals’, 
communities, beneficiaries etc. are often secondary factors in the 
decentralisation equation. Questions of access and exclusion complicate often 
oversimplified, idealistic notions of participatory and community development. 
Schaffer questions decentralisation and whether it assists or restricts access for 
the most vulnerable areas and people of underdeveloped societies. He further 
judges that ‘decentralisation in rural areas needs to be judged by the degree 
which works with people's own organisations and provides help to [those] who 
would otherwise have been excluded. In the end, that is the meaning and test for 
rural decentralisation’ (Smith 1986:463).
1.2 Decentralisation in the Education Sector
The scope of discussion regarding decentralisation thus far has been on 
public administration at a national level. Theorists are abundant in their policy 
analysis and prescription of fiscal, political, and administrative changes at a 
macro or State level. Rondinelli has been cited as a seminal author of 
decentralisation literature in regard to public administration and hierarchical 
relationships between national and local governments. He later turned to 
decentralisation in the education sector in 1990. Bray (1994) cautions that 
theory for public administration should not be automatically construed as 
education sector theory. Because of this tendency as he pointed out in his 
critique of Cummings and Riddell’s (1994) article on ‘Educational Research’, 
great care must be given not to confuse conditions of administrative change that 
may occur at different levels and to misrepresent theory regarding public 
administration as having general applicability in the education sector (Bray 
1994:819).
This study, however, has found some validity in the application of general 
public administration and organisational literature to the education sector as a 
resource for making some general observations about government policy and 
implementation. In their discussion of patterns of influence and control of 
education, Lauglo and McLean (1985) make general use of Weber’s classical 
concept of bureaucracy, as referenced above. They do this to make general 
characterisations to organisational theory in the education sector.
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The following section takes a sectoral approach to the topic of 
decentralisation. The education sector, about which this study has been framed 
and designed, has been the target of donor strategies and government policies 
that call for transfers of power and authorities for education administration to 
local levels. In yet another analysis of educational decentralisation literature 
composed by donors, it is claimed that 'while a tremendous body of literature 
has been written about decentralisation in general terms, very little has been 
written about decentralisation in education sector reform' (Jain 1995:5). This is 
an arguable claim, given the discussion by Lauglo and Martin (Lauglo and 
McLean 1985: 1985:12) who introduce carvers of ideology such as Pestalozzi, 
Froebel, Grundtvig, Henry Morris, Gandhi, Mao and Nyerere in terms of their 
general support of educational decentralisation. However if the characterisation 
of the paucity of literature is on substantive work on education sector reforms 
through donor driven development projects, his claim may be more accurate.
Decentralisation as an institutional reform mechanism in education is 
analysed in this section. International development agencies such as the World 
Bank have invested billions of dollars in education reform in developing 
countries ‘but the impacts of these investments are often undermined by 
developing countries’ weak capacity to manage and implement changes’ 
(Rondinelli, 1990:4). Interestingly, the World Bank, it is claimed, has no official 
position on decentralisation in education (Winkler 1989; Prud'homme 1994) 
only that it favours such a policy shift. In addition, its policies continue to stress 
or strongly recommend such reforms, with varying degrees of success. Whether 
decentralisation could or is expected to be the definitive reform model is not as 
pertinent to this discussion. Rather this section analyses to what extent 
decentralisation strategies have and can be rationalised as an integral part of 
policy decisions and thus, to what extent is it the best option in education 
administrative reform.
The States’ Role and Responsibility for Education
In the early 1980s a broad disillusionment with centrally planned 
economic systems and with the all-invasive administrative ‘State’ emerged and
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began to sweep the globe. Accompanying this was a widespread disappointment 
with overall progress of the education sector. While primary school enrolments 
in developing countries grew dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, issues of 
quality, equity, efficiency, participation, sustainability, and innovation fell by 
the wayside. As a result, many of the benefits that were typically associated 
with the investment in education failed to materialise in developing countries. 
Much of the blame for these failures has been attributed to the inefficient and 
bureaucratic nature, the lack of commitment, or the low institutional capacity of 
governments throughout developing countries. Consequently, throughout the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, efforts that have been undertaken in trying to 
reform the education sector have focused on addressing weaknesses in 
implementing organisations and institutions through mechanisms such as 
decentralisation (Jain 1995).
Advocates of decentralisation claim that central government officials 
around the world found that they could provide many types of services, including 
education, more efficiently, effectively and responsively by decentralising 
appropriate responsibilities to subordinate units of administration, local 
governments or non-governmental and private organisations. However, even 
when national governments were willing to decentralise, it is acknowledged that 
they retained an important function in providing the 'enabling conditions' that 
allowed local units of administration, school districts or the private sector to play 
a larger role in service provision (Rondinelli, 1995:1). It has been suggested that 
when national governments did encourage the decentralisation of education and 
other services, one of the strongest roles that they could perform over the long 
run was to strengthen the financial and administrative capacity of local 
administrative units, a goal that has not always easily been accomplished 
(Ibid: 2). For example, in terms of the provision of education, it is argued that 
there is no guarantee that local governments will be more ‘well-meaning’ than 
central governments. Burgess (1997) argues that unless there is a mechanism for 
local households to thwart politicians acting in their own interests such as local 
voting rights, decentralisation will not work.
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Local government is more sensitive to local needs , but it is the 
local needs as they are perceived by the political system, and in 
the absence of democratic institutions, these may be the needs 
of a powerful minority (Ibid:337).
Burgess further claims that the success of decentralisation depends on local 
reaction to the powerful minority through local organisation, but admits that 
this can occur if the local government is democratic.
At the same time, advocates of decentralisation also acknowledged that 
some types of services could only be provided effectively by the central 
government or by an agent of a central ministry at the provincial level. In some 
countries, educational and other services had to be provided by the central 
government by default. They were unprofitable for the private sector, or the 
private sector was not organised to provide them, or local governments did not 
have the required resources or management capacity (Rondinelli 1995:1).
Problems of Implementing Decentralised Education Reforms
The evidence that exists regarding decentralisation of education paints a 
bleak picture in terms of the state’s role and responsibility for this. Commonly 
used education indicators make this point loud and clear where the ‘Centre’ has 
played an influential role in education development. In developing countries, 
basic education services are often inefficiently managed by central governments 
and often, to the embarrassment of development donors and agencies, done so 
with external advice. For example, the average adult literacy rate in SAARC 
countries in 1970 was thirty two per cent increasing to only forty eight per cent 
for 1993. In comparison, the average for other developing countries increased 
from forty three per cent in 1970 to sixty nine per cent in 1993 (ul-Haq 1997:144).
After studying UN sponsored projects, Havelock and Huberman (1977) 
identified five problems with the implementation of education reforms in 
developing countries:
1. Problems in managing the innovation process
2. Problems arising from the personalities and behaviour of those involved in 
project implementation
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3. Inadequate resources and organisational capacities
4. Financial problems
5. Opposition from key groups in society to the proposed reforms.
(Havelock and Huber man 1977:11)
The problematic issues in implementation are classic in donor-supported 
work. As donors addressed development ‘panic’ in many sectors, they did so with 
a margin of error in reading and understanding the complicated nature of host 
countries. In his study of World Bank education projects, Rondinelli (1990) 
identified some of the causes of ineffective implementation that corroborates this 
notion.
❖ Complexity of reform proposals: Burgeoning demands of complex projects 
placed enormous ‘strains' on the management capacity of education 
institutions in developing countries'. Donors continued to develop 'more 
complex and more innovative education reform projects during the 1970s and 
1980s' (Rondinelli, 1990:11).
❖ Unpredictability of Education Reforms: One cannot assume that 
interventions tested in Western countries will have*fhe same effects in less 
developed countries, where environments are less certain and management 
capacity is weak (Fuller 1986:17). 'Findings from research on achievement 
and economic effects of school investments within industrial nations should 
not be generalised to developing countries, nor even applied to all historical 
periods within any country' (Rondinelli, 1990:12).
Additionally, in a review of seventeen education projects funded by the 
World Bank, it was found that a high degree of innovation and uncertainty in 
government education policies increased the complexity of projects and their 
management requirements. Projects in the 1970s and early 1980s prescribed by 
international organisations attempted to increase the number of teachers, 
improve their qualifications and skills, and raise their pay. They also sought to 
induce community groups to construct schools, and encouraging private sector 
participation in education. They tried to improve curricula, increase the 
effectiveness of teachers, upgrade instructional materials, and use mass media 
and distance learning (Rondinelli, et al. 1990:8).
In an effort to contextualise the decentralisation process in general, 
Rondinelli has identified four factors affecting the success or failure of 
decentralisation policies:
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❖ Central political leaders and bureaucracies commitment and support
❖ Behaviour, attitudes, and culture which are conducive to decentralisation
❖ Good and appropriate design and organisation of decentralisation programs
❖ Allocation of adequate finances, human and physical resources 
(Rondinelli, Nellis et al. 1984:46-7)
One of the greatest problems with education decentralisation occurs, however, in 
determining which level of government controls each component within the 
education rubric. The next section explores this dilemma.
Locus of Control
The discussion on centralisation-decentralisation in education commonly 
centres on the dichotomy between central governments represented in most 
countries by a Ministry of Education vis-a-vis the regional or provincial authority. 
Many scholars seem to focus on the implementation of decentralisation programs 
from this macro-vantage point. Less consideration is given to the dynamics 
between a provincial, central authority and the local authorities commonly 
termed as district, community or village level. The analysis, however, of where 
the fines of control fie for all of the components concerned with basic primary 
education services is one that must be carefully conducted. As was mentioned 
earlier, some literature emphasises the fact that decentralisation is not an 
either/or dynamic, but should be a mixed propagation whereby the centre is 
responsible for some aspects and local authorities are responsible for other 
aspects.
Winkler (1989) has developed an ‘eclectic model’ of decentralisation that 
draws a continuum from the centre (national level) to the periphery (provincial 
level) along public services included in the education sector. This model, which 
is called the ‘Centrafisation-Decentrafisation Typology for Public Education’ (See 
Box 1.1), begins to map the possibilities that could exist in terms of shared 
control in developing education systems from a macro standpoint. Despite the 
fact that this model depicts a macro dynamic, it is a useful tool of analysis with 
possible adaptation to more local levels of analysis. Essentially, the model 
provides a matrix of three strains or degrees of government control across six 
general categories of education functions (Winkler 1989:8-9).
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Box 1.1: Winkler’s Centralization-Decentralization Typology Matrix for Public Education
Public Education 
Service
Categories
School Organisation
Curriculum & 
Teaching Ivfethods
Examinations & 
Supervision
Teacher Recruitment 
& Compensation
Finance of Recurrent 
Expenditure
School Construction 
& finance
(continuum for locus of control)
Centralised Mixed Decentralised
W
W
wW
W
w
V
V
Source: Winkler 1989:8-9
Winkler has attempted to outline an optimal level of responsibilities for the 
Ministry of Education and the local government against each category of 
provision and finance. However, for this he is accused of attempting to prescribe 
a 'right answer' for what governments should be administering for education 
provision and finance (Jain 1995:9). Winkler demonstrates, however, that it is 
possible for countries to be classified under different categories of degrees of 
decentralisation. He cites Kenya and Indonesia as being examples of mixed 
situations where primary education was nationalised and the provision of 
secondary education was decentralised (Winkler 1989:5).
Other criticisms of the model have been made; for example, that the 
decentralisation process is in reality more fluid and less prescribed or discreet.
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Also, it is alleged that that a 'holistic' approach to the development of an 
education system is one that embodies a range of 'nuances specific to the 
education sector and for contextualizing educational decisions that are made 
within a broader political, economic, cultural, and historical climate' (Jain 
1995:5).
The most challenging criticism, however, was made by Bray (Bray 1996b) 
that no models for discerning the proper locus of control can be recommended. 
With universal applicability and even in specific places, demands are likely to 
change over time (p. 44). For this study, however, it is necessary to analyse the 
relationships between the local-level and the centre. This is important given the 
common practice of policies that are centrally planned with the expectation that 
they can be locally implemented. Winkler’s model serves as a tool for beginning 
to map such relationships.
Analysing Governance in Education
Another helpful tool for considering the validity of decentralisation in 
education administrative reform has been illustrated in James Williams’ (1993) 
article entitled 'Reform in Educational Decision-making.' It is thought provoking 
in terms of deciding whether decentralisation is an appropriate theoretical 
framework for such a reform. As illustrated in Figure 1.5, Williams has 
developed five areas through which to consider change through management 
reform. This model appears to be inclusive and challenges theorists who rigidly 
classify systems that are absent of practical application. Tailor-made policy 
prescriptions, for example, are recommended under his 'Beyond Formulas' idea. 
Here he compares educational governance to architectural design where certain 
laws do not have to be redefined but where context plays a more significant role.
Another significant notion that Williams raises is whether abstract 
theories and strategies can be applied to education. He argues that education 
systems are loosely structured and that change may be more difficult to bring 
about than for more easily managed organisations although he does not give any 
examples of 'easily managed organisations'. Williams asserts that it could be 
more useful to question the theoretical relevance of decentralisation to education
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Figure 1.5: Less and More Useful Ways of Viewing Governance in Education
LESS USEFUL MORE USEFUL
1 Beyond Either/Or
Either decentralisation or 
centralisation
Where is responsibility for a particular 
administrative function best located, to 
achieve particular objectives and given the 
goals, capacities and needs of a system at 
a particular time?
2 Beyond Formulas
One-best, context-free solutions; 
Nothing can be generalized
Principles; options; information about 
options
3 Beyond the Abstracted Technical
Removing issues of politics, 
organisation, implementation from 
technical analysis
Incorporating all insights; Explicit values; 
Establishing legitimate processes for 
considering the interests of all groups and 
for making contestable choices
4 Beyond the Purely Theoretical
(De)centrahsation works in theory, 
so it should work in practice; 
(De)centralisation works in other 
sectors, so it should work in 
education
Too little is known about education to 
assume that insights from theory and/or 
other sectors will apply to education; Look 
for actual effects
5 Beyond Good-Bad Government
'Bad' government (hierarchy, 
regulations, bureaucracy, 
centralisation); 'Good' government
Ways that the organisation of government 
structures relations among actors 
(isolating teachers, promoting 
bureaucratic rigidity); Ways organisations 
can be changed
Source: Williams 1993:5
than to accept the theories 'as is'. He says that not very much evidence is 
available 'about the extent to which theories developed in other sectors work in 
education’ (Williams 1993:7). The example he provides is one in which high- 
quality soft drinks of uniform characteristic are produced effectively by 
relatively free markets. He alleges that 'we do not really know how effectively 
and under what conditions markets might consistently produce education of 
high quality' (Ibid: 7).
He borrows from Hannaway's (1995) discussion on improvement of 
classroom instruction in the U.S. to support his hypothesis. According to 
Hannaway, the positive effects of decentralisation on classroom instruction may
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not be directly correlated to the efficiencies of the reform as is commonly 
assumed. In other words, she relates that in the U.S. school systems are highly 
autonomous with teachers working in separate classrooms, schools operating 
independently of school districts, and school districts functioning fairly 
independently of federal and state governments in terms of day-to-day 
instruction. This situation implies that quality instruction in the classroom, 
could be viewed as the result of more localised inputs rather than the 
decentralisation effort itself. So general decentralisation efforts, Williams points 
out, should be tested in the education sector but not assumed to have dramatic 
classroom effects (Hannaway 1995).
This argument is contrasted with decentralisation experiments elsewhere. 
Chubb and Moe (1992) relay the experience of Britain after the passing of the 
1988 Education Act. They argue that by being allowed the opportunity to ‘opt 
out’, schools were allowed to make their own decisions which have effected 
positive changes. The Act basically allowed schools to leave their Local 
Education Authorities (LEA) to be maintained through grants. It is claimed that 
autonomy to make local decisions was as important as assuming financial 
controls.
But money cannot be separated from autonomy. By giving the 
GM [grant maintained] schools their share of administrative 
expenses, the government empowers them to make their own 
decisions—autonomous decisions about a whole range of issues 
that were previously decided by the LEAs...Now, the GM 
schools decide how the money will be spent, while the rest of 
the schools have these decisions made for them by the LEAs.
It’s an autonomy issue (Ibid: 30)
Examples of local autonomy were introduced ranging from the ability to 
maintain school buildings to the purchasing of badly needed materials. So in 
Great Britian’s experience, according to this account, school effectiveness has 
been correlated to decentralisation.
An analysis of decentralisation and its effect at the ground level, as alluded 
to by the previous discussion, is another way of determining whether it is such a 
positive model for education development. Mai-Brith Schartau concludes in her 
study of local school management in Sweden and Britain that decentralised
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'school management' has not been working. She argues that head teachers have 
received so many new or extended tasks of an organisational, economic, and 
administrative nature that they are not able to fulfil pedagogical management 
in a desirable way (Schartau 1993:238). The framework for decentralisation in 
her study is reduced from the macro dichotomy between a national government 
and its state or provincial institutions to the micro level of authority that a 
school has. It is based on the belief that many important decisions must 
inevitably be made at the school level because she explains that it is at this level 
that professionals close to pupils can decide what to do and how to implement 
goals set at a higher level (p. 229).
This contrasts, in part, with what Glennerster, Hills and Travers (2000) 
have found. They indicate that early opposition to decentralisation in Britain 
has given way to increased support. They contend that no one wants to go back 
to the ‘old’ system of over-bureaucracy and centralised control. Their discussion, 
however, resonates with Schartau on one central point, i.e. it is at the school 
level that one must test for outcomes2.
Schartau further argues that at all levels, good management is an 
important tool to reach the goals of efficiency and productivity. She states that 
management is a vital function of the organisation and lists five variables for 
analysing it:
1. Task
2. Structure
3. Procedure
4. Personnel
5. Culture
Yet organisational obstacles continue to challenge strategies for local managers. 
This, she urges, is worth researching in terms of private sector approaches to 
solving school management problems (Schartau 1993:217;239).
2 See also Ball, Bowe and Gewirtz 1995 for a broader discussion of local educational 
markets.
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1.3 Conclusion
No one has demonstrated conclusively that decentralisation 
solves...problems...or that it is necessarily more cost-effective 
than centralization...Decentralisation is not a “quick-fix” for 
the management problems of developing countries. The factors 
that make it such an attractive policy are usually the same 
ones that make it difficult to implement (Rondinelli, Nellis et 
al. 1984:4).
Rondinelli's statement characterise the analyses that are made of 
countries experiencing administrative reform, namely the attempt by central 
governments to initiate policies of decentralisation. Central government's 
initiation of these policy shifts implies a top-down approach by which most 
countries are usually governed anyway. So what really has been accomplished 
when central governments assume an interest and role in phasing 
administrative functions away from the centre? It is interesting to note that 
Rondinelli's pointed remark above is a common concern for attributing tangible 
results and benefits of decentralisation to the local level. Does the 'record' of past 
attempts at decentralisation illustrate that the voice of the people has been 
heard and their needs addressed? This becomes a critical question for policy 
makers today.
According to Philip Mawhood, no deductive theory exists explaining the 
intricacies of political decentralisation. In other words, a cookbook with 
prescribed recipes for such administrative reform efforts does not exist 
(Mawhood 1993:9). He offers, however, the following question as a means for 
determining a framework for decentralisation: “What kinds of autonomy are 
necessary, and how is the boundary to be maintained?” This question imp he s 
that local institutions as well as central governing bodies are both necessary 
entities for determining the right mix of controls for developing and 
implementing administrative reform policy. At the same time, this question 
reinforces the fact that a prescription for appropriate decentralisation is absent.
Although Mawhood recognizes the ambiguity of the term decentralisation, 
he indicates that by observation of different country experiences, a “cluster of 
characteristics” can be identified. He further proposes that if one or more of the 
cluster of characteristics defining decentralisation are not identifiable in any
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given situation, then a serious argument could be raised as to whether the locus 
of control has shifted from a central authority to a local institution thus 
jeopardizing the assertion of a decentralisation effort. Below is a set of 
characteristics of decentralisation that have been identified through a review of 
policy developments intended to facilitate decentralisation. These characteristics 
are presented in the form of an incomplete decentralisation construct (see 
Figure 1.6).
______ Figure 1.6: Decentralisation Construct______________________________
1. True Decentralisation only occurs when local decision-making bodies have control over 
financial resources. (Midgley 1986:33) A local body has its own budget (Mawhood 
1983:9).
2. A decentralized local body should have a separate legal existence (Mawhood 1983:9).
3. A decentralized local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. 
This includes quantity o f finances handled. Number and qualifications o f the staff 
employed. Power to decide over expenditure. Power to vary revenues. Decisions over the 
staff-appointments, promotion, discipline (Mawhood 1983:9).
4. Decentralisation can be observed through the behavioural patterns o f participation, the 
means o f access for individuals to the bureaucracy (Mawhood 1983:xii).
5. Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on behavioural, attitudinal and cultural 
factors. Most important among these is commitment o f local officials to decentralizing 
development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes o f rural people toward 
government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were compatible 
with decentralized administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200).
6. Decentralisation is a result of the transfer of planning, decision-making or management 
functions from central government and its agencies to field organisations, subordinate 
units o f government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional 
development organisations, specialized functional authorities or non-government 
organisations (Rondinelli 1981).
The development of the Decentralisation Construct is only a small step at 
listing all the criteria that would be conducive to reform and representative of a 
fair sample of cases. All that can be relied upon is the careful, continued 
observation of the reform of systems and processes which decentralisation 
attempts in the developing world and careful application of the right mix of 
policies for testing on a small scale.
In short, there is a theoretical case for devolving budgetary and 
management decisions to levels that maximise knowledge about the local 
situation and give consumers leverage (Burgess 1997). Experience in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom suggests that local administrative capacity is 
good and that decentralisation has been successful (Glennerster, Hills et al.
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2000). However, in a society where local administrative capacity is weak and 
political processes challenge reform, the theory may have different outcomes.
Most important of all, the varying positions on the discourse suggest that 
judgements can be made about definitions of decentralisation by examining 
what is actually happening at the local level of the school. This is what this 
study sets out to do.
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Chapter 2
Research Approach, Methods and Context
It is not for me to remind you how that Government 
had kept Balochistan divided in several parts ye t 
bound together in shackles of backwardness.
Consequently, the people of the Province remained in 
a static position educationally, socially, economically 
and politically.
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah 
Founder of Pakistan 
Speech at Sibi, Balochistan 
14 February 1948
2.1 Aims of the Study
In order to analyse the constraints of decentralisation, we need to review 
the local context if we are to understand it. This is a highly localised study in a 
‘state’ environment with a centralist tradition and attempts to answer three 
basic questions:
1) How successful was the attempt to decentralise education administration 
in Balochistan?
2) What were the policy constraints?
3) What does this experience tell us about both the theory of 
decentralisation and its application to education in a developing country 
with a strong centralist tradition?
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Pakistan’s education administrative bureaucracy has a long tradition of 
centralisation. Throughout the last half-century, its leaders have embarked on 
building a nation where power and control are centralised. This has included the 
administration of education. Prior to Pakistan’s partition from India, colonial 
rule had ingrained a system of administration whereby central and higher 
authorities retained most of the power and where district and local authorities 
were posted as ‘agents of implementation of authority’. As Saqeb (1985) claims, 
‘there was no provision for any public interest groups to share in the functions of 
policy-making, policy adoption or policy articulation’ (p.37). It is further claimed 
that ‘this type of administration, as expected, made people rely for everything on 
the government and killed their sense of initiative and responsibility.’ Pakistan’s 
first and subsequent development plans articulate a continued central tendency. 
This statement implies that full social participation in Pakistan's public 
planning had not been realised but that it was considered to be desirable or at 
least important for future policy implementation. In fact, Pakistan went on to 
include as a prevailing objective in its Fourth Plan (1970) the strategy of 
encouraging 'the maximum decentralisation of responsibility and authority in 
all areas bearing upon plan implementation'. Yet recent attempts have been 
made to experiment with decentralised education administration prompted by 
international donors.
The aim of this study is to examine the decentralisation of primary education 
administration in Balochistan-particularly the institutions that manage public, 
primary education at the district level and to analyse the process of 
administration as well as the extent of devolved power or control. Balochistan is 
a highly centralised province administratively and this study analyses 
institutions at both the local and the central levels to understand how and why 
decentralisation policies in education are prescribed for this province. Local 
institutions in this context are the local district education offices3, local NGOs, 
and less formally structured institutions such as village education committees 
(VECs) and Parent/Teacher/School management committees (PTSMCs) given 
their current, albeit marginal, role in managing primary schools in the villages 
throughout rural Balochistan. A further aim of this study is to consider the
3 Twenty-six districts have been formally established in Balochistan for administering 
social services including education.
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relationship that these institutions have with the central governing body of 
primary education known as the Directorate for Primary Education (PED). The 
system, by which primary education administration occurs, hence, is analysed 
through case studies that feature two specific education districts.
There were several reasons for undertaking this study. Critics have 
suggested that not enough evidence exist to support decentralisation as the 
definitive model for implementing administrative reforms particularly in the 
social sectors and specifically in education management in developing countries. 
Yet major donors were funding development projects that, in fact, emphasised 
decentralisation. The intention of this study was to try to understand why 
decentralisation has been so difficult to achieve by examining the process of 
decentralisation and the difficulties of translating policy prescriptions into 
practice at each level. In other words, decentralisation should be analysed down 
through the layers of administration all the way to the bottom to be able to 
understand the nature of the reform.
The reason for undertaking this study in Balochistan was the unique 
opportunity of investigating education administration there. The primary 
education sector in that province has been under enormous pressure to 
decentralise its education system through the advent of five-year development 
plans, Social Action Programming and subsequent large development loans 
provided by outside donors. In Balochistan, there existed the promulgation of a 
formal devolution plan through Primary Education Directorate annual 
workplans that drove the day-to-day operations of administration. Historically, 
this plan had been approved in joint meetings of Senior Provincial Government 
Officials and officials from the World Bank. On the other hand, there was an 
existing highly centralised system that was structurally less defined. This study 
hopes to identify points of departure between decentralisation prescriptions 
defined primarily by the World Bank and the day-to-day operations as seen 
against the backdrop of the cultural ethos of the province.
Finally, several management-consulting interventions in primary education 
administration have attempted to address organisational issues mostly related 
to district education officers and their staff through training. However, little
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original research has been engaged to analyse the system holistically nor to 
determine whether the potential or capability of the province exists for altering 
or devolving the system of education administration in a functional way--the 
capacity in favour of decentralisation has just always been assumed.
2.2 Structure and Scope
Four major parts are incorporated in this study. The theoretical survey, first 
grounds the study in literature on administrative decentralisation but then 
focuses on the particular aspect of administrative decentralisation within the 
primary education sector. The concept of social participation is discussed and 
how, if at all, this notion overlaps with the dynamic of decentralisation given 
that community participation comprises a significant portion of the community 
schooling process in Balochistan. Secondly, building on this corpus of theory, the 
process of education administration in Balochistan is presented according to 
empirical evidence found in documents, interviews and observations. The policy 
process is described and variables for analysing education administration are 
presented and defined. Third, case studies are constructed around two education 
districts. Education administration in these districts is described and analysed 
according to the variables. Evidence collected through interviews and other 
methods are introduced which help to illustrate the case study and whether and 
to what extent decentralisation has occurred locally. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn through a theoretical matrix where data presented earlier are connected 
to theoretical interrogatories that stem from the primary research question.
The remainder of this first chapter explains the research methods employed 
in this study. Research instruments are described, as are the conditions under 
which this study was conducted. Also discussed are the characteristics of 
Balochistan that rationalise its use as the over-arching case for analysis. 
Geographical, social, historical, political, and economic data are brought together 
to lay the backdrop for the study.
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2.3 Research Methods
The central research aims in this study relate to the process of primary 
education administration—not education outcomes. The sole use of statistical 
data would not be appropriate in the localised context of this research given that 
they would not be able to throw light on the nature of administration at the 
various levels. Hence, this thesis could possibly be the first stage of a larger 
study in which statistical data are collected and analysed to determine the 
effects as opposed to the process of decentralisation.
Qualitative research aims to provide a deeper understanding of the values, 
attitudes, motivations, and behaviours of target groups on their own turf. 
Moreover, qualitative research has been described as a “four-phase affair” 
consisting of invention, discovery, interpretation and explanation (Kirk and 
Miller, 1986: 60). These characteristics appear to be consistent with Hall and 
Midgeley's (1988) protocol for illuminating the study of development. They argue 
that a sociological and qualitative approach to inquiry is 'sensitive to those 
intangible social realities which defy quantification and objectification' (p.4).
The empirical methods used to achieve the research goals in this study 
were contemplated within the strategy of the case study design framework. Yin 
(1994) describes this approach as one that 'comprises an all-encompassing 
method—with logic of design incorporating specific approaches to data collection 
and to data analysis' (p. 13). These methods include collection and analyses of 
documentary evidence, to gain an understanding of formal administrative 
policies, linkages and controls that exist between central administrative bodies 
and local institutions; field observations to learn first-hand how primary 
education administration is being administered; and semi-structured interviews 
which illuminate the process of decentralisation through first-hand accounts of 
administration.
The case study method...usually involves the in-depth study of 
a particular milieu (village, association, organisation, and 
institution) rather than of a random sample of individuals 
drawn more widely. The researcher, rather than briefly 
interviewing a large number of respondents using a
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standardised instrument, relies on a repertoire of methods to 
gather data including informal interviewing, the use of 
knowledgeable informants in the locale being studied (to 
interpret that locale to the social investigator) and 
participation in and observation of events in the setting as and 
when they occur....they gain in greater richness of data and 
penetration of analysis (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993:9).
Finally, Hamel and Dufour's (1993) assertion that the case study design 
can add to theory construction and policy analysis is also a primary argument 
for its application here. Though the results of such a small study can neither be 
generalised to other parts of Pakistan nor greater South Asia, there are lessons 
to be learned about administration processes from this analysis that might help 
policymakers in their evaluation of different strategies to pursue in improving 
education administration in similar settings. Detailed information concerning 
reflections on methods, site selection, the challenges faced in the field, issues of 
reliability and validity, and observations on available data are presented below.
Reflections on Methods
My four-year association (1992-1996) with education development of the 
Province of Balochistan, Pakistan provided the motivation behind this thesis. 
During this time, I was employed as project co-ordinator for two comprehensive 
development projects that addressed primary education administration within 
Balochistan:
♦> the Primary Education Development Project (PED) sponsored by United 
States Agency for International Development;
❖ and a follow-on reform project known as the Balochistan Primary 
Education Development Programme (BPEP) sponsored by the 
International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank.
Significant education decentralisation efforts have been attempted in 
Balochistan since 1992. Hence the study covers a period beginning with 
administrative reform initiative that took place in 1992 and covers a five-year 
period in which donor funding and programme activity reached an elevated 
plateau. The issues raised in this thesis are primarily the products of both 
observation and involvement with management reform strategies applied to this 
end in the province.
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The relationships established with government officials in Balochistan; the 
insights gained through working intimately with technical advisors and locals; 
and the knowledge and access of reports, files and other relevant documents 
archiving the evolution of the reforms together underlie a solid foundation for 
the qualitative methodological approach that was chosen at the outset of the 
study. Research methods are described in greater detail below.
Research Process
Figure 2.1 below is a diagram that depicts the process that this study has 
followed. It began with the selection of three methods for data collection. These 
techniques included document review, semi-structured interviews and informal 
observations of site visits and interactions with respondents. The evidence 
collected through these three methods was combined through a further 
technique commonly referred to as triangulation. This technique is known for 
adding to the robustness of case studies. In the analysis stage of the research, 
the case studies were scrutinised according to five organisational variables. The 
analysis led to the final stage of the research or the conclusion that has provided 
further insights into the theory of decentralisation policy and practice.
Prior to the case site visits, case study protocols were developed (see 
Appendix I). Their development and use are an important aspect of this 
research. The case study protocols contain both the instrument and provide the 
instructions and guidelines for carrying out this strategy of research. Yin claims 
that protocols are 'essential' if using a multiple-case strategy and that 'the 
protocol is a major tactic in increasing the reliability of case study research' (Yin, 
1994:63).
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Figure 2.1- Research Methods Diagram for Balochistan Study
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Observations on Decentralisation 
In Balochistan
Interviews
The technique of interviewing aims to cover the range of views and 
experiences of the target groups and in this manner is sometimes called
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‘purposive sampling’ (Yin 1994). Approximately thirty semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with a range of individuals and groups who were 
engaged in primary education administration in Balochistan (see Appendix II). 
Two thirds of the respondents agreed to be recorded and in some cases, multiple 
respondents were interviewed together. The reassurance was given that 
especially the taped interviews would not be disseminated to PED.
The respondents at the central level included senior government and World 
Bank officials, expatriate technical advisors, and Primary Education Directorate 
staff. At the district level, district education officers and their subordinate staff, 
learning coordinators and teachers, local NGO fieldworkers, and local education 
management committees were interviewed. Although the respondents were not 
chosen randomly, some were chosen on a ‘rolling’ basis. They were referred to 
me by respondents who had been originally selected and through word-of-mouth 
on the basis that they might be able to offer meaningful information to my 
research. The majority of respondents, however, were specifically chosen at the 
outset of the study. They had been earlier identified as the key players to central 
and district primary education management. Once in the field, initial contact 
with these chosen individuals further guided the selection process both as their 
availability and their interest were confirmed.
A majority of the interviews were recorded with the permission of the 
respondents. However, the fact that I had met and worked with some of the 
respondents both challenged and aided my data collection. For those I had 
already met, I had to reintroduce myself as an independent researcher not 
attached to the government. My previous relationship with the programme, 
however, did open access for many of the interviews.
Document Review
In Balochistan, a large amount of documentation has occurred on 
development aspects of education. These data have accumulated throughout the 
1980s and 1990s given the marked donor activity that was concentrated on 
primary education. Documents ranging in content from donor memoirs and
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correspondence, technical consultant activities, project workplans and other 
government reports were all useful primary and secondary sources for this study.
As one World Bank official confessed, their investments in Balochistan in 
terms of development projects had not been blindly based. ‘The Balochistan 
Programme was based on more knowledge than typical. The Harvard 
BRIDGES4 studies provided the foundation including the 500-school study and 
the Household surveys’ (Interview with World Bank Task Manger, October 7, 
1998; Washington, D.C.).
Peter Abell and Nigel Gilbert (1983) have written about contrasting ‘actions’ 
with ‘accounts of actions’ in their discussions about research methodologies. 
Textual analyses were conducted on primary education workplans and national 
education policy documents among other documents. These data analyses added 
to the overall strength of the research by providing comparisons of documented 
data with accounts of actions that were rendered in the interviews. Most of the 
documents reviewed were accessed at the Directorate for Primary Education 
Office in Quetta and in Washington, D.C. at the Academy for Educational 
Development.
Observations
Informal observations can be made throughout a field study ‘including 
those occasions during which other evidence is being collected’ (Yin 1994:87). 
Observations in this study were not the classical or formal methods that are 
generally attributed to direct observations. Rather the observations were more 
informal and were documented in a written journal. Both my research assistant 
and I conducted observations at the same time that we conducted interviews 
and visited various offices. Yin contends that having more than one observer 
adds reliability to the observational evidence.
4 The Basic Research and Implementation in DevelopinG Education Systems (BRIDGES) 
Project was directed by Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) and funded by 
USAID Contract #DPE-5824-A-5076. The goal of the BRIDGES initiative was to identify policy 
options that would increase children’s access to schooling, to reduce the frequency of early school 
leaving and repetition, improve the amount and quality of what was learned, and optimise the use of 
fiscal and education resources.
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Additionally, observations can be recorded in other ways. Dabbs (1982) 
suggests that photographs would help to portray important case characteristics 
to outside observers. In this study, photos were taken at the two case sites and 
references to the photos were entered in the observation journals. Observations 
are not only centred on research objectives. The researcher was alerted not to 
discount any cultural experiences that might be encountered while conducting 
the research. While living in Balochistan during my data collection, I 
experienced first-hand the context of local administration through daily 
interactions in contexts outside of my research, e.g., my registration with the 
local police, application for a visa extension, retaining a police security guard for 
my field visits and through networks I had established locally.
Reliability and Validity
The notion that triangulation increases validity was held by Denzin (1978) 
but has since been challenged. Fielding and Fielding (1986) postulate a different 
outcome of triangulation.
Theoretical triangulation does not necessarily reduce bias, nor does 
methodological triangulation necessarily increase validity. Theories 
are generally the product of quite different traditions so when they 
are combined, one might get a fuller picture, but not a more 
‘objective’ one. Similarly different methods have emerged as a 
product of different theoretical traditions, and therefore combining 
them can add range and depth, but not accuracy, (p.33)
Uwe Flick (1992) suggests that triangulation could be used as an alternative to 
validation (p. 179). In his studies, he triangulates different sorts of data (theories, 
interactions, and current official and historical data), different methods 
(interviews, conversation analysis, interpretation of documents and records), 
and theoretical backgrounds of these methods. He further notes that 
triangulation ‘gives access to different versions of the phenomenon that is 
studied...’(p. 194). Also, he summarises that ‘there is no longer one reality 
against which results can be verified or falsified, but that research is dealing 
with different versions of the world.’ Denzin (1989) later amended his ideas 
concerning the validity of triangulation. ‘In-depth understanding, not validity, 
is sought in any interpretative study’ (p.246).
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The three techniques or methods used in this study were relied upon to help 
provide an in-depth understanding of the primary education administration 
process in Balochistan. Although consideration has been given to accuracy and 
objectivity through triangulation of data, fuller attention has been given to 
broadening the range of the story that these methods explored.
Site Selection
Eileen Kane (1995) advocates using more than one case particularly if it is 
used as the primary method of the research. She also suggests identifying cases 
that provide a clear contrast to the situation being studied (p. 176). Two 
education districts in Balochistan were chosen for case study development 
specifically on the basis of contrast. Jaffarabad was a relatively economically 
advantaged and densely populated district whereas Barkhan was economically 
disadvantaged and more sparsely populated. In addition, in terms of social 
structure, Barkhan was considered to be predominantly tribal whereas 
Jaffarabad was more representative of a feudal system. Another contrast 
between the two districts is that Jaffarabad was a Summer Zone District with 
the school period lasting from approximately 1st January to 22nd December. 
Barkhan was a Winter Zone District with the school period lasting from 29th 
February to 16th December to accommodate extreme climates of these areas.
According to the April 1997 School Census, Jaffarabad had 693 government 
primary schools enrolling a total of 33,515 boys and girls. Barkhan had 335 
government primary schools with an enrolment of 10,838 students5. Jaffarabad’s 
number of primary government schools was the highest of all twenty-six, 
education districts and Barkhan’s was the lowest.
Upon consultation with technical consultants who were working in 
Balochistan at the time of the field study, Jaffarabad District was one that had 
shown promising signs of effective collaboration with NGO and other community 
partners in management of their schools. Barkhan, however, was among the 
bottom three rated as least effective administratively.
5 BEMIS Data are inconsistent as to the precise enrolment figures for this time. Varying 
BEMIS documents indicate conflicting figures.
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Jaffarabad also stands apart from Barkhan in its preliminary success at 
administering a teacher-training program and the collaboration between the 
district education office and a local NGO working in the district to promote girl’s 
education. These two activities speak directly to the issue of decentralisation 
and provide insight into what types of organisational processes might contribute 
(or hinder) the efficient management of primary education. The research 
explores the application of decentralisation policies to primary education within 
a highly centralised administrative environment. Careful attention will be 
placed on the comparison of the alleged successes and failures with the reality of 
management, accounts of which are extracted from each of these districts.
Methodological Considerations
Field research was undertaken in Balochistan from October 1997 to March 
1998. The following issues are presented in consideration of the methods applied 
during this time.
Entry
My prior association with the Directorate of Primary Education proved to be 
a key element in accessing information and resources in Balochistan. The pre- 
established relationships with primary education officials in Quetta provided 
immediate access to interviews and other important data. Other factors, 
however, proved to be a challenge in the collection of data. Investigative site 
trips had been planned in the initial stages of the fieldwork. These were planned 
early on to synchronise with staff and school schedules. Access to the interior 
was prohibited to foreigners, particularly Americans, for a brief period of time 
because of security threats. Travel to the case sites became possible only at the 
end of the six-month research period but limited my access to schools that were 
not open and staff who were on vacation.
Language and translation
A research assistant was identified to assist me who was conversant in 
Pashtu, Punjabi, and Urdu and was also knowledgeable in other local languages
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as well. Although I have studied Urdu, Pakistan’s national language, I relied 
heavily on the assistant especially in far-flung areas where English was less 
frequently used and where other local languages were spoken. The respondents 
were given a choice of speaking in their language or English. Half felt more 
comfortable responding in Urdu and the other half responded in English. My 
assistant was also helpful in identifying and interpreting cultural situations 
that we encountered in our site visits.
Interview responses that were given in Urdu and recorded on tape were 
later translated into English by native Urdu speakers. These translators were 
not affiliated with Balochistan or the education system in Pakistan and 
therefore were considered neutral to the content of the data with which they 
were working. This would help to avoid any bias that might have been 
consciously or subconsciously inflicted in the translations.
Presence as an outsider
Social researchers face many challenges. They are sometimes viewed with 
suspicion and distrust. Also expectations of respondents must be diffused, e.g. 
outsiders are often perceived to be associated with donor or government 
authorities. In some studies, villagers perceived that researchers were sent to 
listen to their problems. ‘They thought that the interviewers were there to 
record grievances for the government’ (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993:209). During 
the course of contacts, interviews, and encounters with respondents and 
informants, reassurances were given that taped interviews, notes and other data 
collected would not be given to the government and that I was not associated 
with the government. In some cases, I had to dispel the false assumption made 
that I had control of resources that could be availed to the 
informants/respondents.
Given that my research involved travel to the interior, I was required as an 
outsider to hire a security guard to travel with me. In some cases, it became 
necessary to restrict the presence of the guard at my interviews in order to 
neutralise any negative perceptions about my status. Sometimes the presence of
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armed guards or ‘levies’ as they are called in Pakistan can be mistakenly viewed 
as a status symbol reserved for notables or tribal leaders.
Gender
Although the cultural practice of purdah for women sometimes hmits the 
access of male interviewers to females in Balochistan, it was not found to be a 
constraint. All the female respondents contacted for this research readily 
participated in the interviews conducted by myself and my research assistant, 
both males. This may be partially attributed to the cultural norms of the 
particular districts where these interviews were conducted. For example, in the 
village of Abdul Latif Umrani in Jaffarabad, mothers of the women’s village 
education committee voluntarily joined the men including myself and my 
assistant in the interview.
Analysis
Atlas/ti is a software package used for qualitative data analysis. It handles 
more than just text analysis. It establishes a data corpus enabling the researcher 
to concentrate many documents around particular themes. Initially, textual data 
from interviews and observations were analysed using this software package. 
This practice was particularly helpful in organising the data. After a basic 
familiarity with the data had been established and given its relatively small size, 
manual methods of textual analysis were employed.
Observations on a Data Source
During my field trip to Balochistan, the Planning and Development 
Department of the Government of Balochistan completed the task of preparing 
district profiles for all twenty-six districts. These profiles proved to be a valuable 
source of information for the cases that I researched and developed. The profiles 
were a secondary source and the statistical data specific to each district was 
characterised as ‘inadequate’. Despite cautions concerning the reliability of the 
data, however, it was a significant accomplishment that data had been collected 
and assimilated. Prior to the time of printing of the profiles, data had not been
61
co-ordinated and/or analysed in such a way at the district level. This exercise 
has been a first comprehensive trial to bring district-based data together for 
analysis. A CD-Rom database that encompasses all the data collected from the 
twenty-six districts accompanied the profiles and was consulted for this thesis.
2.4 Building the Context: Balochistan
The demise of development in Pakistan in modern terms is largely due to 
low human development and social sector investments (Noman 1997). The 
country’s poor social indicators have continued to overshadow economic growth 
over the last fifty years since partition. Eight development plans later and 
millions of rupees channelled through foreign aid have leveraged very little 
success in their redress. Corruption, politics and inefficiencies are among the 
causes that inhibit the Government of Pakistan and other agencies from 
implementing change policies. The late Pakistani economist, Mahbub ul-Haq 
laconically summarises the economic condition of the country as a ‘dilemma’.
The current dilemma of Pakistan is fairly basic: its previous 
pace of economic growth cannot be sustained without 
substantial investments in human development. But its ruling 
elite, divorced from the aspirations of the masses, is supremely 
indifferent to the provision of basic social services to the people.
Without basic reforms in Pakistan’s political and economic 
system, its prospects for economic or social progress appear 
somewhat clouded. Yet the question persists as to how and 
when such fundamental reforms will be engineered and who 
will engineer them (ul-Haq 1997:42).
Balochistan, the largest province in Pakistan geographically, is its least 
developed province. Its population of six and a half million is scattered 
throughout much of the arid and barren terrain. According to an Economist 
(May 22, 1999) survey, the average monthly household income in Balochistan 
was one hundred and nine U.S. dollars, the lowest of Pakistan’s four provinces. 
(Respondents in this study, however, gave a much lower figure of approximately 
forty U.S dollars per month earnings in rural areas.) Despite its huge potential 
in terms of natural resources of gas, minerals, and coastal land, its people
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remain disadvantaged both economically and socially. Much literature 
characterises its people and resource potential as being, in fact, marginalised 
(Titus 1996; Siddiqi 1991; Ahmed 1990).
Box 2.1: Snapshot of Balochistan’s Development_____________________
Pakistani development planner Sultan Ah Barq of Islamabad wrote his 
characterisation of Balochistan’s development problem:
I have never observed any parallel history of injustice and indifference towards a 
people and their resource system as the one in Balochistan. A snapshot of today 
shows that there are gross differences in the status of development and quality of 
life between the people of Balochistan and other provinces. Moreover, there are 
misplaced apprehensions and a feeling of distrust about the capacity of the 
leadership, bureaucracy and tribes to manage simple things and execute 
development projects. I believe that the Federal ministries and their few dozen 
institutions have never considered the province as anything more than a ‘laboratory 
desk’ and have got into a habit of running ‘Pilot Projects.’ The world has gone far 
beyond giving small doses of development.__________________________________
Source: (Barq, 1997:4)
Complex problems underlie the difficulty that both Governments of 
Pakistan and Balochistan have experienced in improving social conditions in the 
region. These issues include declining quality, dire poverty, and conflicts 
between the central government and the provincial power structure. Box 2.1 
further articulates Balochistan’s development problems.
The following sections provide further background information on 
Balochistan’s spatial attributes, social dimensions, politics and economic 
performance that all have relevance or wield influence on the provision of public 
services such as primary education in that province. Additional localised 
background data are presented in chapters five and six in correspondence with 
the administrative districts being analysed there.
Territory
Balochistan carries various stigmata in terms of the territory its borders 
encompass. It has been characterised as the ‘apex of the arc of geopolitical crisis’. 
The arc is a space that stems from the Eastern coast of India and the Western
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coast of Africa all the way through the Arabian Sea to the conjoining of Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and Iran. This arc figuratively represents the string of countries 
throughout the late 1970’s that were embroiled in one insurrection after 
another.6 Balochistan has also been characterised as being the ‘crossroads’ 
amidst the Indian sub-continent, central Asia, the Iranian plateau and the vital 
waterway leading to the Persian Gulf suffering it to be ‘used’ but never settled 
or developed over past centuries.7 Balochistan’s early history is really a legacy 
of movement and migration. Many conquerors of India travelled through the 
area without leaving behind much of a trail.
One of the most striking features in the history of Balochistan 
is that, while many of the conquerors of India passed across the 
area, they have left few permanent marks of their presence. 
Macedonian, Arab, Ghaznawids, Mongol, Moghul, Durrani—all 
traversed the country and occupied it to guard their lines of 
communication, but they left neither buildings nor other 
monuments of their presence (Siddiqi 1991:19).
One explanation for the absence of permanent settlements in earlier times 
is the stark nature of the terrain. The province lies outside the monsoon system 
on which agriculture elsewhere in Pakistan relies. Therefore, with the exception 
of its northeastern districts, it has an exceptionally dry and arid climate with 
annual rainfall generally not exceeding fifteen centimetres. Rainfall is scarce 
and unpredictable. The temperature fluctuates from four degrees Celsius and 
below in the winter to fifty-four degrees Celsius in the summer.8
Overall, its rugged and desolate mountain ranges, deserts and extreme 
climate preclude the practice of agriculture on any great scale and only small 
settlements or communities have evolved.
6 Discussed in greater detail by Professor Robert G. Wirsing in The Baluchis and the Pathans, The 
Minority Rights Group Report No. 48. July 1987, p.3.
7 See Carroll McClewin’s introduction in Paul Titus, edited Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity 
and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. xv.
8 Nina Swidler in Marginality and Modernity, p. 171 and Ahmed, 1986, p. 187.
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Figure 2.2: Map of Pakistan
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Geographically, Balochistan encompasses approximately 347,193 square 
kilometres that accounts for approximately forty-three per cent of the total area 
of Pakistan.9 It is the largest of the four Pakistani provinces in landmass but 
accounts for as little as five per cent of the country's total population (see Figure 
2.2). According to preliminary results of Pakistan’s fifth population census 
conducted in 1998, Balochistan had a population of six and one half million with
9 Siddiqi, 1991, p.l; see also Genkovski in Ahmed, 1990, p. 260.
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a population density of approximately eighteen people per square kilometre.10 
By World Bank estimates, the majority of the population in Balochistan resides 
in rural areas. A settlement of five thousand or more people has been defined as 
an urban area. A semi-urban area is defined as a settlement within an hour’s 
motor drive of an urban area. A rural area is defined as a settlement more than 
an hour’s drive away from an urban area and difficult to access by road (World 
Bank 1993:1). A widely scattered population and the existence of unpaved roads, 
limited public-transport, and poor communication systems in many areas deter 
the provision of basic services.
Since 1970, Balochistan’s provincial status has given borders to a major part 
of the ethnic territory inhabited by the Balochi people (Ahmed 1990:260). 
Anthropologist Paul Titus has suggested that it is ironic that given the vast 
ethno-territory in which the Balochi dwell (one of the largest in South Asia) and 
given that it has been and continues to be strategically positioned, its 
inhabitants ‘are one of the regions least studied ethnic groups’.11
In terms of civil administration, Balochistan is spatially divided into nine 
administrative divisions and twenty-six districts. The administration of 
education is coterminous with these administrative units (Malik 1992:40). 
District education offices are located in each district with the Directorate of 
Primary Education located in the provincial capital of Quetta located in Quetta 
District. Figure 2.3 illustrates the district borders within Balochistan. Case 
studies chosen for this research were Jaffarabad and Barkhan Districts. More 
details about these areas are discussed in chapters five and six respectively.
10 Ihtasham ul Haque, “Provincial figures of census released: Population swells to 130.58m,” Dawn 
Internet Series, 9 July 1998.
11 See Preface written by Paul Titus in Marginality and Modernity, p. ix.
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Figure 2.3 Balochistan- Provincial Map
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Society
According to the literature on sociology of Pakistan, its people have been 
misrepresented as being part of a largely uniform social structure with ‘common 
values and norms” (Ahmed 1990:viii). Akbar argues that evidence exists to 
counter this notion, as does Mahbub ul Haq who argues that Pakistan possesses 
a ‘fascinating combination of many contradictions’. He explains that widespread 
regional disparities, in fact, augment the condition of human development from 
poor to worse (ul-Haq 1997:37-38). Balochistan poses an example of the 
dissimilarity of social structure in Pakistan. It is a region that although is 
sparsely populated, comprised in and of itself of unique tribal and feudal 
structures that are accented with linguistic and organisational differences. This 
section highlights aspects of the major ethnic groups within the province.
Three principal ethnic groups are found in Balochistan: the Baloch, the 
Pathan, and the Brahui. These major ethnic groups are organised into tribes, 
with their ethnic and tribal identities playing a far more important role in their 
lives than either religious or national affiliations. Although there exists 
differences in the ways power and leadership issues are addressed among 
different groups, they subscribe to a more or less common tribal code of ethics.
The first of these ethnic groups is called the ‘Baloch’12 which literally means 
‘nomads or ‘wanderers’ (Superintendent of Government Printing 1991:29). 
Because the Baloch were historically a society of nomads, no cities or permanent 
institutions were established solely by them. The tribe of the Baloch is self- 
contained according to Ahmed. He indicates that the sardar is positioned at the 
centre as the chief of the tribe (Ahmed 1986:188). In addition, tribes are known 
for their self-application of the jirga (assembly) system whereby justice is 
carried out. This system is performed outside the state civil law system.
Approximately nine principles have been outlined as Baloch ‘code of honour’ 
referred to as Baluchmayar. These include:
12 Paul Titus discusses the spelling of ‘Baloch.’ He indicates in his Preface to Marginality and 
Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan “prior to 1990, the term was spelled a 
myriad of ways—‘Baluch,’ ‘Baloch’, ‘Belooch,’ ‘Biloch’—the most common being ‘Baluch.’ In 
1990, the Provincial government of Pakistan Balochistan agreed that the official English spelling was 
to be ‘Baloch’ and this has become accepted standard in Pakistan.” (page xi)
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❖ Revenge;
❖ Refuge;
❖ Hospitality;
❖ Pardoning of an offence at the intercession of a woman;
❖ Penalty of death for adultery;
❖ Respect for weak and helpless persons;
❖ Trust;
❖ Promise; and
❖ Reminder of obligation to keep Baluchmayar
The first of these principles characterises the basic protection to the code of 
honour. Revenge, in response to any wrong committed against a tribal member, 
is a way of life. The basis of most intertribal feuds is zar, zan, or zameen (money, 
woman, or land). The association of tribal honour with the purity of women 
reduces them to objects of ownership, which have to be carefully guarded and 
hidden from public. The practice of revenge is still prevalent in modern 
Balochistan in spite of calls from educated Balochi to discourage inter-tribal 
feuds (Baloch 1987:80-88).
In a more positive vein, attributes of ‘hospitality’ are recognisable in Balochi 
culture. In fact, it has been noted as extending beyond tribal kin to strangers. 
One Pakistani not of Balochi ethnicity, characterised hospitality that if a 
stranger were to travel to rural Balochistan, he would be treated by the Baloch 
as a brother and even offered a meal (Baloch 1987; Barq 1997). Gender plays an 
important distinction in hospitality extended. Given that in Balochi and other 
regional ethnic societies in the area are male dominated, men would most likely 
be travelling as opposed to women.
According to interviews, secondary data, and observations, Balochi tribes 
largely dominate the two case districts included in this study. It is interesting to 
note, however, that while Baloch ethnicity is shared among the people of these 
two districts, differences in the social structure are noted. One major difference 
is that the feudal system of powerful landowners in Jaffarabad overshadows the 
sardari system that prevails in Barkhan. The economy in Barkhan is more 
depressed given lower agricultural production, thus sardari leadership and 
tribal influence are stronger. Hence economic factors can and have influenced 
social organisation. Language was another variable contributing to differences 
among Balochi people in both districts. In Barkhan, Khetrani and Balochi are
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predominately spoken but in Jaffarabad-Sindhi, Balochi, Saraiki, and Brauhi 
are spoken.
In terms of development, Balochistan’s social demography has been 
described as its most formidable threat. Thousands of refugees from 
Afghanistan, the majority of which are Pathans, have migrated over the past 
years to Balochistan. This has upset the balance of the scale between the prior 
predominate Balochi tribal and the Pathan. If Pathans outnumber Baloch, then 
political clashes could result. Even the name of the province, Balochistan, could 
be contested (Ahmed 1986:189). In terms of livelihood, the Baloch are primarily 
dependent on agriculture. By contrast, the Pathans are more involved in 
commerce. Because of limited arable farmland, however, areas such as Barkhan 
are limited in terms of profitability while Pathan traders and those involved in 
the informal sector are more economically advantaged (Titus 1996).
Given that both the Pathan and Balochi ethnic groups are generally 
recognised as subscribing to tribal societal structures, does not necessarily mean 
that Balochistan is entirely organised socially through tribal organisation. As 
Nek Buzdar (1991) underlined in his research, the Makran division of 
Balochistan ‘is the only division in Balochistan that presents a social 
organisation radically different from the rest of the province. Although people 
speak Balochi language and members of all-important Baloch tribes are found 
throughout the Division, Baloch tribal social organisation is completely absent. 
There are no tribal territories and there is no tribal hierarchical leadership 
patterns as is found elsewhere in Pakistan’ (Buzdar 1991:10). This finding is 
illustrative of the characterisation made above that the social structure of 
Balochistan is not uniform throughout the Province. A consideration of these 
differences is important in the formulation and implementation of policies for 
public services.
With the social and spatial background of Balochistan and Pakistan 
surveyed thus far, political cleavages emerge where provincial interests are 
pitted against central control. Rondinelli (1995) suggests that in any 
decentralisation intervention, analysts should assess the political situation. He 
suggests that they should have a clear idea of which groups and organisations
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are likely to benefit from decentralisation, which groups are likely to perceive a 
loss of power and resources, and the degree of political support and opposition 
that is likely to arise from proposals to decentralise responsibilities for basic 
education’ (Rondinelli 1995:SR3-2).
The following section further addresses two levels of power and control that 
bear influence on the development of education administration. The allocation of 
resources and the vulnerability of leadership are specifically examined.
1) allocation of resources
Over one hundred and fifty years, the Baloch have struggled to resist 
colonial and postcolonial governments. Even Pakistan’s partition from India has 
been perceived by the Baloch as an attempt to deconstruct Baloch social life in 
order to produce the new Pakistani citizen. The perception of slippage of Balochi 
power is characterised below.
...to many Baloch...the power of the Pakistani State has 
expanded over the years [but] the number of its representative 
political institutions has not. They and other ethnic groups 
claim that the concentration of power in the hands of a 
bureaucracy controlled by Punjabis and (mohajirs) emigrants 
from India has failed to structurally assimilate them into a 
united Pakistan. Many Baloch see the centralised, unitary form 
of government functioning in the name of Islam to protect 
Punjabi hegemony by perpetrating discriminatory policies, and 
by labelling legitimate expressions of ethnic grievance as anti­
national and subversive (Titus 1996:141).
The central demand of the Baloch movement within Pakistan has been 
greater autonomy for the province of Balochistan from the central government. 
A number of issues have been noted which have fostered the Balochi demand for 
autonomy. They include:
❖ Exploitative Federal development policies, particularly in regards to natural 
gas, coal and water;
❖ Under-representation in government decision-making structures;
❖ The political repression of Baloch dissidents; and
❖ Status displacement due to unchecked migration of Pushtuns and Punjabis 
into Balochistan. (Titus 1996:141)
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These elements refer to specific perceptions of marginalisation of 
Balochistan. Historically these elements were evidenced through such measures 
as the State’s appropriation of eighty per cent of the natural gas (taken from the 
Sui gas fields in Balochistan) to industries in the Punjab and Sindh provinces 
with a disproportionate return of gas royalties to Balochistan’s coffers. As one 
respondent claimed, the finance of recurrent expenditures for provincial public 
service departments is a highly centralised system controlled at Federal level. 
Finance of recurrent expenditure of every province is dependent on the centre 
because they collect the gas royalty and exchange that gas royalty for public 
provincial financing. Natural gas is the main resource of Balochistan and is 
controlled under the constitution by the centre. In exchange they provide cash 
development loans and some of the finances including financial grants for 
running the administration of the province. Resources through appropriations to 
education, health and other sectors are made at the discretion of the Federal 
Government. The respondent indicated that the Federal Government was 
usually behind in its disbursements (Former Director, PED, Quetta 1997).
The Chief Minister of Balochistan, through whom the funding is disbursed, 
was making sincere promises that the backlog of funding would be released but 
could not make any guarantees except to release the funding once handed over 
by the Federal Government. Unfortunately for Balochistan was the fact that the 
Federal Government (Pakistan Muslim League or PML) did not have any 
political links to the provincial ruling party (Balochistan National Party or 
BNP). The weak political link from the Federal to the Provincial level is one 
claim to the marginalisation argument (Ibid).
Arguments made that Balochi people have been marginalised in terms of 
their provincial government’s administrative and fiscal relationship with the 
Federal Government, however, have been refuted. As Ahmed notes, ‘Islamabad 
counters Balochi complaints of marginalisation with the argument that rampant 
corruption has eaten up the millions of rupees which have been bestowed on the 
province’ (much of the money finds its way into private pockets) (Ahmed 
1986:190). Also, claims made by the Balochi that they are underrepresented in 
the civil service and military posts nationally have been dismissed. One former 
Pakistani Justice remarked that ‘the Baloch had been given more than their
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fare share of the civil service quota but that they didn’t qualify’ (Harrison 
1981:158). This comment was made in reference to the ‘backwardness’ of the 
Province and the people as perceived by the ruling elite.
Despite the fact that the majority of Pakistan's natural gas is produced in 
Balochistan and that many of Pakistan's coal and other mining operations are 
situated in the province, the Balochi have little control over their operation and 
regulation (Harrison 1981:158; Wirsing 1987:8). The notion of marginalisation is 
depicted in Figure 2.4 Political satire presented in the Dawn, a Pakistani 
newspaper suggests popular belief that Balochistan has been subjected to 
Federal ‘looting’.
Figure 2.4 Central vs. Provincial Control 
E3J
FEDERAL 
\ \  GOVT
"How can \ drive when he takes away all that?*1
Source: www.Dawn.com. Dawn Internet Edition, 31/07/98
2) vulnerability of political leadership
Provincial politics in many ways reflects national politics. One especially 
compelhng example is the instability of governance. Noman (1997) has noted 
that a serious problem has existed in Pakistan since the 1980’s and that is the 
incentive of the opposition political forces to destabilise the ruling party rather 
than act as a responsible opposition. In this assessment, Noman characterises
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the contemporary political system, as being unstable as opposed to being 
democratic. The strength of the military and its track record of control and the 
limited tenure of civilian rule together suggest an indifference to economic 
progress if not altogether neglect. ‘The [political] instability would not be quite 
as serious if the economy could be insulated from it’ (Noman 1997:300).
The vulnerability of political leadership at the Federal level is mirrored at 
the Provincial level. One communique received for this research describes the 
instability issue at the provincial level. A consultant returning from an annual 
review mission of the health sector in the province indicated the necessity of 
having to close a project that would normally have been followed by another.
Due to the existence of the (then - pre-coup) coalition 
government, serious horse-trading has gone on to an extent 
that no management reform has been able to function; people 
trained have continuously been transferred, resulting in a total 
lack of sustainability o f investments; and in the transformation 
of what had been a successful project into a failure in 
institutional reform terms (Personal correspondence from E.
Hooper, 10/30/99).
The consultant further indicated that the comments could also stand for 
education. ‘This failure of ‘good’ programmes due to political circumstances 
which impinge unduly on administrative reform certainly bear further thought, 
not least because it is the people of Balochistan who continue to suffer as a 
result’.
Common political behaviours exist among diverse territories of Balochistan 
involving the idea that ‘might makes right’ and that he who holds power should 
be obeyed. Pastner states ‘A corollary of currying favour with those higher in the 
status hierarchy is lording it over those below’. And he provides an old adage 
from southern Balochistan: If your fortress is strong and your followers 
numerous, for you there shall be neither danger not trouble” (Pastner in Ahmed 
1990:280), a statement with strong implications for decentralisation.
Centralised political forces are not only found at the Provincial level, but 
also at the district level with the existence of landowners or feudals and sardars. 
Modernisation has resulted, however, in reduced tribal authorities. To ambitious
74
tribal leaders with strong political agendas, the integration of provincial 
economy with national and international markets/interests, the ‘erosion’ of 
authority is feared. Other political forces not mentioned such as political parties, 
student groups, and other organised political institutions such as unions are 
also factors in the complex equation of decentralisation. The following section 
takes a look at the economic challenges for decentralisation.
Economy
1) Pakistan’s national context
At the macroeconomic level, Pakistan’s economy has been characterised as 
fragile. Narrow bases for production, export, and taxation, high debt levels, low 
business confidence and weak governance all hamper savings, investment, 
public revenue mobilisation, and growth (Pakistan Country Brief 2000, 
http://www.worldbank.org/). Ironically, from 1970 to 1993, Pakistan’s real 
income per capita increased by 231% which was the highest rate of increase in 
South Asia (ul-Haq, 1997).
Human development in Pakistan, however, has not mirrored such success. 
According to the 1997 Human Development Report for South Asia, human 
development data are ‘dismal’. Over two thirds of Pakistan’s adult population 
were illiterate. Seventeen million children were out of attendance to primary 
schools in 1995. Sixty million people did not have access to health facilities and 
sixty-seven million people were without safe drinking water. Eighty-nine million 
people were deprived of basic sanitation facilities. There were seven hundred 
forty thousand child deaths a year, half of which were finked to malnutrition. 
The population growth rate of around three per cent per year was the highest in 
South Asia. Thirty million people lived in absolute poverty. More than half of 
the cultivable land in fifty-acre holdings and above was owned by feudal 
landowners (Ibid: 3 9).
The gap between stated economic growth and poor human development in 
the country has been attributed to a variety of factors, many of which bear 
testimony to a centralist environment.
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❖ Skewed income distribution;
❖ The absence of land reform;
❖ Non-existence of income tax on agricultural incomes;
❖ A reliance of fiscal policy on indirect rather than direct taxes;
❖ Heavy burden of defence and debt servicing on limited budgetary 
resources;
❖ Political domination by an elite class that pre-empts the patronage of the 
State in its own favour;
❖ Corrupt ruling elite;
❖ Expenditure of less than five per cent of GNP on education and health 
services; and
❖ Low transfer of total income to the poor in terms of social security 
benefits—only 0.2% (Ibid:38).
As already pointed out, Pakistan’s economic crisis has been the result of low 
investment in social development. This concept is also developed in Omar 
Noman’s book, Why Pakistan did not become a Tiger (1997). Noman deals with 
what he calls the ‘grand canvas’ of economic development and social change in 
Pakistan. He measures social change through such indicators as education, 
health and demographic trends. Two strands of thought are presented for 
understanding the relationship between human capital and structural change. 
The first strand emphasises the instrumentality of human capital for economic 
development. Technology is the key driving force behind economic growth. The 
second strand offers an assessment of the extent to which basic social 
investment have accompanied economic growth and thereby benefited the poor 
directly. Through this strand, Noman has suggested that theoretically, social 
policy influences economic development particularly through human capital 
investments. This claim is based on evidence of comparison with other Asian 
countries (Noman, 1997:58-59).
The determinants of East Asian economic growth and subsequent success 
have been attributed to public policy reforms. Social, industrial, agricultural, 
financial and trade policies are all noted as shaping or influencing East Asian 
growth. Policy influences as well as sound macroeconomic management have 
produced rapid increases in per capita income stemming from intermediate 
variables of high levels of investment and savings, pace of technology acquisition 
and adaptation; and efficiency of resource allocation. In terms of the social policy 
inputs, two areas that have positively influenced East Asian growth have been 
identified 1) that education policy emphasised cognitive development and had a
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strong technology orientation and 2) that health and population policy, along 
with primary education investments, eased supply side pressures on the labour 
market (Ibid:42).
In contrast to East Asian performance, Pakistan’s investment patterns have 
been characterised as ‘improper’ thus influencing a 'vicious linkage’ system 
shown below in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 Social Policy and Economic Development:
___________Pakistan’s Harsh Linkages___________________________________
• Low spending on basic education and health
• No serious commitment to population and planning.
• Traditional roles of women reinforced by social policies.___________________
I
Poor literacy.
High fertility and population growth.
Low nutrition levels of children and mothers.
Poor human development indicators.
Lower per capita GDP growth.
Diversification into higher productivity activities constrained by lack of 
skills.
Explosive demographic pressures are reflected in the labour market. Rapid 
annual growth in labour force seeking employment.
High levels of child labour due to lack of basic education facilities.
Low socio-economic status of girls sustains poor parental interest in their 
education.
Lack of skilled manpower.___________________________________________
Source: Noman 1997:61
In 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a three-year 
financing package for Pakistan worth $1.56 billion in support of its medium- 
term adjustment and reform program. The approval of the package was based 
on the historical review of Pakistan’s economic performance. The IMF suggested 
that in previous years, attempts by the authorities to address Pakistan’s 
macroeconomic imbalances and deep-rooted structural problems were 
‘frustrated’ by slippages in policy implementation which had adverse impact on 
growth, inflation, and the balance of payments.
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The government’s strategy was to rationalise further the public sector, 
shifting more of the primary productive role to the private sector and to 
strengthen local institutional capacity. In the public sector, the domestic tax 
base was to be broadened; tax administration strengthened; government 
expenditure to be shifted towards the social services and human capital 
formation; and key public enterprises restructured. The Federal Government in 
principle, however, typically agreed that corrective measures such as the ones 
suggested by the IMF in this situation have to be in place but have more 
difficulty being implemented in Pakistan {Balochistan Times, October 22, 1997).
2) Balochistan’s resources
Balochistan has been characterised as a province in Pakistan that is 
economically dependent. Dependency in this case is largely correlated to the 
distribution of natural resources. That no single community or leader can 
develop a base of power broad enough to control the resources for such a large 
territory is the reason given for this economic dilemma. ‘The resources found in 
Balochistan while significant do not balance the reality that the local or 
‘community’ level is still economically dependent on financial and technological 
aid channelled through the national and provincial governments’ (Siddiqi 
1991:6). Box 2.2 below illustrates both the resources and challenges that 
Balochistan must manage.
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Box 2.2: Profile of Balochistan
❖ Population of 7 million or 6% of Pakistan’s total population;
❖ Approx. 1.5 million live in urban areas and the rest in rural areas; a small 
population is a “cherished asset” and yet paradoxically this disposition has 
turned out to be a weakness and a factor for unjust resource allocation in 
Balochistan’s case;
❖ Balochistan has the lowest literacy and highest unemployment rates;
❖ Society is highly tribal, perceived to be static but has a history of 
constructing and maintaining the projects of common interests like the 
complex and difficult “Karez” systems despite inter--tribal feuds;
❖ Geographical area of Balochistan is 34.72 million hectares (43.6% of 
Pakistan) while the populated area is 18.60 million hectares. The rest of 
the area is comprised of barren mountains and desert. Forests comprise 
1.09 million hectares, and 11.16 million hectares are not available for 
cultivation;
❖ The province has one of the most potent and able to be developed coastline 
for commercial production of aquaculture and fisheries for domestic 
market and export;
❖ The province has a large reserve of precious stones and marble valued at 
over Rs. 10 trillion; coal reserves of over 579 million tons and an estimated 
commercial value of Rs. 1.7 trillion. Source: Barq 1997
least developed in the area. This generalisation is offered with the caveat that 
scarce data are available for statistical comparisons on income distribution, 
morbidity rates, and life expectancy that might broaden the understanding of 
the standard of living especially in rural Balochistan. Researchers admittedly 
have determined that Balochistan and the NWFP are the two ‘weakest’ 
provinces economically well behind the Punjab. It is further posited that a local 
economy such as Balochistan’s is slowly beginning to affect political stakes.
Balochistan’s economy is slowly being integrated with the 
modern and market-oriented national economies and 
bureaucratic controls. In practical terms, this has meant the 
construction of roads and growth in transport, the spread of 
commercialised agriculture and the institutions and 
technology to sustain it, the promotion of land reforms and of
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changes in systems of land tenure, increasing pressures for 
the migration of local manpower to distant cities and to areas 
abroad, the opening of new industries and -  above all — a 
steady decline in the tribesmen’s traditional economy 
(Wirsing 1987:8).
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Bhutto accelerated this basic, economic 
transformation in the 1970’s ‘with his keen appreciation of the political uses of 
economic incentives’. However, the transition has been slight and what meagre 
growth has transpired, the tribesman have usually been under-represented in 
managing the commercial or industrial sector especially in the tribal areas of 
Balochistan.
Donor assistance from such agencies as the IMF has not always had positive 
effects throughout Pakistan’s provinces including Balochistan. According to 
Pakistani development specialist Barq, Balochistan’s culture has developed into 
one that takes all services as free and without any cost liability. Implementation 
of policy reforms requires some structural and fundamental changes in 
administration. Barq recommends that these changes must be initiated from the 
top and then be filtered to the provinces. For instance, it is suggested that the 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet work very hard to change the attitudes of the 
Ministries. In this transformation, ministries would be encouraged to optimise 
the resource base ‘instead of sticking to the colonial psyche of considering 
development as a gift and funds as a charity or alms’ (Barq 1997:4).
Despite the base of natural resources that Balochistan possesses, the 
infrastructure and fiscal mismanagement of the Province make their 
exploitation very difficult. For fiscal year 1996-97, total revenues amounted to 
Rs. 13.426 billion while expenditures reached Rs. 17.908 billion. The gap/deficit 
was Rs. 4.482 billion. Given the resource base that has been outlined above, 
‘there is no economic and logical justification for the budgetary deficit...’(Ibid:4). 
The overarching problem, however, rests not only with the province but also 
with the Federal Government. The basic conclusion here is that it is difficult to 
decentralise control to the provinces if revenues and resources are nationally 
collected and their allocation is controlled from that level.
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Education
1) State of Education in Pakistan
While Pakistan had seen some improvements in higher education through 
the 1980s and 1990s, progress remained slow in terms of the overall sector. At 
the end of the twentieth century only forty percent of the population was literate, 
compared to an average of forty-nine percent in South Asia and fifty-three 
percent in low-income countries worldwide. Gender disparities in education 
were also significant. Only sixty-two percent of Pakistan's girls were enrolled in 
school compared to eighty percent of its boys (Pakistan Country Brief 2000, 
http://www.worldbank.org/).
Despite substantial economic growth, human resource development in 
Pakistan has lagged well behind other countries at similar stages of 
development and income levels. Pakistan’s gross participation rate of 50% in 
primary education compares poorly with developing countries of similar or lower 
GNP per capita, e.g. Nepal at 64%, Laos 111%, Bangladesh 70%, India 98%, 
China 135%, Nigeria 70%. World Bank Country Economic Memoranda, as well 
as the Government’s Social Action Program and a series of Five-Year Plans 
since 1955, have identified the low level of human resources development as a 
major constraint to a qualitative transformation of the Pakistani economy into a 
dynamic, middle-income country like its East Asian neighbours (World Bank, 
1993:1).
At the bottom of the demonstrable record of investments to human resource 
development has been basic education. Despite considerable public rhetoric; 
numerous planned large-scale programs; and some increase in primary school 
attendance, Pakistan’s educational base remains weak enough to constitute a 
serious threat to sustainable economic growth. The legacy of public expenditure 
on education as a percentage of GNP in Pakistan has been a little over two per 
cent through the 1980s and early 1990s.
Added to this statistic are others exhibited in Table 2.1. In developing the 
phase of education polices beyond 1998, strategists in the Federal Ministry of 
Education in Islamabad saw the urgent need to double the outlay of expenditure
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for education from two and two tenths percent of GNP to approximately four per 
cent. As shown in this table, education expenditure as a percentage of GNP had 
only risen from 0.88% to 2.2%—a 2.1% increase within a thirty-eight year time 
period (1955-1993). Also, the outlays were marginally utilised.
The chequered and uneventful history of five-year plans has 
brought to fight the shortcomings and tendency to set 
unrealistic and unattainable education goals, objectives and 
targets. The decisions about or affecting education in too many 
instances, have been the product of political expediency 
(Ministry of Education, 1994:3).
But as Noman claimed, poor achievement may have had more to do with low 
investment than the setting of unrealistic goals. Qaisrani and Khawaja (1989) 
had earlier made this point. In their study of basic education in Pakistan, they 
fist ‘failure of policy’ as the number one reason for the low investment made in 
education.
Pakistan has been spending approximately two per cent of GNP 
on education. A major share of this amount is transferred to 
higher levels of education. While primary education caters for 
the majority of the students and teachers in the educational 
system but its share in the budget is meager. Therefore, funds 
for primary education need to be increased (Qaisrani and 
Khawaja, 1989:16).
The present system offers a travesty of education in most rural areas. Thirty 
percent of primary classes meet in the open air, lacking any facility other than a 
chalkboard. Where schools exist, seventy percent are unsanitary, badly 
maintained and without learning materials. Supervisors are responsible for, on 
the average, 150 schools of all levels in addition to other duties and have little 
time for individual primary schools. The curriculum is standardised, ignoring 
rural/urban, male/female or language and cultural differences. (USAID, 1987:25)
From the time that USAID had made this assessment to the early 1990s, 
the state of education in Pakistan had changed very little (World Bank 1993).
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Table 2.1 PAKISTAN: Public Expenditure on Education, 1955-1993
Plan Total 
Outlay 
(Rs In (M)
Education 
Outlay 
(Rs. In (M)
Percentage of 
Total
Development
Budget
Education 
as % of 
GNP
1st Plan (1955-60) 4,863 206 4.23% 0.88%
2nd Plan (1960-65) 10,606 527 4.97% 1.55%
3rd Plan (1965-70) 13,204 677 5.13% 1.38%
Non-Plan (1970-78) 70,500 3,886 4.51% 1.53%
5th Plan (1978-83) 226,000 5,643 2.50% 1.5%
6th Plan (1983-88) 250,000 13,430 5.37% 2.4%
7th Plan (1988-93) 350,000 22,680 6.47% 2.2%
Source^  Ministry of Education 1994
During the planning for the Seventh National Education Policy, strategists 
in the Federal Ministry of Education indicated that the government would seek 
to raise the education budget from two and two-tenths per cent to four per cent 
of GNP, but the Balochistan Times reported that throughout six prior education 
policies [plans], ‘none could practically he implemented’. The Education Ministry 
reportedly conducted a thorough study to determine the causes of their failure 
and identified thirteen reasons. The top three of these were lack of political will, 
resource constraint and political instability (Balochistan Times; Feb. 2, 1998:2). 
While not conclusive, this report suggests evidence of past plans not being met.
The government had already committed to provide Rs. 260 billion under the 
Social Action Programme. The World Bank had committed to pay the rest. Of 
these amounts, Rs. 225 billion had been earmarked for primary education. The 
Joint Educational Advisor indicated that this amount was the minimum, the 
country needed to develop its educational infrastructure. He also commented 
‘and if we don't have education, our other plans will fail’ (Ibid). The critics of the
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education policy, however, suggested that it was a long wish list that would be 
difficult to implement.
2) Balochistan’s education
Educational status is probably the single most important social variable 
contributing to economic development, as the effects of most other investments 
are influenced by education levels. If this statement is true, the Government of 
Balochistan should be concerned with the very low education levels in the 
Province. Nearly 600,000 children are enrolled in primary schools: 390,000 boys 
and 202,000 girls (April 1997). In 1991, forty-five per cent of the urban boys 
(age-group six to ten years) were enrolled and forty seven per cent of the rural 
ones, while the respective shares for girls were thirty-five per cent and twenty 
per cent. This indicates a clear gender gap. Enrolment for boys increased by 
twenty three per cent from 1990 to 1997; while for girls the increase was one 
hundred fifty-one per cent. Literacy rates were among the lowest in the world. 
Only fourteen per cent of the rural population (national average twenty-nine per 
cent) are literate, with the poorest even dropping below ten per cent. There are 
six thousand nine hundred primary schools for boys and one thousand three 
hundred for girls; only four Districts (Quetta, Pishin, Jaffarabad and Turbat) 
have over one hundred girls’ schools each (Planning and Development 
Department 1998).
Compared to the nation, the province of Balochistan had the lowest gross 
participation rate in primary education at thirty-four per cent (in 1993). The 
female participation rate of fifteen per cent was among the worst in the world. 
As a result of the low rate of participation in primary education, the base of 
primary graduates would not be sufficient to support any kind of significant 
expansion at higher levels of education (World Bank, 1993:1).
Also of public policy concern is the low financial investment that 
Balochistan has made to the education sector. Table 2.2 shows that for 
Balochistan within the time period spanning 1993 to 1998, approximately fifty 
per cent of the education fine item in the Eighth Development Plan was actually 
allocated representing only 1.57% of the total development budget. The actual 
expenditure was roughly forty-eight per cent of the actual allocation.
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Table 2.2- Education allocations and expenditures during 8th FYP period
(Rs. in millions.)
Sector 8th Plan Actual % of Total Actual %of
Allocation Allocation Budget Expenditure Actual
(1993-98) (1993-98) Allocation
Education 691.704 377.558 1.57% 181.904 48
SAP (Education) 5771.367 24.07% 3255.480 56
SAP=Social Action Programme
Source* 9th Five-Year Provincial Plan, 1998
Marlaine Lockheed expresses the donor rationale behind their emphasis to 
promote and fund primary education initiatives in developing countries.
Education is a cornerstone of economic growth and social 
development and a principal means of improving the welfare 
of individuals. It increases the productive capacity of societies 
and their political, economic, and scientific institutions. It 
also helps reduce poverty by increasing the value and 
efficiency of the labour offered by the poor and by mitigating 
the population, health, and nutritional consequences of 
poverty. As economies worldwide are transformed by 
advances and new production methods that depend on a well- 
trained and intellectually flexible labour force, education 
becomes even more significant (Lockheed and Verspoor 
199L1).
Analyses that correlate education with economic growth, however, must 
carefully consider the existing environment of the education experience. Jean 
Dreze and his research team have reported on the condition of administration of 
primary education in the Northern States of India. The Public Report on Basic 
Education or PROBE study (1999), among other findings, has assessed the 
conditions of the provision and administration of education as being 
unsatisfactory. This assessment, however, calls into question Dreze’s public 
response that compulsory primary education makes a difference. The reliance on 
modelling, which in fact correlates economic growth to primary education 
assumes that the transfer of knowledge and various forms of learning are taking 
place. The report pointed out that education was substandard and that rarely 
few benefits resulted from compulsory education.
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Attempts to derive the above correlation need to specify whether quality 
education is an input or merely schooling or attendance is being used as the 
input. Economic indicators among other issues, as expressed above for 
Balochistan, surely reflect the poor education received by children across the 
province, i.e. if it is possible to positively correlate economic growth to primary 
education.
Chapter three will discuss further the transformation of education policies 
in Balochistan to their implementation including the extent of investments 
made to that sector over the past years.
2.5 Conclusion
The central questions that this thesis sets out to answer are
1. How successful was the attempt to decentralise education administration 
in Balochistan?
2. What were the policy constraints?
3. What does this experience tell us about both the theory of 
decentralisation and its application to education in a developing country 
with a strong centralist tradition?
We have already seen that the social, political, and economic context of 
Balochistan make it very difficult to achieve decentralisation. These issues 
together comprise a complex, abstract canvas against which primary education 
is administrated in Balochistan and therefore among reasons already stated is 
the context upon which this study analyses decentralisation. The following 
chapters begin to chart how far Balochistan had actually succeeded in achieving 
this reform in the education sector between 1992 and 1997.
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Chapter 3
From Policy Formulation to Implementation: 
Education Administration in Balochistan
The broad sector goal of the Primary Education 
Development Programme is to strengthen the 
institutional capacity of the Balochistan Province to 
formulate and implement equitable pohcy that 
improves access to primary education and its  quality.
United States Agency for International Development
In Pakistan, provision of public education is the constitutional responsibility 
of the provinces. This delegation to the provinces implies that the system of 
education in Pakistan is structurally decentralised. Constitutionally the 
provinces were guaranteed their autonomy in that the provincial Ministries of 
Education are primarily responsible for the planning and implementation of 
their respective education programmes. In fact, the 1992 National Education 
Pohcy (NEP) called for the provinces to bear an even greater responsibility for 
educational development. The NEP claimed that any ‘sum total of educational 
progress’ would have to be measured through individual progress of the 
provinces (NEP 1992:77).
Progress in the province of Balochistan, however, is difficult to measure or 
analyse without a clear definition of decentralisation pohcy for the province. 
Strategies calling for management reform were evident at least in the language
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of formal education policy documents handed down from the Federal level. Prior 
to 1992, every successive government in Pakistan had consistently advocated 
and supported the development of primary education administration which was 
reflected in each of its national five-year, development plans (seven), its formal 
education policies (five), and in its provincial annual work-plans (three in 
Balochistan) (MOE 1994:2). These plans repeated the demand for the 
development of local school management capacities. The 1992 NEP is an 
example where the recommendation for improved provincial education 
administration was called for.
Accordingly, for efficient implementation of the Education 
Policy it is necessary that the management of education in the 
Provinces is professionally organised with men who are trained 
in the art of management and educational administration...The 
devolution of management will touch the local bodies, district 
councils, and even villages and mullhas. The implementation 
strategy therefore invites maximum devolution down the fine of 
management scale ending at the community level and, of 
course, with feedback reaching the highest rung of the 
management ladder (Federal Minister, 1992:77).
All of the classic terminology was used in this and earlier policy statements 
to align theory with popular ideas on what constituted decentralisation. 
However, when these policies are compared with implementation realities, 
considerable divergences emerge. In Balochistan, for example, local development 
objectives ingrained in ‘workplans’ called for decentralised services in public 
education, but as some respondents claimed, these measures were long on 
promise and short on delivery.
This chapter introduces evidence that suggests a departure between 
decentralisation objectives in Balochistan and the reality of implementation. 
Smith (1986) as introduced earlier, sheds light on ‘why’ this classic divergence 
between pohcy and implementation sometimes occurs.
Centralisation in developing countries is not just a function 
of scarcity. It is in part a function of commitment. Those who 
recommend administrative reorganisation and have to 
implement it, the central government politicians and civil 
servants, have the most to lose if access, participation and 
responsiveness are strengthened by decentralisation. There
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is thus a generally disappointing record as far as the 
implementation of decentralisation schemes is concerned 
(Smith 1986:460).
The evidence introduced in this chapter provides an important 
foundation for answering the research question. By analysing the nature of 
pohcy and implementation for primary education, some insights might be gained 
as to whether and to what extent ‘decentralisation’ plans existed in Balochistan 
from 1992 to 1997.
3.1 Education Policy in Pakistan
Public pohcy is a complex pattern of interdependent cohective choices, 
including decisions not to act, made by governmental bodies and officials (Dunn, 
1994:85). But as Robert Porter (1995) points out, ‘knowledge utilisation’ availed 
by pohcy makers is not at ah straightforward: ‘the adoption and implementation 
of pohcy entails more than analysis. Pohcy making is also, and inescapably, an 
organisational and pohtical process’ (Porter, 1995:6). To help us understand the 
nature of education pohcy in Balochistan, this section will provide insight into 
the pohcy process for Pakistan. First, the system of policy-making is described. 
Secondly, key administration pohcies estabhshed at the Federal level are 
presented and compared with provincial implementation plans. Finally, the 
question is raised as to whether hnkages exist between federal pohcies and 
provincial implementation.
Historically, the Federal Government of Pakistan had been responsible for 
curriculum and textbooks, research and the general co-ordination of pohcy and 
planning for the provinces. Pohcy initiatives as early as 1947 were developed at 
the national level to guide reforms in education. More comprehensive pohcy 
documents were produced at the Federal level in 1959, 1970, 1972, 1979 and 
1992 for restructuring of the education sector (Minister of Education 1992:1, 
NEP 1998:4).
Like their predecessors, the Federal Ministry of Education estabhshed the 
1992 NEP in Islamabad and included major pohcy statements concerning
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primary education (Farah, 1996:4-5). Participants in the development of the 
NEP included primary through tertiary level administrators and educationists 
who attended a series of provincial conferences on education. These conferences 
were held in an attempt to ‘reshuffle the priorities, restate the pohcy, revise the 
strategy and re-examine the fabric of education so as to make it compatible with 
the demands of prospective economic activity, and social cultural and pohtical 
development...’ (Minister of Education, 1992:2).
In addition, a national conference was held in Islamabad in April of 1991 
that reportedly brought together academics, journalists, scientists, teachers, and 
lawyers for mapping out the Pohcy. The Ministry of Education also 
independently sohcited recommendations from ‘known’ intehectuals and 
educationists to be incorporated into planning the Pohcy. After preparing basic 
principles formulated through the conferences and surveys, the Minister of 
Education commenced discussions with the Education Committees of the Senate 
and National Assembly. The Pohcy pubhcation asserts that pohcies were 
ultimately presented and discussed in an inter-provincial Ministers meeting 
‘and modified in deference to the recommendations of the Provinces’ (Ibid:2). 
Whether or not the Provinces, in fact, returned recommendations to the Federal 
level, however, was not confirmed.
It has been argued that the hnkages from pohcy development to 
implementation break down at this ‘hand-off stage from the Federal level to the 
provincial level. The World Bank noted in one of its institutional reform project 
papers for Pakistan that the reasons for poor education quahty in Pakistan were 
numerous. However, at the centre of the problem was weak institutional 
capacity. The way the education system was structured did not help decision­
makers to identify problems and actions to rectify them. From basic policy­
making to day-to-day management, education agencies were inappropriately 
structured and staffed. Decision-making was centrahsed and pohticised. Few 
officials at any level had clear spheres of responsibility, and most lacked 
professional training for their posts. Lack of motivation, enthusiasm, and 
accountability was prevalent, and strong pohtical interests often interfered with
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opportunities for progressive change (World Bank, Working Paper, October 28, 
1996, p.l of attachment)13.
This argument for policy breakdown has also been characterised by Weiss 
(1991). As indicated below in Box 3.1, determinants of educational decision­
making in Pakistan related more to pohtical and personal pressures and 
preferences than research conducted on the basic educational needs of its 
citizens.
Box 3.1: Determinants of Educational Decision-Making in Pakistan
They asked me to look at the extent to which the research and statistical 
data reported to Pakistani officials was influencing educational decision­
making and programming in the country. I  found much the same thing 
that I  found in other places: people in positions of authority say that 
research is  very important and that they support it, but i t  doesn't have 
immediate or direct effect on what they do. This is true not only of the 
Pakistani situation but throughout the world. Research does not tend to 
have direct effects in determining policy. Moreover, decision-makers have 
ideological commitments. You are not going to change their opinion about, 
say, the value of educating girls in Pakistan, ju st by giving them 
information. They have deep-rooted beliefs and values. Decision-makers 
also have interests. They must satisfy certain constituencies, gain support 
from other agencies, abide by the rules and routines of their constitution, 
or even please some powerful political figure.
Source: (http://hugsel.harvard.edu/~OIE/WEISS.htmr)
Professor of Education in Administration Planning and Social Policy, Harvard 
University, Graduate School of Education._____________________________
Although the Government of Pakistan (GOP) was responsible for general co­
ordination of pohcy and planning between provinces, the Federal Ministry of 
Education based in Islamabad was responsible for major pohcy statements 
concerning primary education (World Bank, 1994:65). That this role is defined 
for the Federal Ministry of Education, however, did not necessarily mean that 
pohcy, as articulated above, was carried over or implemented in the provinces. 
In particular, Balochistan was noted for its ‘pohcy vacuum’ with regard to 
primary education in the province (World Bank, 1993:27).
13 See also Qaisrani and Khawaja 1989.
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Education Policy and Planning in Balochistan
This characterisation of Balochistan’s education pohcy raises the question of 
how and to what extent pohcy was developed for that province. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, the development of primary education pohcy appears 
to have been directed by primarily two different sources: 1) the Federal 
Government and 2) outside donors. The World Bank (1993) reported that 
educational pohcy in Balochistan, as elsewhere in Pakistan, had been largely 
driven by federal mandates which neither took into account the particular 
demographic, geographic and cultural conditions of the province nor were backed 
up by adequate evaluation, experimentation, or resources. Marked variations 
among districts and poor educational indicators testify to the absence of pohcies 
tailored to local needs (World Bank 1993).
Additionally, World Bank documentation indicated that the historical non­
availability of timely and accurate data about the educational system resulted in 
the lack of real planning for the province. Precedent and pohtical pressures 
traditionally and primarily guided pohcy decisions. Prior to 1990, planning 
activities for Balochistan’s school system were the responsibility of the Planning 
CeU within the Provincial Directorate of Schools. Basic information about the 
school system cohected and compiled manually by personnel from the 
Directorate of Schools was inaccurate and took too much time to compile (World 
Bank 1993:8).
The World Bank’s finding that planning and the development of education
pohcy in Balochistan was lacking and weak was corroborated with quahtative
data cohected for this study. These data indicate that the existence of education
pohcy was in question in Balochistan prior to 1997. It was revealed in a
majority of the interviews conducted that formal primary education pohcy did
not exist in Balochistan prior to 1997. Respondents including government
sources, district level staff, technical consultants, and World Bank officials ah 
0
independently made this claim.
One senior government official indicated that ‘basic pohcy comes from the 
Federal Level and that due to pohtical changes, pohcies also change’ (Additional
92
Secretary of Education, Quetta, 1997). Congruent with this claim were those 
made by district officers. Their responses ranged from uncertainty and some 
confusion to suspicion and distrust that pohcies were being made without their 
knowledge. One female officer’s response is illustrative.
What policy do they have for education? They have not developed 
any policies for education. I  think they have never had any policy 
or have never developed one. They first take an action and then 
think about it, e.g. they started making PTSMC14 which was a 
total failure, so i f  they had planned first and started making them, 
i t  might had been a success. Policies—actually, we do not have 
(Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).
Another source that was closely associated with primary education projects in 
Balochistan articulated the perceived pohcy vacuum in another way:
I  think that up until 1997perhaps late 1996 there were no policies.
I  think they were goals that were set up in lieu o f policy. I  think 
that a degree of policy o f universal prim ary education, that was 
one thing that had been agreed. That was probably a policy. But 
all sorts of other things were really lim ited goal statements. (Chief 
Technical Advisor, Quetta; 1998)
A majority of respondents shared the view that formal pohcy was non­
existent prior to 1997. However, the broad programme goal of donors beginning 
in 1989 for Balochistan served as evidence that access to primary education, 
equity and quahty were fundamental tenets that would drive the development of 
the education sector in the future. Whether these goals can be characterised as 
‘pohcies’ is a very fine argument. The disconnect between peoples’ views on what 
constitutes pohcy and the actual existence of pohcy illustrates a lack of 
information or understanding of the flow of pohcy from the Federal to the 
provincial level. In some ways, pohcy was left for the Province to flesh out but no 
‘real’ knowledge existed as to the hnkages of this pohcy between the two levels.
Given the recent heavy input of donor technical assistance and financial 
support towards primary education development in Balochistan, it is 
particularly noteworthy to include one donor official’s insight on the subject.
14 PTSMC represents the Parent/Teacher/School/Management Committee scheme 
mandated by the Secretary of Education in 1996. The purpose of the PTSMC was to 
provide a locahy representative committee with discretionary funding for school 
maintenance and responsibility for monitoring tasks.
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When asked whether the World Bank had estabhshed an education pohcy for 
Balochistan, this official gave the fohowing response.
There is no education policy in Balochistan. The policy is driven by 
or determined by the program side of things that are ad hoc. There 
is not a lot of co-ordination. Two policy levels exist in Pakistan: one 
a t the Federal level and one at the provincial level. A t the two 
levels, however, policy reforms are only addressed in key areas the 
same as the program components (Task Manager, World Bank,
1998).
The donor agencies and their participation and influence in the pohcy and 
implementation process will be discussed in detail below.
Flow of Pohcv from Federal to Provincial Level
The first annual workplan for primary education in Balochistan was 
generated in 1989. The plan was created in response to donor (largely USAID) 
advice for the improvement of education in the Province (PAAD 1990). However, 
over time this and subsequent plans had served the province as operational 
guides for primary education. As imphed by the respondent above, broad goal 
statements were set out at the outset of primary education funding in response 
to Education for Ah Conference proceedings. Also apparent in the actual 
workplan document is language that identifies the impetus behind the 
statement. Rather than references to a National Education Pohcy, the 
referenced ‘broad goal’ is linked to the activities specified for an ‘intensive ten- 
year program’ to be sponsored by an outside donor (USAID). The ‘goal’ reads:
The broad sector goal of PED is to strengthen the institutional 
capacity of Balochistan Province, and to formulate and 
implement pohcy that improves access to, and the equity and 
quahty of, primary education.
The correlation between the annual workplan activities and the 1992 Pohcy 
reveals that donor agencies bore greater prehminary influence in determining 
the goals for education development in Balochistan than the 1992 pohcy. Under 
the 1989 Primary Education Development (PED) agreement between USAID and 
the Government of Pakistan, USAID recommended that pohcy formulation and 
implementation would be adhered to as per the grant agreement objectives. 
‘There will be semi-annual progress reviews of program activities, and progress
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toward the policy and action benchmarks will be used to monitor the flow of 
funds so that they are tied to program accomplishments and increased GOP 
funds available for primary education’ (USAID 1989:7).
The Action Benchmarks that were laid out in the PAAD for ‘administration and 
management’ were delineated for the Provinces of Balochistan and NWFP:
Directorate of Primary Education:
❖ Allocation of funds to establish the directorate;
❖ Assignment of space for a directorate; and
❖ Full assignment of staff, with individuals at post and supporting 
infrastructure including furniture and office equipment.
Organisational studies:
❖ Commissioning of full provincial and national organisational studies.
PoHcv Studies:
❖ Commissioning of provincial and national pohcy studies (Ibid: 15).
The PAAD further explained that the programme process would be focussed 
by a continuing pohcy dialogue between the provincial government and the 
donor that would influence ah related activities, and an annuahy revised set of 
pohcy and action benchmarks related to the programme goal and objectives. 
Dialogues concerning education pohcy began during the pre-programme 
planning and had been anticipated throughout the life of the project. USAID 
claimed that ‘these dialogues w[ould] permit a joint GOP-USAID exploration of 
policy alternatives to meet the program targets estabhshed in th[e] PAAD’ 
(USAID 1989:14). USAID, however, did not claim exclusive authorship to the 
pohcies it placed in the PED agreement. The PAAD explained that ‘the PED 
Program builds on the Seventh Plan criteria to help the GOP achieve its 
objectives in primary education’(USAID 1989:9). USAID specifically stated its 
intent to support what it characterised as the ‘decentralisation plans’ of the 
primary system in Balochistan.
Box 3.2 below highlights pohcies concerning administration and 
management that were included in the 1992 NEP. The first pohcy strategy item 
that calls for the estabhshment of Directorates for Primary Education was 
interestingly already an agenda item in the agreement that the GOP made with
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USAID earlier in 1989. Its inclusion as a major tenet to the 1992 NEP suggests 
that donors such as USAID had influenced the shaping of national education 
pohcy.
For this thesis, an analysis was conducted of the annual workplans for 
Balochistan against Pakistan’s National Education Pohcy (see Table 3.1). This 
analysis only examined suggested activities related to the six major pohcy or 
‘strategy’ statements expressed in the 1992 NEP (see Box 3.2). Information 
however, confirming whether an activity had been completed was not included 
in these workplans. Hence, rehance on other reports to confirm activity has been 
necessary. Pohcy strategy items two, three, five and six are more difficult to 
attribute to prior donor conceptuahsation and activity. Ah of these pohcies, 
however, appear in some shape or form in Balochistan’s operational workplans, 
which span 1990 to 1998.
Table 3.1 tracks the activity that was undertaken according to the workplan 
goals. As the title implies, it is difficult to necessarily correlate decentrahsation 
activity to the six 1992 NEP strategy areas noted in Box 3.2. Though four of the 
five ‘actions’ could be said to advance the objective of decentrahsation, the third 
did the opposite and was far reaching. The Minister of Education was given 
powers to appoint, promote, and transfer civil servants including teachers and 
ministerial staff instead of the district education officers at a time when these 
should have been rohed out to the district officers. The centralisation of these 
powers goes against the spirit and the letter of the 1992 NEP. The impact on 
district managers will be examined in chapters five and six.
The fact that implementation activities were weU underway by the time the 
1992 NEP was published cahs into question what or who was driving the ‘policy’ 
for primary education in Balochistan. This assertion leads to the next discussion 
of outside donor influence and control of pohcy.
96
Box 3.2: Pakistan National Education Policy 1992-2002
Administration and Management of Education 
POLICY STATEMENT
The process of decision-making will be decentralised. Educational development 
plans shall be effectively co-ordinated and monitored. Management of district 
level education will be improved by associating the local community.
BACKGROUND
Many of our failures in the past had been less owing to resource scarcity than to 
the administrative and managerial inadequacies. The management of education 
requires a special type of professional expertise. Not many of our educational 
managers are trained in this art. Furthermore, the existing administrative 
norms do not allow for the participation of the community in the management of 
educational institutions at the local level. Substantial changes are required to be 
made in the administration of education to improve the efficiency of the system.
STRATEGY
1. Separate Directorates of Primary Education will be estabhshed.
2. School Management committees shall be constituted at the village, 
settlement and institution levels.
3. The district education officer shall be delegated appropriate financial, 
administrative and personnel management powers.
4. All supervisors, headmasters and principals shall receive training in 
techniques and methods of educational administration and financial rules 
before appointment.
5. A manual describing the principles of educational administration and 
financial management shall be prepared.
6. A system of accountability and rewards based on performance evaluation of 
teachers and head of institutions will be developed.
Source: National Education Policy '92:1992-2002, Ministry of Education,
___________ Islamabad Pakistan (December 15, 1992)____________________
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Table 3.1* Claimed Changes in Local Administration in Balochistan Resulting from 1992 National Education Pohcy Plan
Pl a n*/Year S t r a t eg y# A c tio n : N otes
2nd/1990-91 -- . . . . . .
3rd/1991-92 4 Field Training For Headmasters and Other 
District Administrators Initiated
The design and conceptualisation of this training preceded the 
1992 NEP. FuU training of staff prior to their appointment, 
however, could not be confirmed. Institutionalisation of such a 
training program could not be confirmed.
4th/1992-93 1 Primary Education Directorate Estabhshed 
(July 1993)
The establishment of a separate Directorate for Primary 
Education was more influenced by pohcy reforms that were 
delineated in the Program Assistance Approval Document of June 
1989 and covenants agreed to by USAID and the Government of 
Pakistan under the Program Grant Agreement of June 1989 (AED, 
p. 79). The National Education Pohcy came about later in 1992.
5th/1993-94 3 Minister of Education Reins in power to 
appoint, promote and transfer Basic Pay 
Scale Employees 16 and below (August 
1993)
This notification SOR-I(3)S&GAD-93 was vahd from effective date 
of August 16th and was still in effect during field research 1997. 
District Education Officers were basically stripped of their 
authority to hire, fire, and transfer teachers and ministerial staff. 
Also, DEOs at this point are only authorised to administer funds 
for salaries and direct expenditure. Their financial powers were 
extremely limited.
6th/1994-95 5 Officer’s Guides for Field Staff Completed 
(June 1994)
Officers’ Guides were previously developed under the USAID 
sponsored portion of Primary Education Development Assistance 
in Balochistan prior to the development of the 1992 NEP.
7th/1995-96 2 Parent/Teacher/School Management 
Committees Estabhshed
■ • •
8th/1996*97 -- . . . . . .
9th/1997-98 -■ . . . . . .
*Refers to Ba ochistan Annual Workplans for fiscal years July to June
3.2 Donor Influence
Balochistan’s education sector has been a major target of outside 
development assistance since the late 1970’s. Inefficiencies were presumed to be 
remedied through structural reforms within the Provincial Department of 
Education and a series of five-year plans called for decentralisation strategies to 
relieve these centrally burdened agencies. Approximately U.S. 556 million 
dollars had been invested through IDA credits alone from 1977 to 1993, towards 
education reforms in Pakistan as a fraction of social sector projects (World Bank 
1994:9). Despite the growing external resources described here and below, poor 
social indicators continued to persist. It is therefore noteworthy to consider what 
aspects of management and administration in the sector continued to hamper 
improvements in the opinion of some observers.
For example, in 1992, the GOP initiated a Social Action Programme (SAP) 
with the explicit aim of providing access to basic services in education 
throughout the country (along with health and family planning and 
water/sanitation). SAP was supported by World Bank operations including 
province specific education investment projects. The Bank noted the following in 
1996 as challenges to these reforms: vested political interests at various levels, 
weak institutional capacity, un-involvement of stakeholders. (World Bank 
Correspondence 4/10/1996:1)
The late economist Mahbub ul-Haq considered these challenges in analysing 
funding that Pakistan would be receiving and administering on behalf of the 
Social Action Programme.
Pakistan has recently undertaken the implementation of 
several, billion dollar SAP programs under the umbrella of the 
World Bank. While this represents some progress, many 
independent analysts have expressed serious misgivings about 
whether SAP will also be politicised and used as a patronage 
programme for political party workers rather than as a real 
breakthrough in human development for social engineering. 
Evidence of poor indicators in Balochistan is indicative of lack 
of efficiency in usage of funds. Pakistan has a legacy of 
assistance and sad results or benefits of all the monetary 
support since post-partition (ul-Haq, 1997:38,42).
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This study cannot ignore the role that donors have played in the 
development of the primary education sector in Balochistan whether or not their 
role has been perceived as beneficial from the local perspective. Table 3.2 gives 
an idea of the donor community for the two decades prior to 2000 and the 
funding allocated through grants and loans to Pakistan as a whole. Between 
1990 and 2000 approximately U.S. $934 million in external assistance had been 
allocated to Pakistan for the development of primary education.
Table 3.2: Foreign Assistance for Basic Education in Pakistan
(l990-2<X)0)
Agency Assistance 
(U.S. Million)
World Bank (IDA) 592
Asian Development Bank (ADB) 252
USAID 77
UNICEF 10
UNDP 3
TOTAL 934
Source- Far ah 1996
Figure 3.1 below is a summary of donor-assisted work that took place beginning 
as early as the late 70s. Historically, the World Bank has played a dominant role 
in Pakistan’s basic education sector. The Bank, building on an already designed 
AID project, initiated the First Primary Education Project (PEP 1) in Pakistan 
in 1979 (USAID, 1988:6) Based on the analysis of these past initiatives, USAID 
embarked on planning an effort to target the two provinces left out of these 
initiatives, namely Balochistan and NWFP. For the PED program, AID claimed 
that WB and ADB were consulted to avoid duplication of other donor activities 
but rather build on the PEP 2 efforts. AID’s target of new areas of development 
included:
❖ girl’s middle schools;
❖ methods of enabling female middle school graduates to achieve teaching 
certificates; and
❖ Influencing15 incentives for teachers, students and communities to develop 
more and better educational opportunities.
15 Author’s emphasis
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Figure 3.1 Profile of Donor Influence in Education Development in Pakistan; 
1979 1994
PEP 1- World Bank, 1979 $10 million
Focussed on rural primary schools in all provinces with special attention
❖ to increasing access
❖ reducing wastage
❖ reducing costs
❖ increasing the quality of education provided to girls
PEP 2- World Bank, $52.5 million Five year follow-on
The objective was to improve primary education quality in 14,000 schools in 
three provinces by
❖ improving teaching and learning materials,
❖ upgrading physical facilities,
❖ strengthening supervision
PEP3: World Bank, CIDA, EEC, and GOP $215 million
Targeted the province of Punjab and was designed to expand the programs of 
PEP 2 into all districts of Punjab
PEP 4: World Bank, CIDA, EEC, and GOP 
Similar to PEP 3, but was to target the Sind Province.
ADB—1988-1993  ^Asian Development Bank $73.4 million
Five-year program country-wide program that would include
❖ construction of physical facilities, (65% of loan)
❖ upgrading teacher training
❖ development of instructional materials in selected model primary schools
❖ strengthen management and supervision of girls’ primary education 
through in-service training of sub-district administrators and supervisors 
and through support of for a computerised management information 
system.__________________________________________________________
PED Project 1990-1994- USAID $280 million originally earmarked
Ten-year project shortened to 4.5 due to US Foreign Policy concerning
assistance to Pakistan. Targeted Balochistan and NWFP. Aimed to increase
access to primary education and to improve equity, quality, and efficiency.
UNICEF- $5 million
The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integrated curriculum._________
Source: (USAID 1988:6; AED 1994)
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Donor involvement in education development in Balochistan is thus a 
reality that has powerfully shaped policy for the province. Porter (1995) suggests 
that donors may choose to influence the policy implementation process 
directly—for example, by tying development aid to various conditionalities that 
specify how implementation is to proceed. Alternatively they may try to 
influence the thinking of policy makers through policy dialogue—‘reasoned 
argumentation and persuasion’ (p. 16).
Donor engagements have been structured both ways in Balochistan. Under 
a discussion of policy benchmarks, USAID indicated that a list of policy and 
action benchmarks was discussed with representatives of the provincial 
government of Balochistan. The public policy statement which spelled out the 
ten-year enrolment goals implied that with the government’s endorsement, they 
would be presented as government policy (USAID, 1989:15) At the same time, 
the release of funds for the Primary Education Development Project were 
contingent on certain conditionalities. These conditions were the agreed 
activities set out in Balochistan’s annual workplan that, in turn, led to achieving 
goals (benchmarks) agreed to by USAID and Pakistan (AED, 1994:38). Under 
the initial agreements some program agreements included:
1.Enrollment Targets—Endorsement of the ten-year enrolments, by province 
and gender, as GOP policy;
2.Budget Support—Agreement to increase the total (federal plus provincial) 
funds spent on primary education at the rate of ten percent annually for 
Balochistan over the next ten years, with FY 1990 the base year;
3.Directorates—Establishment of a Directorate for Primary or Basic Education 
in Balochistan
(USAID 1989:3; see also Program Implementation Letter, 9/23/90 USAID.)
USAID saw its role as a facilitator of the development of policies of 
Balochistan that would engender change (USAID, 1989:9). When for political 
reasons, USAID had to terminate its activity in Pakistan, it handed off its 
support responsibilities to the World Bank who had in earlier years also been a 
major contributor to primary education development and policy formulation. 
Other donors were also playing marginal roles in addressing policy concerns with 
the Federal and Provincial Governments. However, the education development 
activity following USAID’s pullout of Pakistan was largely already entrenched in
102
the early policy reforms agreed to by USAID and the GOP. The necessary task of 
implementing these policies, as discussed in general terms in the next section, 
rendered the role of the World Bank as a ‘task manager’ to make good on its 
investments. The early effects of policies from the decade of the 70s to the 90s, 
however, had been poor as noted by the Ministry of Education:
As a social artefact, education so far, has not been able to 
assure good life for the individual and best arrangements for 
society. Its ability to build human capital that could provide 
high rates of return to society has remained minimal (MOE 
1992:1).
3.3 Implementation
Organisation and Management of Primary Education in Balochistan
The establishment and management of primary schools are the 
responsibility of the Provincial Governments, whereas curriculum is developed 
by the Federal Government in consultation with the provinces. There are 
separate Directorates of Primary Education in each province.
Until 1992, a single Provincial Directorate of Schools under the Department 
of Education managed all primary, middle, and secondary schools in Balochistan. 
Within the Directorate, neither budget nor personnel were earmarked 
specifically for primary education. This lack of an organisational focus on 
primary education was further repeated at the division and district level. The 
neglect of primary education was evident in the severe shortage of facilities and 
materials in primary schools as compared to middle and high schools. Even 
within the same school, primary grades with majority of the student population 
were displaced into the schoolyard while middle and higher grades occupied the 
few available classrooms (World Bank 1993:6).
In July 1992, the Government of Balochistan (GOB) agreed to ‘bifurcate’ the 
existing Directorate of Schools by level, and to establish two separate 
Directorates for primary (K-5) and secondary (6-10) education. The bifurcation
103
was officially sanctioned in December 1992. Under this arrangement, the 
management of primary education became the responsibility of personnel from 
the Directorate of Primary Education located at both provincial and district 
offices.
Within the Department of Education, the administrative structure is 
segregated by gender from divisional level downward. Male District Education 
Officers are responsible for management and supervision of all boys’ schools 
within their respective districts. Because of the small number of girls’ schools, 
female divisional education officers perform the same tasks for girls’ schools 
covering three to five districts within a division. Female administrators are 
therefore doubly constrained: first by the vast geographical territory falling 
under their jurisdiction; and second, by their having to rely (for cultural reasons) 
on the availability of official transport rather than public transport (World Bank 
1993:7).
Pakistan’s culture of education administration is based on the principle that 
organisation is administration and the best test of administration is compliance 
with orders from above (Warwick 1995:9). Since partition, the system of 
administration with its emphasis on control and top-down communication has 
been described as having an infinite capacity for obscuring and killing initiatives 
and innovations (Saqeb 1985). The style and structure of administration often 
meant that senior provincial administrators were not aware of what actually 
took place within schools. Administrators and decision-makers frequently lacked 
accurate and relevant information on which to base policy and resource 
allocation choices.
While provinces had control over the delivery of public education, they were 
dependent on the Federal Government for recurrent and development funds for 
implementation. After the funds were released, however, a process of 
disbursement through the provincial government did not always guarantee 
timely and efficient distribution according to the account of one respondent who 
worked in the finance office of the Directorate for Primary Education.
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And with the recurrent budget, the Federal Government gives the 
allocation to the Provincial government and then the provincial 
government— they decide how much they w ill give to the health 
and other sectors. So the education department gets the budget 
and under education department they have three different 
categories. One is  called prim ary education budget and the other 
is  secondary education and the college budget. They also get one 
budget under administration. So for prim ary education, the 
Finance Department, Government o f Balochistan, releases that 
budget to the Primary Education Directorate. And the 
Directorate further distributes this budget to different DEOs 
based on their sta ff and enrollment and everything. That’s  how i t  
is done financial Administrator, PED, 1997).
However straightforward the above account describes the process of 
financial distribution and control, it does not account for the low expenditure on 
education both nationally and provincially. Table 3.3 indicates that within the 
period covered by the Seventh Year Plan (1988-92), Balochistans expenditure on 
primary education barely reached eight per cent of total public expenditure for 
the province.
Table 3.3 BALOCHISTAN: Public Expenditure on Education 1988*1992
(million Rupees)
7th Year Plan
Fiscal Year- *88*89 ‘89-90 *90-91 ‘91-92
Expenditure on Development 40 42 48 92
(Primary Level)
Expenditure on Recurrent 282 314 319 413
(Primary Level)
Total Primary Education 321 357 368 505
Expenditure on Primary Level
as % of Total Public Expenditure 6.5% 7.2% 6.9% 7.9%
as % of Total Education Budget 42.6% 46.5% 44.7% 54.9%
Source* (World Bank 1993)
As noted in Pakistan’s 1992 NEP, policy envisioned that district education 
officers would be delegated appropriate financial responsibilities. The next 
chapter will examine to what extent these envisioned controls were extended; 
however, discretion of funding had been low and centralised. Other forms of
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centralised administration were the development of curriculum, which has 
already been noted as a federal level function. Also, teacher appointments had 
been a function that was centralised at the provincial level. In assessing the 
structure of administration in Balochistan, it is apparent that little evidence of 
decentralisation existed in principle. Once source illuminates the dynamic of 
centralisation of administration.
I f  you... want to take the power out of the hands of the Secretariat 
in Quetta and devolve i t  to a person further out, I  don’t think that 
anybody’s confronted that ye t...I  think that decentralisation is  
geographical rather than authority, power and accountability 
(CTA, BPEP, Quetta, 1998).
Balochistan and the Period of Devolution
With the advent of USAID, World Bank and other donor assistance, 
Balochistan became the laboratory for agendas that called for administrative 
decentralisation. The Balochistan Primary Education Programme, under donor 
advice, projected its final period from 1996 to 1999 as the period of ‘devolution’ 
with the objective of devolving further authority and responsibility from the 
‘centre’ or the Directorate of Primary Education to the district, community, and 
school levels.
The Primary Education Directorate (PED) was located in the Provincial 
capital of Quetta. PED incorporated into its Annual Workplans formal 
decentralisation strategies as already discussed. These plans theoretically 
served to drive the day-to-day operations of primary education. The workplan 
delineated Government approved activities that were also sanctioned by outside 
donor agencies. In essence, these workplans became the policy guidelines for 
primary education. From the time that PED had been established, the 
workplans had been developed with external technical assistance advice and 
approved by a joint donor/government agreement. Throughout these agreements 
and plans was the call for improvement in the representation and the provision 
of administrative support at the district and community level. The rationale 
behind this goal was that improvement in the quality of administration should 
result in a more effectively managed school system.
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The Primary Education Development Project Final Report (1994) claimed 
that at the end of the initial project in 1994, an enabling infrastructure for 
better local administration of primary education in Balochistan had been 
developed. A follow-up World Bank financed Balochistan Primary Education 
Development Project (BPEP) supported further the development of devolved 
education administration. These measures included the establishment of 
Village Education Committees (VECs); Parent, Teacher, School Management 
Committees (PTSMCs); and Women’s Village Education Committees (WVECs); 
and the development of an NGO called the Society for Community Support for 
Primary Education in Balochistan (SCSPEB) which had worked under GOB 
funding as well as through outside donor financing to support these ‘community’ 
developments (AED 1994).
Thus by 1996, as far as the outside world was concerned, a programme of 
significant devolution was under way in the primary education of Balochistan. 
Internally, however, this programme had its drawbacks. For example, the 
organic nature of the education system in Balochistan as evidenced by the 
growing number of schools with increased enrolments had posed a very 
‘threatening’ challenge to its effective management in such a widespread rural 
area. A former advisor to the Chief Minister in Balochistan was noted for 
objecting to this perceived ‘burden’ that the donor community was placing on 
‘successive generations’ (CTA, BPEP, Quetta, 1997). How real these attempts at 
devolution were as well as further discussions of other challenges will be the 
subject of the next chapters.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have explored the policy process from the ‘top’ down to 
understand the origin and nature of formal education policies in Balochistan. 
We have also explored the role played by outside donors and their influence over 
the policy process. Implementation of primary education has been discussed to
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locate linkages between the decentralisation policies and any outcomes that 
implementation might have yielded. The following conclusions can be drawn:
❖ Outside donor assistance through ‘tied’ financing packages had more 
influence in introducing decentralisation policies than Federal and 
Provincial institutions.
Donors indeed not only influenced primary education policy in Balochistan 
but to a large extent have actually developed or shaped it. These initiatives 
sometimes alienated both Federal and Provincial governments. But the 
‘program approach’ of USAID in the late 90s required local government to be a 
‘necessary partner’ in the reform efforts. Thus, an indirect tension was evident 
from the outset.
❖ The very existence of an education “policy” in Balochistan prior to 1997 was 
in doubt.
Broad, formal education policy plans existed at the Federal level but there 
was little evidence of plans or policies at the provincial level in Balochistan prior 
to the establishment of PED. Even after the Directorate was established, 
workplans facilitated implementation but provincial policy-making mechanisms 
for primary education were absent. This was despite significant investment in 
Balochistan. The attempt to set out detailed plans and reporting procedures to 
the donor agencies in the 1990s was a new development.
❖ Decentralisation policies for Balochistan were made manifest in two ways— 
1) Federal policy filtered to provincial level; and 2) Donor tied agreements.
Chapters four, five and six provide further insights into the 
implementation of decentralisation plans. Insights of central and local 
agents and people captured in interviews and through observations describe 
the process of administration from the central and local level perspectives. 
These chapters further explore the gaps between nationally/provincially- 
developed policy and their implementation to determine how 
decentralisation has occurred at the local level and if so, to what extent.
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Chapter 4
Education Administration: Central Roles and 
Responsibilities__________________________
The state functionaries are not interested in 
decentralisation. They don't want to part with their 
powers... Decentralisation is a good model but i t  
requires certain influence by the government.
Former Director 
Primary Education Directorate 
Quetta, Balochistan
This chapter focuses on the role of central administration and perceptions of 
central actors as to the limits of decentralisation. In the first part of the chapter, 
we look in turn at the bureaucracy or rather a number of agencies within the 
government and examine the extent to which these agencies can be said to have 
decentralised its activities. In the second part of the chapter we undertake a 
function analysis looking at public service functions identified by Winkler (1989) 
and discuss how central actors felt it was feasible to decentralise and to what 
extent it was done.
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4.1 Central Institutions
The ‘centre’ or central institutions in this study represent the 
administrative bureaucracy in the province above the district and divisional 
levels. Primary education administration in Balochistan, as in the other 
provinces in Pakistan, is situated in the hierarchy of a central provincial 
administrative structure. This section presents and briefly describes the 
institutions within this hierarchy. This will help illuminate the process of 
administration through an understanding of the primary actors who participate 
in the process from the centre.
As pointed out in Chapter Three, the provinces of Pakistan are 
constitutionally guaranteed their autonomy in the management and operation of 
the educational system in their respective administrative territories. This 
autonomy comes with the proviso that their administration is to be guided by 
the National Education Policy. The 1972 NEP recommendations that were 
implemented resulted in the formation of the ‘more-or-less’ uniform education 
structure including the formation of the provincial departments of education 
(Malik 1992:40). The departments of education are ultimately responsible for all 
layers of the education system including primary, secondary, college, and 
university education.
One World Bank Official observed that Balochistan was lacking a strong 
administrative ‘centre’. It was further noted that accountability was also needed 
at this level (Task Manager, World Bank, 1998). The following sections are 
presented to explore this characterisation.
Provincial Department of Education
As mentioned above, the existing organisational structures in the provinces 
are the outcome of the implementation of the 1972 National Education Policy 
(see Figure 4.1). At the provincial level, there is a Department of Education 
(DOE). The Minister of Education, an elected official, heads the DOE and acts as 
the spokesperson for education in the Provincial Assembly. The Secretary of 
Education (an appointed position) reports to the Minister of Education and is
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responsible for advising on policy issues. Also, as chief executive officer of the 
DOE, the Secretary is responsible to implement and evaluate policies and plans 
in the province. The Secretary is assisted by an Additional Secretary, Deputy 
Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Section Officers and other supporting staff— 
all who work at the Secretariat. The Secretary also oversees the work at the 
Directorates both for Primary and Secondary Education (Malik 1992:40-41). The 
organisation of the Directorate for Primary Education will be described in 
greater detail later in this chapter.
Figure 4.1 Provincial Organisational Chart
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As we have seen in Chapter Three, active policy-making in rational form 
was essentially absent in Balochistan from 1992 to 1997. Though it has formal 
jurisdiction, most respondents interviewed in this study felt this role had not 
been actively filled. Insofar as policy emerged, external donor agencies
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influenced them significantly. Explanations were given that the provincial 
annual workplans had almost been surrogates for policy. These had been policy 
interventions made by donors such as USAID. It was first noted that policy or 
‘goals’ had been formed in agreements between the Provincial Government and 
the donors. Alternatively, it has been explained that policy was an outcome of 
provincial cabinet decisions in which the Minister of Education participates.
Whatever the Cabinet decisions are, they are declared as policy 
m atters or policy issues. So the policy as a document is now 
prepared. I  have not seen any health policy or education policy 
that is prepared by the cabinet. We prepare the annual plan to 
reflect the cabinet decisions in implementation (Former 
Director, PED, 1997).
Although no formal policy document for provincial education could be found, 
other examples of policy influences from the centre were given. The Director of 
Primary education had received a notification formed by a Cabinet decision that 
the powers of appointment, transfers, from basic pay scale (BPS) grades one to 
fifteen were to be handled by the Minister of Education. That Cabinet dissolved 
and the caretaker government took over. At that point, the policy was abolished. 
When the new government came in, the first thing they did was to adopt the 
same policy as it was given in the previous Cabinet—to give the authority of the 
Minister to appoint and transfer any government functionary. These 
explanations for the origins of policy, while not consistent, are neither mutually 
exclusive. Together, however, they suggest that the ‘forum’ for policy-making 
was centred at the top level in Balochistan.
The degree of power had been constrained to some extent, however, by 
external funding. Operationally, the DOE in Balochistan had been restricted in 
terms of resources for primary education. One senior government official in the 
Office of the Secretary for Education (Secretariat) indicated that Balochistan 
relied heavily on external funding from donors and that only two per cent of 
GNP had been allocated for education in terms of government expenditure sans 
external funding. Despite the low funding, however, the officer reported that 
from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, the education system was more 
decentralised as defined by the fact that DEOs were given discretionary 
authority over their budgets and administration for their respective districts.
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For the following years, he described the inadequacies of decentralisation as a 
systems problem and one that was driven by changing politics at the centre 
(Additional Secretary, Quetta, 1997). In fact, between the years of 1992 and 
1997, seven ministers of education and seven secretaries of education had been 
responsible for controlling the education system in Balochistan (Multi-donor 
Support Unit 2000).
The frequent transition of provincial leaders, the culture of centralising 
politics and the external power manifested through outside donors, explain the 
vulnerability of further devolving power and control of implementation to lower 
levels within the education system in the province. The following section 
examines the second tier of administration in Balochistan in terms of primary 
education management—the Primary Education Directorate—and its role in 
administration
Primary Education Directorate—Shadow or Reality?
Although PED assumed foremost responsibility for all aspects of primary 
education in terms of administration, it also facilitated technical work to help 
develop such areas as teacher training and curriculum. These technical areas 
were divided into different cells all housed within the Directorate.
❖ Teacher Training and Supply Cell;
❖ Balochistan Instructional Materials and Development Training Cell 
(BIMDTC);
❖ Balochistan Education Management Information Systems Cell 
(BEMIS);
❖ Beneficiary Participation Cell (Community Mobilisation);
❖ School Construction Cell; and
❖ Assessment, Monitoring, Planning and Evaluation Cell
The fact that these cells were formed and housed within PED does not 
suggest that none of their functions pre-existed prior to the opening of PED. In 
fact, functions of two of the cells, Teacher Training and BIMDTC, were handled 
to some degree, in two different agencies. These two agencies are discussed in 
greater detail below. At times, they competed and/or overlapped with PED in 
terms of development and implementation of primary education work. Often the 
competition led to confusion over which agency was in ‘control’ or had more say
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than the other—a quagmire noteworthy in a discussion concerning 
decentralisation.
Each cell was developed and managed within the period of 1992 to 1997 by 
external technical advisors hired under the requirements of the donor contract 
through the BPEP modality. These advisors were instituted to shadow the 
government counterparts, who were line managers, and provide them with 
technical advice. However, the burden of donor demands for deliverables added 
with the specific skill sets possessed by the advisors in their area of work often 
intimidated the officials and resulted in their shadowing the advisors. It can be 
argued that to an extent the control and power of some of the deputy directors 
went as far as their will could be exerted. Often, however, some were reliant on 
the advisors leadership. From the donor perspective, though, this outside 
support was seen as ‘essential’.
Close support of the situation by the donor and technical 
advisers is essential in promoting the process by which 
governments implement change. The number of times when 
donor requirements were used to stimulate a discussion or force 
a decision or the Technical Adviser was called in by government 
officials to assist in or facilitate an action or deliberation cannot 
be enumerated (AED 1994:94).
This observation is contrasted with evidence concerning control and 
authority that were wielded by government officials within PED. At the 
beginning of its formation, only a few government posts had been sanctioned at 
PED. Among these positions was that of Additional Director. Those initially 
posted were prime contributors to the metamorphosis that the small operation 
began to take. In fact, these individuals became quite powerful, if not political 
over time. Added with increasing responsibilities and authority, their interface 
with external donors yielded significant power. Also, they held permanent civil 
service status not threatened by constant transfers. For example, a majority of 
respondents claimed that one senior official in PED retained financial control of 
the external and recurrent budgets for primary education within the province. 
This one individual was not in a position of political appointment; thus, the 
position insulated him and by default gave him control over matters that both 
PED and district officers felt they should control. It was observed that these
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other officers were politically inclined to ingratiate themselves with this officer 
to gain priority in getting their local needs met. Doing one’s job is not in 
question here. The officer in question had merely begun working in a small 
organisation. Over time his scope of control was broadened but inevitably 
rendered him as a gatekeeper for a variety of functions performed within PED. 
This control at the top, in time, impeded progress to reform or decentralise the 
administration and management of primary education in Balochistan.
The Primary Education Directorate (PED) has already been described to 
some extent above and in chapter three in terms of its origination and 
development in Balochistan. Its establishment was seen as a structural move 
towards decentralisation (USAID 1989), although questioned in the discussion 
above. The organisation of PED, depicted in Figure 4.2, helps to illustrate these 
points. The Director of Primary Education oversaw a series of fine directors or 
deputy directors who were responsible for the day-to-day functions of PED. 
Furthermore, two additional directors had fine responsibility for district 
education officers positioned in two jurisdictions of Balochistan—the Southwest 
or the Northeast. It was assumed that through these positions, administration 
could be further devolved as explained by one respondent.
The concept was that there would be decentralisation through 
the Additional Directors, and the Additional Directors would be 
based out of Quetta, most of the time. In fact, the Additional 
Directors are based in Quetta next to the Director. Logically the 
Director can allocate to the Additional Director a whole lot o f 
responsibilities that are then effectively devolved to the Northern 
Areas or the Southern Areas. I f  that had happened and they had 
been placed into the province, then I  think you could have had 
much more devolution. But in effect, they came back, and they 
centralised even more the power because they were so related to 
the Director, and they saw themselves also their powers being so 
dependent on the Director so being close to the Director was 
important to them. So it  was better for them to be in the Centre.
They didn't want to be marginalised out there. (CTA, BPEP,
Quetta, 1998).
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Figure 4.2 Organisational Structure, Primary Education Directorate
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Attempts to decentralise power and authority to the districts was often 
accompanied with frustration and distrust towards those further down the 
hierarchy and further away from PED. The Director, for example, saw his role 
as delegating to government ‘functionaries’ rather than idealistically devolving 
authority for the engagement and the participation of people. He further 
claimed that he, in fact, had to retract the powers granted to district education 
officers after the initial formation of the Directorate.
‘The [local] people [were] not honest in dealing with activities 
such as procurement, like giving information for merit-based 
criteria because they were always dodging i t  so we established 
the Balochistan Education Management Information System  
(BEMIS) [at the centre] ju st to develop a criteria’ (Former 
Director, PED, 1997).
Another factor in the decentralisation equation is the relationship and 
interface between local government and school planning with central 
administration. One respondent claimed that social sector involvement by local 
government institutions was defunct. At the district level, a structure had been 
established known as the District Co-ordination Committee for co-ordination 
work with all sectors. The district education officer, by default, was the 
secretary of the committee. Also, locally elected Union Councils had no co­
ordination with the district education officer (DEO). Prior to external funding for 
education, DEOs had responsibility for developing the annual development 
plans for the schools under their jurisdiction. Planning was made in 
consultation with the Deputy Commissioner of their respective district. These 
plans included construction of schools and up-gradation of older schools. Under 
this administrative set-up, it was reported that political interference was not as 
prevalent (Former Deputy Director, Planning, 1998).
As noted in earlier chapters, the creation of PED was seen as a move toward 
decentralisation in that attention to primary education would be separated 
within the education sector. However, most respondents viewed it as the 
bottleneck for future management reform. As one respondent observed, PED did 
not continue to push for further decentralisation but rather clung to powers and 
held them in Quetta.
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I  don't think there are many good examples of decentralisation 
a t all. I  think there are certainly examples of privatisation or 
NGO development which has carried with i t  some 
decentralisation, but I  think within the structure o f this 
Directorate m y feeling is that i t  is as centralised now as i t  has 
ever been, that all crucial decisions are taken at the centre.
There's not an example of decentralisation or devolution.
Perhaps the real shift in that came from [a recent Secretary of 
Education], He took all powers to himself, effectively. Nothing 
could be done without his approval. Even the Director couldn't 
do anything without his approval...the Secretary centralised 
everything (CTA, BPEP, Quetta, 1998).
While PED was given the mission for decentralisation, in interviewing 
people within it was evident that officials saw major constraints to which 
decentralisation was feasible. At no point was there any enthusiasm about 
decentralisation. For example, most officials felt that staff at the bottom or in 
the districts could not be trusted; the culture of the organisation itself was one 
that was dependent on a leading figure. This culture is antithetical to the way 
PED had been envisioned to work. Also, lack of accountability and fear of 
marginalisation if posted away from PED were other factors that combine to 
create the core ethos or central value of the Directorate. The establishment of 
PED affected other provincial institutions, which will be examined in the next 
sections.
Bureau of Curriculum and Extension
Policies for curriculum, instruction and training like other education policies 
for Balochistan were said to originate with the Provincial Department of 
Education according to the 1992 NEP. The implementing agencies were 
identified as PED and the Bureau of Curriculum and Extension (BOCE). The 
Bureau of Curriculum was the GOB’s original education training organisation. In 
fact, it was the government agency responsible for developing and facilitating all of 
the primary education training programs. However, at the time of the research, 
the training programs at the primary level were being run by PED (BOCE Officer, 
Quetta, 1998).
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The name of the agency was a misnomer according to one source that 
indicated that the Bureau of Curriculum and Extension historically always 
concentrated on teacher training.
They have done little or nothing in curriculum development y e t i t  
is interesting because the Federal Curriculum Wing, i f  they want 
to hold a workshop dealing with the National Curriculum, they 
set up that workshop through the Bureau of Curriculum so 
that... Let’s say i t  was in the area ofprimary education, there’s a 
good chance that no one at PED knows that they are holding this 
workshop so that’s odd too (T.A., BIMDTC, 1997).
Also pointed out was the fact that the Federal Curriculum Wing controlled 
BOCE. ‘The control, the focal point of control is the curriculum Wing. The 
Textbook Board has to get approvals from the Curriculum Wing. BOCE has to get 
approvals regarding teacher training curriculum from the curriculum and the 
Curriculum Wing pretty much calls the shots right now, a t any level o f curriculum! 
(Ibid 1997).
Basically, external funding ‘stopped’ the institutional development of the 
Bureau of Curriculum. Had the teacher-training cell within PED been housed in 
the Bureau of Curriculum then the subject specialists of the Bureau of Curriculum 
would have been trained as a function of the project. Therefore staff development 
programs suffered at the Bureau. One former officer indicated that by establishing 
a training cell within PED, programs planned by the Ministry of Education were 
overshadowed. In fact, his account indicated that PED-led initiatives in terms of 
teacher-training projects were developed without the approval of the MOE. It was 
quickly explained that this was possible given the power of the external funding 
mechanism (BOCE Officer, Quetta, 1998).
Respondents described what the functions of the BOCE were. First, the 
history of teacher training and examinations was described. There have been a 
variety of experiences in Balochistan. There was a time when the Director of 
Schools would conduct the teacher training examination. They later were 
decentralised and the principals of the Government Colleges of Elementary 
Teaching (GCET) were allowed to conduct the examination. But it was felt that it 
was a race among the principals to produce the best pass rates. Therefore one 
hundred per cent of teachers were passed, none failed. The principals, however,
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were said to have complained that the materials they received were very weak and 
the trainees were very weak, still the results were one hundred per cent and the 
teachers did not perform well when they went to the classroom. It was also noted 
that from 1996 to 1997, BOCE had started conducting the examinations at the 
central level. The GOB through their trainers prepared the papers and the BOCE 
administered these papers. They were also marked, evaluated, by the teachers of 
the GCETs and sometimes by the BOCE. One respondent claimed that the 
outcome of this process had been mixed. ‘ Though it  has occurred for the last two 
years, we haven’t seen much improvement (Ibid 1998).
While in theory BOCE should have held responsibility for all teacher-training, 
its limited practice was attributed to other reasons besides low levels of funding. 
One respondent indicated that due to donor driven demands for BOCE’s attention 
to various secondary education projects, attention was taken away from primary 
education. Therefore, under the BPEP, activity for developing teacher-training 
programs had been centred at PED. Given competition with BIMDTC and work 
pressures with secondary education, BOCE could not effectively decentralise its 
functions.
Textbook Board
The Textbook Board was an institution based in Quetta that had the general 
responsibility of printing educational textbooks. It hired editors to do editing and 
usually contracted all other activity including the making of illustrations for the 
textbooks. One respondent identified those employed by the Board as ‘contract 
managers’ rather than implementers. The Textbook Board is a provincial authority 
required by Federal law. Every province has their own. Federal law, from the 
Federal level, established textbook boards to print materials. This originally was 
perceived to be a good idea so that they could strike reasonable deals with printers 
who would not want to be bothered with small and scattered print jobs. Before, 
professional publishers were not interested in publishing special books for a 
province that had so few children enrolled in school such as Balochistan. Small 
print jobs coming from different places were found expensive. So the textbook 
boards assumed the role of brokering the textbook printing process including the 
bidding process.
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One respondent explained, however, that new technology and progress and the 
publishing industry had gone beyond the textbook board model of consolidating the 
procurement and printing of books under one umbrella organisation. Also, the 
textbook board was characterised as not being terribly efficient at doing that or 
providing any cost savings (T.A., BIMDTC, PED, 1997).
As noted earlier, the Balochistan Instructional Materials and Development 
Training Cell (BIMDTC) was housed within PED. Its role of developing books 
overlapped with the responsibilities of the Textbook Board. Issues of competition 
and power or control are highlighted below in Box 4.1 to make the point that even 
at the centre of a system, sometimes functional roles are not clearly defined, thus 
negating opportunities for the engagement of power sharing or decentralisation.
/
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Box 4.1: Who's In Control at the Centre?
Sometimes i t  is difficult to see the distinction but there is one. The Textbook Board 
has the authority to print all books that go to the schools. BIMDTC could do that 
perfectly well and PED could get cheaper books i f  they allowed BIMDTC to 
manage the print contract itself—because everything is done. When we hand it  
over to the Textbook Board, the Textbook Board wants and will get in the first year 
a twelve per cent cut on time and will add this twelve per cent on top of the cost of 
the books. The second year, they are likely to add another twenty seven per cent on 
top of the books further when they give them to distributors. Those distributors get 
a fifteen per cent cut on top of the cost of the books. So the books become very, very 
expensive.
Originally, the Textbook Board was supposed to be contracting all the development 
themselves so they were putting in work that justified the twelve per cent 
management fee and the twenty seven per cent was like a royalty fee. In our 
(BIMDTC) case we are developing the textbooks but by law we have to give the 
copy to the Textbook Board and so these same percentages apply to our books 
although the Textbook Board did no work except the contract for the printing. So 
there is this kind of unhealthy, unresolved relationship that PED has with the 
Textbook Board.
The chief overlap that is still not ye t resolved is in the copyright—the copyright 
issue. By rule, not necessarily by law, but by rule, the Textbook Board is supposed 
to have the copyright of these books and the World Bank, as well as BIMDTC, feels 
like that since BIMDTC developed the books to camera ready copy, they should 
retain the copyright. I f  we do, that means that we can revise them anytime we 
want to and the textbook board cannot revise them anytime they want to unless 
they sought permission from BIMDTC. I  think that in order for BIMDTC to 
address the feedback that comes in from the Districts and the schools and the 
teachers and the teacher training people, in order for BIMDTC to legally be able to 
revise the books in the future without having to go on bended knee to the Textbook 
Board, we need to have the copyright.
So that’s a big overlap between the Textbook Board and us. After having said all of 
that, I  think there is increasing co-operation and understanding between the 
textbook board and BIMDTC but I  know the Textbook Board will never ever 
develop books as BIMDTC does. They will never have files of the books on the 
computer so that they can be revised from one year to the next as BIMDTC does 
and that’s probably the chief difference between the way that they develop books 
and the way that we develop them.
____________________________________ Source: T.A. for BIMDTC, Quetta, 1997
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NGOs
Another experiment that was framed under an attempted plan for 
decentralisation was the development of NGOs. Local NGOs were established in 
rural areas and one in Quetta. The Directorate had de-concentrated certain 
responsibilities to them but not authority. According to one NGO representative, 
‘opportunity’ was given to them to provide services to the community but that 
they were not always accepted in the field. Also, the NGOs were not so strong 
financially and could not stand on their own unless they had sufficient financial 
resources. Because of the lack of local financial resources, they had to depend on 
outside donors and state agencies. Naturally once they became dependent on 
these agencies, they became bound by the accompanying rules and regulations 
from the centre. These rules and regulations were not necessarily suitable for 
local situations and/or organisations (Former Director, PED, 1997).
The respondent further claimed that plans had to be developed to prepare 
local constituents for regaining control over primary institutions like primary 
schools, basic health centres, rural area police stations, or civil court. 'If they 
have some control and demonstrate to the government that they are responsible, 
then in the real sense, this will be a good model of decentralisation (Ibid 1997).
Attitudes at the centre, however, represent a strong apprehension to NGO 
legitimacy in Balochistan. A former adviser relayed a dialogue between a former 
Secretary of Education and a donor representative. The Secretary was quoted as 
labelling NGO work in the Province as an ‘NGO Mafia’. This comment was made 
in an attempt to thwart their further development. The donor's response, 
however, was that the development of ‘NGOs were not negotiable’ (CTA, BPEP, 
1998). The problem with NGOs as described by the respondent was that while 
they were being developed there was a lack of policy prescriptions to govern 
them or rather guide the development of education. It was also suggested that 
no mandate had been formulated to suggest that NGO/GOB partnerships should 
be a shared process giving important and significant roles to NGOs and 
legitimacy with the GOB. The respondent further claimed that, in reality, donor 
documentation indicated that NGO and Government collaboration was indeed a 
working policy. However, he felt that this was an assumption worth questioning.
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You've got NGO development but do you have NGO policy, 
which says that the development o f education should be a 
shared process, which gives important and significant roles to 
NGOs in partnership with Government? Now, the reality is 
that that's what happens. The SAP document says that's a 
policy. But is it?  In whose mind is it?  Who actually owns the 
policy? I  ju st think you could go through and find many 
examples where what is stated in the document as policy is  not 
owned by that many people at higher levels in the government 
but is owned by the Bank and by the Donors and therefore is 
agreed to and activated by the Government (Ibid 1998).
Government ownership of donor objectives was not only questioned in the 
context of NGO/Government partnerships. It was learned through the course of 
interviews at the central level that often the GOB would agree to donor 
demands at the negotiating table but would walk away knowing that the 
demands could not be met. Given the political environment and the threat of 
losing power, the donor demands were sometimes considered as being peripheral 
to ‘business as usual’.
Initiation of Community Involvement
Strategies for the involvement of communities in primary education were 
initially developed in Balochistan in 1992. A strategy paper was prepared and 
presented to the provincial DOE and donors. The DOE agreed to test and 
implement community involvement in three areas. Two of these areas 
encompass the case districts examined in this study: Barkhan is situated in the 
Zhob Division and Jaffarabad is situated in the Nasirabad Division. Through 
this initiative, a thirteen-step process was conceptualised and piloted for 
implementing a community support effort. One year later, the results of the 
pilot were presented to the DOE and the donors at the donor coordination 
meeting in February of 1993. A recommendation was made that a unit should be 
installed within the Primary Education Directorate for coordinating this effort. 
The Secretary of Education, however, reportedly disagreed for the following 
reasons:
❖ The Community Support Process (CSP) is successful because it exists 
outside the Government;
❖ CSP is implemented by committed people who are not Government staff;
❖ Employees within the new government cell or unit would pressurise the 
Government to give them permanent jobs; and
124
❖ The BPEP project will be finished but the Government will be left with 
the burden of additional staff to support 
(Bakhteari, Final Report, 1997:6).
At the same donor coordination meeting, the decision was made to create an 
NGO or find an existing one that would conduct services under the community 
support process strategy for developing girls’ schools in Balochistan. In spite of 
early scepticism and an unfriendly environment to NGOs in Balochistan, 
however, the CSP concept (see Appendix III) with the objective of involving local 
communities evolved that was fundamental to the creation of an NGO that 
would assist the government in this regard. Below is a discussion of this 
centrally located NGO.
Society for Community Support of Primary Education in Balochistan (Society)
The NGO known in Balochistan as the ‘Society’ was formed and registered 
in early 1993. Its stated goals were
❖ To create sustainable partnership between communities and the 
government;
❖ To institutionalise the Community Support Process; and
❖ To Provide access to basic, quality education (especially for girls) 
(SCSPEB ca.1996).
Initially, PED provided technical assistance to aid the Society’s development. 
Technical advisors to PED were also appointed as members of its board to 
strengthen the organisation’s credibility in an otherwise sceptical environment.
This arrangement was basically made to satisfy the 
Government and ensure the NGO's financial, field operations 
and monitoring management. One can understand this 
requirement by the Government, as this was the very first time 
that Government was going into a contract with a non- 
Governmental Organization as a Partner in school 
establishment process. Nowhere in Pakistan had this happened 
before. The Government of Balochistan had its apprehensions 
(Bakhteari 1997:7).
Funding from USAID, CIDA, World Bank and UNICEF was provided initially 
and in January 1994 a formal two-year contract between PED and the Society
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was signed. The Society was expected to establish 360 rural girl’s primary 
schools through CSP. Once CSP had been piloted, PED contracted the Society to 
expand its operation to all twenty-six administrative districts. By 1994, six 
teams of Community Education Promoters (CEPs) comprised of both young male 
and females had been hired and were working throughout rural Balochistan. As 
the number of schools established under CSP grew, the resources needed to 
support them became stretched.
The tangible results of expansion of the CSP were seen as a success in terms 
of providing girls with the access to formal education where none had previously 
existed. Initially, schools were established in twenty-seven villages in the 
District of Loralai in 1992. By 1997, out of 1,500 communities where the CSP 
process had been initiated, 573 schools were established (Rugh, 1998:96) and 
approximately 28,000 students had been enrolled through these community 
programmes (PED 1997). In 1996, the Society realised the need to decentralise 
its functions of managing community school development to regional offices. 
Three NGOs were identified to take on the additional work of community 
development. However, contracts for the three regional NGOs were established 
with PED rather than with the Society. This became an important technicality 
that would affect the jurisdiction for implementation, accountability, and 
subsequently the future relationship between local NGOs and the centralised 
location of the Society. These organisational dynamics will be examined further 
in the case study chapters.
The success of the CSP process was attributed to its distinct operational 
function outside the provincial department of education. Recall the Secretary of 
Education’s earlier scepticism of the government’s ownership of the process. 
Personnel of the Society also held the view that the success of CSP had been due 
to its independence from the government bureaucracy as noted below.
While the Society’s promoters may be right that the functions of 
the CSP promoters cannot be handled effectively through 
governmental agencies, putting the responsibilities in the 
hands of NGOs only puts off the day when government 
bureaucracies themselves must be reformed to handle what are 
ultimately their responsibilities (Rugh 1998:99).
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This observation will be examined later in an assessment of CSP work 
conducted in Jaffarabad and Barkhan. In addition to the schools that were 
established under the CSP initiative, school committees were established to 
support this process. The next section briefly describes their formation.
School Committees
The NGOs, as explained above, were responsible for facilitating the CSP 
throughout the province, which included the establishment of village education 
committees (VECs). From 1992 to 1996, 360 VECs had been formed (PED 
Annual Plan 1997) and approximately 300 women’s village education 
committees (WVECs) had been formed in the province during the same time 
period (SCSPEB, ca.1996).
While these committees had functionally aided community school, teacher 
appointments, and the management and maintenance of schools since the 
inception of CSP, the Secretary of Education launched another committee 
scheme. The discussion below is about the development of the 
parent/teacher/school/management committees (PTSMC). According to Rugh 
(1998), by 1997 the extraordinary number of 4,985 PTSMCs had been 
established in Balochistan. She claimed that ‘originally, DEOs were requested to 
set up these committees but they usually did not comply because there was no 
compensation for the added effort and transportation costs (p.97).
Nevertheless, the PTSMC held promise in terms of decentralisation, given 
that they were conceptualised to supplement the government system of 
administration. It was projected that their active role in local school 
management would improve the quality of school maintenance and monitoring. 
This organisational scheme is presented here to contrast central control with 
district participation and response to forms of self-management. Further 
discussion of PTSMCs will be provided in Chapters Five and Six giving the 
district perspective on their development.
From the central perspective, decentralisation of education management 
through PTSMC organisation and funding was difficult to achieve given the
127
difficulties in the disbursement of funding from the centre. One respondent 
claimed that the Secretary of Education would not authorise the flow of funding 
(approximately forty million rupees) from the Directorate of Primary Education 
directly to the committees bypassing the controls of the DEO and SDEO. This 
officer indicated that when pressed by the Secretary to disburse the money, he 
refused with the caveat that he needed legal authority to take the action. The 
Secretary would not legalise this direct funding process subsequently; the 
process was not put into action. The hesitancy was perceived to have been 
motivated by a fear of loss of power, i.e., if money had been given to the 
committees, they would be in a position to control the schools and the teachers. 
The centrist view indicated resentment towards decentralisation because 
community citizens would be propelled into a monitoring role (Former Director, 
PED, 1997).
A financial officer of PED claimed, however, that funds would be better 
placed in the committees' hands rather than in the DEOs' control. Participation 
of people at the local level in the control of finances of schools has been 
negligible. If the funds were to be released to committees such as PTSMCs, they 
would have better knowledge of the way the funds are used and could hold 
themselves accountable for spending it in an efficient manner especially for 
school repairs and supplies. The point was also made that ideally, if DEOs were 
to receive their own recurrent budgets in a timely fashion, independent funding 
to the committees would not affect the DEOs' powers (Financial Officer, Quetta, 
1997).
However, this scenario was later negated. When asked whether the existing 
primary education budget for the province could support the PTSMC funding 
scheme, the answer was negative.
Based on the conditions we are facing now, I  don’t think so. Under 
the World Bank project we might be able to give them [PTSMCs] 
money through the IDA Credit but I  don’t  think the Government of 
Balochistan is in the position to. Everyday we are talking about 
cutting down our budget and cutting our expenditures so I  don’t  
think we will have any money for extras (Ibid, 1997).
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The community support process to be administered by NGOs and PTSMCs 
and other village committees had been predicted to alter or leverage the nature 
of management of primary education and services. The leverage was meant to 
decentralise monitoring and maintenance tasks at the school level to these 
bodies. This plan, however, was characterised as not being very effective.
Facing the opposition of the government functionaries they 
(community organisations) are becoming dormant. Otherwise 
the community support process was a very effective process for 
decentralisation for controlling the institutions or promotion of 
prim ary education. But a t the same time when the government 
functionaries realised that they are not effective as compared to 
the communities because their power is relegated to the 
community...so they don't have a say. Their authority is  a t 
stake...I will say. Whatever authority they have they think 
their authority a t stake and the communities are becoming 
more powerful but the...unfortunately, the communities were 
not becoming powerful because they did not have any financial 
control (Former Director, PED, 1997).
It was explained that the World Bank was not giving direct grants to the 
communities in Balochistan under the community support process scheme. 
Instead, these resources were given to the government functionaries for 
distribution through the formal, financial administrative procedures. When a 
new provincial government was established in 1997, however, the process 
stopped. The claim was also made that officials sitting in the Directorate also 
opposed the community support process and funding scheme. The account was 
given that peers of one PED official challenged his interest and support to 
disbursing funds to the PTSMCs. They asked him what his interest was in a 
community that controlled their own schools and whether teachers were in 
attendance to their classrooms and accountable to these local monitoring bodies. 
He counter-challenged them that what harm would there be to establishing 
these local controls. The reply was that the central functionaries would lose 
control and authority over the teachers. The community organisations were seen 
as a threat to central power.
Also, it was pointed out that getting communities to mobilise their own 
resources would not equate to classical definitions of decentralisation. ‘Getting 
communities to kick in supplementary support for community schools does not
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necessarily leverage full control or authority of local school management. So 
decentralisation being viewed as community development in popular policy 
prescriptions is only an illusion (CTA, BPEP, 1997).
While it may be premature to judge the process of decentralisation in 
Balochistan given the measure’s formative stage, the institutions that we have 
surveyed in this section were observed to be struggling with it. The obstacles 
pointed out in the data were not only related to organisational, cultural and 
political agendas but also had to do with ambiguities in policy and immediate 
calls for changes at the centre without much consideration and preparation of 
the districts.
There are still vulnerable portions of the program that can only 
be strengthened through policy reform. As yet [1998], VECs and 
PTSMCs do not have legal status and therefore their ability to 
function as local management agencies for schools is limited. 
The NGO strategy to integrate them into the overall education 
program includes seeking Cabinet level endorsement of the 
approach, Parliamentary approval to legalise the committees, 
and the establishment of accounts so that annual funds can be 
deposited directly in the name of the committees. A remaining 
difficulty is that the committees have no legal authority over 
the teacher once she or he becomes part of the civil service 
(Rugh 1998:99).
To help us understand more about the nature of the process of primary 
education administration, the next session examines some functions of primary 
education administration and the locus of control for administering them in 
Balochistan from 1992 to 1997.
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4.2 Educational Services and the Distribution of Control: 
A Functional Analysis
Winkler’s functional analysis model that was presented in chapter one is 
used throughout the study but has been adapted to fit the scope—the continuum 
of control from the centre to the district in Balochistan. Originally, Winkler 
apportioned educational services into specific functions or components for 
analysis. These components were school organisation, curriculum and teaching 
methods, examinations and supervision, teacher recruitment and compensation, 
finance of recurrent expenditures, and school construction and finance.
Figure 4.3: Centralisation-Decentralisation Typology Matrix for Public
Education In Balochistan ___  ___
! PUBLIC EDUCATION 
| SERVICE CATEGORIES}
(continuum for locus of control)
; Centralised
<----------------
Supervision
Monitoring o f 
Curriculum
Budget Alloca tions
Other D istrict 
Administra tion
MIXED Decentralised
Adapted from Winkler, 1989
The model primarily assessed education services from a macro perspective and 
the relationship between the federal and provincial levels. This thesis makes an 
adaptation to Winkler’s model but a more appropriate one in terms of analysing 
the relationship between the provincial and district levels.
The questions posed to respondents were composed according to service 
categories that mirror Winkler’s key administrative categories. The four
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categories in Figure 4.1 serve as guideposts for analysing not only the quality of 
the services, but also the measure of decentralisation, if any that has occurred in 
the prescribed timeframe of 1992-97. Winkler (1989) pointed out that his is a 
study of an alternative measure of decentralisation that would more directly 
reflect the distribution of decision-making authority. This measure, in his 
assessment reveals the degree of central government control over major kinds of 
educational decisions (p.6). His matrix depicts three varying states in which the 
locus of control could be designated for education services: ‘centralised’, ‘mixed’ 
and ‘decentralised’ and are conditions used in Figure 4.1.The remainder of this 
section analyses the functions of primary education in Balochistan to see overall 
if any change had occurred in activity that Winkler has recommended.
Supervision
As indicated in chapter three, workplans were being developed in 
Balochistan prior to 1992. These workplans largely drove implementation of 
donor agreed activities that were meant to improve the quality of service 
delivery. Supervision was an area that necessarily needed attention if ‘quality’ 
however defined, was to be improved. Job descriptions had been written for field 
staff to ensure that they understood their spheres of responsibility. For instance, 
DEOs’ responsibilities were defined in five different areas: academic duties; 
administrative duties; supervisory duties; development duties and financial 
duties (Government of Balochistan 1994a). A majority of respondents, however, 
revealed that they lacked the necessary authority to enforce most of these 
responsibilities. In fact, they claimed that many of their supervisory duties had 
been retained by authorities at higher levels including PED and the Provincial 
Department of Education. Specific accounts to be revealed in the case studies 
that follow this chapter together with reasons already mentioned validate this. 
Accounts from both the centre and the district levels acknowledge that 
supervision in its broadest sense was weak. The following quote made by an 
official with a central agency in Quetta is illustrative.
The supervision is very weak. It does not speak on the quality of 
education, i t  does not speak on the guidance to the teachers, 
supervision is therefore I  would say the supervision is absent and 
the inspection is absent It should be controlled by the Director of
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Primary Education, he should himself know what the supervision 
is. He should be aware of all these things. And once he is aware 
he can make the district education officer implement his 
programs and do something towards the quality of education. So 
first o f all the Director of Education should be competent enough 
(Principal--PITE, Quetta, 1997).
This account taken five years after the formation of PED suggests that it was 
weak in its overall supervision of the education process and its ability to capably 
devolve the supervision process to the district level. It also suggests that PED, to 
some degree, was aloof to quality issues in the district level that needed 
recognition.
As already explained, the Minister of Education had the authority to hire, 
fire and transfer staff below the executive level. One respondent commenting 
from his experience at PED, however, clarified that the Minister usually 
manipulated operating procedures to administer these staff changes.
The Minister picks up the person and he doesn’t issue the 
orders, he asks the DEO male and female to appoint (as 
teachers) that man or appoint that girl in a particular school.
Powers are enjoyed by them but i t  is not a t their discretion.
That’s why I  said le t us develop a testing program. Test the 
teachers of the persons who are ready to teach otherwise the 
Minister will say this is the man, you appoint that one (Former 
Director, PED, 1997).
Supervision of the hiring process of teachers by district level officers was one 
example of a control that should have been devolved to the local level. This 
would have enabled greater flexibility in supervision and would have avoided 
the appointment of unqualified teachers. Higher authorities, however, usually 
made the ultimate staffing decision on a political basis.
So supervision, as a function, cannot be characterised as having improved or 
properly devolved from 1992 to 1997. Written job descriptions prescribing 
responsibilities was not enough to improve quality. The powers and authorities 
whether abused in the case of the MOE or neglected in the case of PED 
thwarted a potential opportunity for decentralisation. The dynamics of 
supervision in the education system are multi-faceted. Some are presented 
below in the discussions of the other service categories which follow.
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Monitoring of Curriculum
Officials responsible for administration of primary education saw the core 
functions such as curriculum development and teacher training as being 
centralised. Curriculum development for primary education is a function controlled 
at the Federal level. Although the development of curriculum is implemented at 
the Provincial level, the Federal mandate was viewed as being ‘constraining’. 
Within PED, the development of instructional materials including the primary 
curriculum was co-ordinated through a unit known as the Balochistan 
Instructional Materials and Development Training Cell (BIMDTC).
The Federal Ministry of Education controlled all contents of primary school 
textbooks. This power was exercised by a Federal Curriculum Wing which in turn 
controlled activities of the BIMDTC. BIMDTC had more control, however, over the 
development of supplementary materials such as teaching or learning aids like 
posters and charts and supplementary kits for teaching and learning.
To a certain degree, for an organisation like ours, there is an 
obhgation to develop the books but i t ’s of greater interest to our 
organisation, I  think by now, to deal with supplementary 
materials. Because as soon as they go into supplementary 
material category, you don’t have Federal approval of those 
ma terials(T. A.-BIMDTC, 1997).
Also, because of alternative external funding sources such as UNICEF, 
BIMDTC had further resources with which to develop these supplementary 
materials. This special funding gave BIMDTC some opportunities to address 
special needs that came to their attention without having to go through the 
approval process at the Federal level.
More and more i t ’s evolving into addressing materials-teaching 
and learning materials’ needs that are identified by those that 
are closer to the districts which include to a certain degree DEOs 
but more importantly those who are involved with teacher 
training and addressing the needs that the teachers identify (Ibid 
1997).
Thus in school curriculum matters, decentralisation had only spread as far as 
materials that supplemented the federally endorsed curriculum were being 
developed within BIMDTC and with district input.
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Central institutions such as the GCETs and BOCE controlled teacher training 
curriculum especially for pre-service training programs. In-service teacher training 
curriculum more flexibly he under the purview of PED for developing and 
designing the content of the curriculum. As for the training of these curricula, 
respondents indicated that there was not a significant amount of ownership on the 
part of the DEOs and other field officers. This leads to another complexity 
concerning the control of the curriculum. The BPEP or donor funded project called 
for central planning and implementation of curriculum tasks by staff at the centre.
Almost everything has been organised by the Directorate 
and/or the Bureau. And I  think that historically this has been 
part of the problem. It was, as far as training goes, we were 
doing things for teachers for the DEOs rather than having 
them take initiatives and take responsibilities to make sure i t  
gets done right. And so that's part of the reason why we're now 
having to decentralise (T.A.-Teacher Training, 1997).
Despite the fact that central staff was controlling much of the planning for 
teacher training, the DEOs, SDEOs, and ADEOs were, nevertheless, responsible 
for monitoring the teaching of the curriculum in the field. One government officer 
working in the teacher training unit in PED commented however, that further 
training was needed for these field officers in this area.
Maybe they [officers] are very able to check the cleanness in the 
classroom, attendance of the teacher, they are very developed 
with that. But to check the curriculum inside a school is a little  
bit difficult for them at this stage. Always when I  talk to teacher 
they say that when a District Education Officer came to us, he 
ju st asked that how many pages of this book have you finished 
(BOCE Official, Quetta, 1997).
This official further explained the judgement of students’ notebooks as the 
criteria for assessing the curriculum process in the schools. He indicated that the 
field officers were more concerned with the number of pages that had been copied 
or written by the students, than with how many activities had been done or how 
many illustrations had been prepared for the classroom. For example, if there were 
two hundred pages in total to be written by students, then often the officers would 
only check that exactly two hundred pages had been completed. It was expected 
that students would fill all those notebooks with the teacher’s work. In other words, 
teachers gave the students the home assignment for copying.
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I  don't think that the student is learning from this. He is ju st 
copying... doing some labour without getting some knowledge. So 
this is another criteria for the assessment of the teacher to check 
i f  there are heaps of notebooks filed  out together with the 
homework. Otherwise they [field officers] say, Oh! You’re a poor 
teacher {Ibid 1997).
In terms of teacher training, the training packages were normally developed in 
• Quetta in isolation from the teachers although some teachers had been involved in 
the process. DEOs were asked to nominate twenty teachers per district and up to 
thirty teachers per district for master trainers. 'So, here, we develop the master 
trainer cadre, master trainers and then they are trained in their own respective 
districts. I t is totally managed by the Primary Education Directorate. I t’s 
monitoring, its payment, conduction; all are managed by the Primary Education 
Directorate” (BOCE Official, Quetta, 1997).
The capacity of district offices to handle, monitor and supervise a 
decentralised teacher- training program was identified as minimal. Most of the 
respondents at the centre or PED made this claim. Training is one area that if 
monitored properly, impacts the quality of the curriculum being taught-the two go 
hand in hand. One respondent claimed that the LC was the only member of staff 
within the DEO’s office that was technically prepared for training. The LCs job 
description included the training of the teachers but it was reported that they had 
not been doing it properly and that DEOs had not been doing it either.
I  would say that the district education ofScers don't have the 
capacity to train the teachers. Yeah, there should be some other 
mechanism for training the teachers at the District level and the 
Bureau of Curriculum also can know because the Bureau of 
Curriculum doesn’t have the funds to run a primary training 
program (Ibid 1997).
Learning Co-ordinators were former primary school teachers that had been 
promoted without the proper qualifications and competencies. They had been 
promoted on the basis of their seniority, on the basis of their age, not on the basis 
of their competency. Therefore they were classified as not competent enough to 
train the teachers although the PED had arranged two or three training venues for 
them which in the opinion of one officer, had not proven successful. The idea of a 
‘learning co-ordinator’ as envisioned originally was a good one that identified a
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valuable role for them in the districts. A number of external factors 
compromised the LCs ability to do their job. First, there were not enough of 
them. The idea ratio was one LC for every fifteen teachers. It is rare to find LCs 
who are responsible for less than forty to sixty schools and teachers. One 
respondent claimed that the LCs could not possibly supervise such a range of 
teachers and schools. Because of their lack of supervision skills, they were 
continuing to focus on inspection (T.A.-Teacher Training, 1997).
Transportation of the LCs was another real problem. Motorcycles used by 
men were found in short supply and if motorcycles were available, there usually 
wasn’t enough allowance given to maintain them. Petrol, oil, and lubrication 
(POL) charges were considered insufficient or commandeered by DEOs. The 
female side was even considered worse, in terms of numbers and no 
transportation. In theory, vans were to have been provided at each district 
headquarters. The respondent claimed that he had not seen any vans 
functioning in the districts he had visited.
So that what's happening is that LCs are basically peons of the 
DEOs. They spend ninety per cent of their time in the DEO 
office doing clerical work and gophering. Now, maybe in 
Jaffarabad when you go there you'll find the situation better 
than that They're keen on their LCs down there. They seem to 
be over time more actively lobbying to get these problems 
solved than is happening in other districts. But I  think in 
terms of decentralisation, to shore up the supervision side of i t  
[in the districts] is really essential because we can't do that 
here in Quetta (Ibid 1997).
In contrast, if external factors could have been rectified, another official felt 
that a mentoring program would help to improve the capacity of field officers for 
training teachers. It was the belief that the development of the Primary Teacher 
Mentoring Program (PTMP) was one step towards the decentralisation of in- 
service training. Historically the in-service training had been conducted at PED. In 
the PTMP, however, PED was responsible for facilitating a one-day training on 
mentoring at the district headquarters with the teachers. Then the mentors would 
conduct training for two days back at the cluster site on the same topic with other 
teachers.
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In some districts where DEOs are committed and competent, i t ’s 
going excellent But on the other hand i f  in one or two districts he 
is not committed and he is not motivated, so i t  is affected. So it  
means that i f  we can provide some sort of training to all those 
DEOs I  think i t  can work very easily {BOCE Official, 1997).
In-service teacher training programs were also characterised as being 
expensive. Travel and daily allowance (TA/DA) had to be given to teachers for 
travelling from their districts to Quetta for this training. Regular government 
budgets exclusive of external funding would not be able to handle all associated 
training costs once donor-supported projects had concluded. Decentralised 
programs such as the mentoring program that was conducted in the district was 
explained to be a cost-efficient way of handling the in-service training program. 
The government rule for providing TA/DA was travel in excess of sixteen 
kilometres. Clusters would then be formed of teachers within a sixteen— 
kilometre radius ensuring that no travel funds would need to be disbursed. In 
the opinion of one official, this program was showing signs of success in the 
district of Jaffarabad.
In terms of decentralisation, the explanation was given that the proximity of 
DEOs to teachers enabled the officer to know the difficulties and problems faced 
by his/her teachers in the district. If teacher training could be decentralised, it 
was hypothetically noted that through localised training, the DEO would be able 
to assess and address the needs of the teacher. Through this assessment, the 
DEO could then make a request to the centre or PED or BOCE for assistance 
with specialised training or provide feedback on the curriculum.
In terms of quality control and monitoring of curriculum, BIMDTC did make 
an effort to field—test their curriculum and supplementary materials. One 
source revealed, however, that once the materials were printed, it did not have 
the capacity to conduct observations in the field as to whether the materials 
were being used properly. It was further noted that BIMDTC relied heavily on 
the Teacher Training cell and through its mentors for feedback on the materials 
(T.A.-BIMDTC, 1997).
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Finally, respondents commented on the budgetary controls associated with 
curriculum training for teachers. At the time of research, the training budget was 
controlled from PED and to some extent, the BOCE. One respondent indicated 
that instead of placing the training budget at the central office, every district 
education officer should get a training budget.
The district education officer should assess the training needs of 
the teacher and then come to the BOCE or the training cell a t 
PED for the training of teachers. They should arrange training 
for their teachers to the training cell in accordance with the 
funds available to them and in this way I  think training will 
become more effective (BOCE Official, 1997).
The opinion expressed here assumed that DEO’s had discretionary control 
as well as the necessary funds with which to facilitate local training programs. 
This false assumption is representative of the centrist viewpoints taken in terms 
of the broader financial management function which is discussed in the next 
section.
Budget Allocation
According to strict definitions of administrative decentralisation, it only 
occurs when local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources 
(Midgley 1986:33). Respondents at the centre agreed that in Balochistan, the 
process of budget allocation for primary education had never been decentralised.
During the 1992-97 research period, primary education operated from two 
budgets: 1) GOB recurrent budget; and 2) World Bank development budget. The 
process of recurrent budgets was described as a series of cascading steps. The 
Federal Government had allocated only two and one-half per cent of its overall 
budget to education. Incidentally, education was sixth on the priority scale with 
defence spending being first. So this two and one-half per cent then was 
apportioned to the provinces proportionate to population. Balochistan having 
one of the lowest populations did not get enough funding to cover their expenses 
(Financial Officer, PED, 1997). The Provincial Government, in turn, decided on 
the allocations of funding per sector and for education, divided the budget into 
three categories: 1) primary education; 2) secondary and tertiary education; and
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3) administration. The Finance Department of the GOB then released funds to 
PED who in turn released funding to district offices throughout the province. 
District officers had been given the authority to draw the money from the 
government for its use locally.
It was reported that recurrent funds ideally would have been distributed to 
the districts on a monthly basis but that at the Directorate, the recurrent budget 
was released only twice a year—a recurrent budget and a modified recurrent 
budget. The DEOs were required to send expenditure statements by the tenth of 
every month to the Directorate but some of the officers failed to do so and 
consequently the Directorate estimated their budget based on their staff posts 
and other regular expenditure (Ibid 1997).
DEOs had the responsibility of providing to the Directorate the statement of 
their expenditures. But as several respondents indicated, submission of 
expenditure statements is no guarantee that the necessary funding would be 
disbursed. The bottom fine was that whether or not statements of expenditure 
were submitted by the DEOs to the Directorate, the Provincial Government 
would generally disburse funds according to its own discretion and in uneven 
intervals. The salaries, however, were released on a monthly basis but other 
reimbursements were not made on a timely basis.
DEOs did not have discretionary funding for procurement of new items such 
as construction, purchase of furniture, reading and writing materials, vehicles 
and repair and maintenance and training. Under the external funding of the 
BPEP, these items were financed and controlled at the centre by PED. 
According to this account, the officer claimed that the new education policy that 
came out in 1998 and was to cover the period through 2003 exposed a problem of 
realism. Examples of this lack of realism were the expectation that fourteen 
thousand teachers would be added to schools upgrading from primary to middle 
schools. Five new rooms per upgraded school would be added and funding for 
training and materials would be allocated. The officer characterised these plans 
as not merely ambitious, but also unrealistic in the given timeframe.
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Concerning capability, staff at the Directorate presumed that it did not exist 
at the district level for local planning and participation of district budgets. As 
one financial officer indicated:
A t the district level, I  don’t think we are ready for decentralised 
system of financial management because we don’t  have the trained 
and well-experienced human resource. I  think we don’t  have even 
enough educated people, you know, who could do accounts and 
everything. So each of the DEOs they have assistants but most of 
them are not qualified enough to handle these accounts. (Financial 
Officer, PED, 1997)
The second source of operational funding for administration outside the 
recurrent budget was World Bank development budget. For this World Bank 
Credit which was signed in 1993, a loan of U.S. $106 million from the World Bank 
was provided against a development budget. While the recurrent budget was 
permanent, the development budget would cease at the end of the project until 
1999. The project process was structured in a way that an annual development 
plan would be developed every year according to the components of teacher 
training, curriculum development, construction of schools, and administration. 
Under each of these components allocations of funds were made to the different 
components and each of the sub-categories. For example, with construction, sites 
were selected where construction needed to be done and priority was given to the 
girl’s school and throughout Balochistan, schools were selected based on criteria 
such as enrolment.
When the sites were selected in the various districts, those site nominations 
were sent to the World Bank for final approval. When the World Bank approved 
those, the tenders would be floated in the newspapers. After the selection process, 
the contracts were awarded to different contractors (T.A.-School Construction, 
1997). When the schools were constructed, then the contractor would send those 
bills to the Director of Primary Education. Before these bills were paid, 
construction had to be verified. According to the credit agreement one hundred per 
cent funding was appropriated for construction from the World Bank. For other 
things, .e.g., vehicles, the World Bank paid sixty per cent and the government of 
Balochistan was to pay forty per cent. So according to these distributions, a 
statement was prepared on a monthly basis and submitted to the World Bank for 
reimbursement. This expenditure would come under the development budget (Ibid).
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Centralisation and control of this development budget had also occurred at 
an even higher level than the Directorate. For example, in the 97-98 fiscal year, 
funding for the Balochistan Primary Education Program was not forthcoming 
from the GOB. According to the Credit agreement, the World Bank would 
provide eighty-eight per cent of the funding amount and the Government would 
provide twelve per cent. The bottleneck to PED's appropriation and use of 
development funds was blamed on the slow and infrequent disbursement of 
funds from the Government of Balochistan. The World Bank's contribution was 
contingent upon the disbursement of the GOB's twelve per cent.
Every month when we send the apphcation for reimbursement to 
the World Bank, they ask how much has the Government 
contributed and i f  you don’t  have that, then we cannot send the 
reimbursement application. So for this twelve per cent, we ju st 
keep on asking the Government that we need to get i t  otherwise 
the project will have trouble running; so we ju st keep on asking 
and the Director sometimes has to go to the Finance Department 
and talk to the Secretary (Financial Officer, PED, 1997).
Overview
Three points can be made respective of central administration. First, the 
claim was made that Balochistan was not ready or capable of handling a 
decentralised financial management system given the prevailing administrative 
environment. Secondly, it was noted that the cost of administration would 
definitely be increased if decentralisation policies were put into effect. ‘ The cost 
would go up because we don’t  have the equipment like we would need 
computers... Even i f  we provide the computers, still, we need skilled persons to 
do the accounts, to know the accounts and right now, I  don’t  think we have 
that (Financial Officer, PED, 1997). Thirdly, corruption was claimed as a major 
impediment to developing the administrative capacity for local budget planning 
and control at the local or district level. ‘Already, sadly Pakistan has a problem 
with corruption so i f  we decentralise our financial management I  think our 
corruption level would go up’ (Ibid).
These observations corroborate the judgement of the literature that 
decentralisation processes fail to discuss the costs to the system. Decentralisation 
implies that the financial burden on the system will be lessened and the response
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time will be increased. In many cases increasing the number of government levels, 
increasing level of communication, etc. all pose a financial cost and burden on the 
system.
In terms of guidelines or training in the procedures of financial 
management of primary education at the centre, sources indicated that such 
facilities were negligible. The financial officer interviewed for this research 
indicated that he had been working for six years but had not seen any such 
procedural guidebook.
It would have helped me a lot i f  there had been something. The 
things I  learned were based on m y own experience and like 
working with the Deputy Director. Because m y job was to go 
with the current system, I  had to work based on whatever was 
the current system  (Financial Officer, PED, 1997).
It was further noted that no policies for financial management were readily 
accessible or available if even to be found in existence. If there were a formal 
policy vacuum, then it would be logical to assume that an informal system of 
administration could also evolve. If an informal system was operative, then we 
should ask what the factors were that significantly influenced the system, i.e., 
would they be individuals or events? Or might they be political? The data 
suggest a mix of factors. A combination of powerful individuals combined with 
weak administration has led to Balochistan’s centralising tendencies.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have looked at central institutions and the culture and 
attitudes within them. They were not conducive to decentralisation as a goal 
and this was brought out when we discussed their functions and the extent to 
which those functions had been decentralised.
We have seen evidence to explain why the establishment of the PED had 
centralising tendencies. Budgeting at PED became a central function that was 
controlled by not only federal and provincial ministries but once released
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became the object of control and patronage to certain individuals within the 
PED. Also, the Bureau of Curriculum as the GOB’s formal branch for conducting 
teacher—training was marginalised through the establishment of a teacher- 
training cell within PED. Although external funding of teacher training hoped to 
achieve better co-ordination of education activities, in terms of decentralisation, 
this component became more centralised with the exception of cluster programs 
started in Jaffarabad and a few other districts.
NGO development was introduced through externally funded goals. PED 
implemented these plans but failed to formulate policies surrounding the roles 
of NGOs contrasted with roles of government education officers. Carrying 
mandates to conduct business of establishing monitoring committees and village 
education committees, the NGOs soon found themselves treading on government 
officials’ territories. Even teachers unions had been neglected from the 
beginning as a stakeholder in the education management process. This neglect 
later led to breakdown of community mobilisation for education development.
Finally, DEO’s powers were found to be weak. It is suggested that their 
authority had been scaled down with the advent of the formation of PED. 
Controls of budgets, construction, training, personnel, and procurement of 
supplies were all held at the centre under ‘single-authority’ practice where an 
individual or two could leverage most of the power. This chapter raises the 
question that what conditions would be necessary for the centre to let go of its 
power? The donor ‘flag waving’ did not seem to make a difference.
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Chapter 5
Case Study: Jaffarabad
The stated intention of education reform in Balochistan was to devolve 
administration to a ‘local’ level. To test the reality of this claim, it is necessary to 
observe education policy and administration in practice at the ‘local’ level.
Jaffarabad16 was selected as a case for reasons already stated but re-emphasised 
here. In 1997, this district was characterised as being relatively economically 
advantaged. The ample availability of surface irrigation water and its tropical 
climate set Jaffarabad apart from the other districts in Balochistan. The 
predominance of ‘command’ area (the majority of land in the district) irrigated 
with canal water, the comparatively high yields of wheat, rice, oilseed and 
cotton, and the dense population portray it as having the most potential for 
social and economic development among all the districts in Balochistan (Bureau 
of Statistics 1997:60). In short, the economic condition for successful 
implementation of decentralisation policy was greatest here.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first gives the local context. 
The second introduces local institutions associated with primary education in 
Jaffarabad. In the third section, the locus of control over primary education 
management is analysed in connection with these district institutions. Evidence
16 The Jaffarabad discussion relies heavily on the 1997 Bureau of Statistics Report; 1997 
SCOPE Progress Report as well as field observation notes and semi-structured 
interviews that were documented in 1998.
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collected through interviews, documents and personal observations will be used 
to identify the locus and level of control that the district had at its disposal.
Data collection concerning Jaffarabad occurred at two levels. At the district 
level, we conducted semi-structured interviews with education officers, 
ministerial staff, NGO representatives, villagers and community notables. In 
addition to these interviews, we documented field observations and took 
photographs. Reports and other documents were collected from offices that we 
visited. At the central level, Balochistan Education Management Information 
System’s (BEMIS) data were obtained relating to Jaffarabad. Interviews were 
also undertaken of administrative staff at the provincial level to gain their 
perspectives of the administration situation in Jaffarabad. Together, this 
information provides the corpus of evidence for the case study.
Hartley (1994) informs us, however, that case studies cannot be defined by 
the techniques used to gather data for their formulation. Instead, definition 
must come through the case study’s theoretical orientation. To this end, primary 
education administration in the Jaffarabad District is analysed using Winkler’s 
Typology Matrix. This matrix analyses the various components of education 
administration as well as the level of management reform. Later in Chapter 
Seven, the evidence introduced in this chapter will be compiled with other data 
and analysed against five organisational variables that are crucial to 
decentralisation theory.
5.1 Background
Jaffarabad was named after Mir Jaffar Khan Jamah, a Muslim League 
political party veteran from Balochistan and an alleged close friend of 
Mohammed Ah Jinnah, commonly known as Quaid-e-Azam, the founder of 
Pakistan. The notification for the formation of the district was July 1, 1981. At 
the time of data collection (1997-98), Jaffarabad entered its sixteenth year of 
existence but with a growing disparity between its potential for economic 
development and its lagging social indicators (See Table 5.1). Despite the fact
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that the district contained a series of canals and waterways for potentially wide 
distribution of water, only twenty five per cent of the population had access to 
water. Also, electricity served only fifteen per cent of villages. Population growth 
projected at five per cent was above the national average for that same time 
period. Jaffarabad also had an expanding labour force for which limited jobs 
existed; i.e. primarily tenant farming and labourers. Education indicators for the 
district will be presented in detail later.
Socio-economic Indicators
Jaffarabad is a long, narrow strip of land bordering the Sindh Province. It 
covers a territory of 3,100 square kilometres. There are two sub-divisions—1) 
Usta Mohammed and 2) Dera Allah Yar (Jhat Pat) and there are three sub* 
Tehsil’s—1) GandakhaJ 2) Panhwarl and 3) Sunehri. Area-wise Jaffarabad is the 
second smallest of all districts in Balochistan with a geographical area of 244,510 
hectares. The table below shows that eighty five per cent of the district is arable 
land, while only 10,973 hectares (forty five per cent) is non-cultivable. The 
district is densely populated with an estimated population in 1995 of 555,557. 
The combination of a relatively small area of land (the second smallest district in 
size) with a relatively high population (fourth largest) makes Jaffarabad the 
most densely populated district in Balochistan outside the provincial capital of 
Quetta.
Table 5.1 Socio-economic Indicators for Jaffarabad District
Area 2,445 sq. km (244,510 hectares)
Population 555,557 (1995 NIPS projection)
Density (1995) 227 per sq. km (1995 NIPS 
projection)
Population Growth (from 1981 to 1995) 5.4% annual growth (NIPS 
projection)
Number of Villages 589
Villages with electricity 89
Area Cultivated 189,377 hectares
Access to Water 25% of population are serviced by 
water schemes
Source* Bureau of Statistics, 1997
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The sub-division of Usta Muhammad was economically better off than 
Dera Alla Yar. Field observations confirm, for example, that there were 
more automobiles in Usta Mohammad than in Dera Alla Yar. One 
education officer explained why.
The landlords in Usta Muhammad have a lo t of land. Also 
people here are more educated and are in services. That is why 
the people are better off in Usta Muhammad. People of Usta 
Muhammad are in top government positions a t the PCS and 
CSS level. There is a lot of agricultural land as compared to the 
population of this area. The land is very fertile. There are three 
or four industrial units in Usta Muhammad. There are 30 to 40 
rice mills functioning here. Rice is supplied to Karachi and the 
interior o f the Sindh province from here, i t  is exported as well 
(Male SDEO Usta Muhammad, 1998).
There are various sources of revenue in the district. The major source is the 
land revenue on rice crops. This is particularly true for Usta Mohammad. The 
revenue includes taxes/income sources on property, vehicles, and agriculture. 
For this reason the district may be regarded better developed than others in the 
province.
The Bureau of Statistics of the Planning and Development Department for 
the Province has indicated in its study of the Jaffarabad district that their 
research concerning funding, transfers, and development funds for the district 
proved to be unsuccessful. Their intention was to collect data on resource 
mobilisation by government institutions in the district, on transfers from outside 
the district and on expenditures in or on behalf of the district. With this 
information, some insight would have been obtained with regard to the flows of 
money in and out of the district. Efforts to obtain complete data, however, failed. 
A collection of fragmented data resulted. It was concluded that the district did 
not collect enough resources internally to cover the costs of all public 
expenditures. The district is dependent on transfers from outside to run its 
affairs and to undertake development activities. Given the system, much of the 
decision-making process concerning the development of the district lay outside 
its boundaries (Bureau of Statistics, 1997)
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Social Organisation
Jaffarabad is ethnically and tribally heterogeneous. There are three ethnic 
groups inhabiting the district: the Baloch, the Jamoot/Jat and the Brauhi. The 
two predominant Baloch tribes are Khosa and Jamah. Politically, the Jamah 
family (classified as feudal) is influential controlling most of the land of 
Jaffarabad and are sheltered by tribahsm. Farmers are more or less the 
servants of feudals, a tradition of society that is not easily altered (See Box 5.1). 
Sindhi is the major language of the district. The other languages that are 
spoken include Balochi, Saraiki and even Brauhi.
Pohtics in the district are closely linked to these elites or landowners, 
rendering pohtical parties virtually irrelevant. The hmited role of pohtical 
parties has been evidenced by the fact that ah those who have succeeded in 
winning elections since 1988 did so due to their personal, family or tribal 
influence. The three provincial constituencies have been under the tribal/family 
influence of the Jamah ehte. In the past the family unanimously agreed to 
forward candidates with clear mandates. Even nationahy popular parties 
including the Balochistan National Party (BNP) and the Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP) and Pakistan Mushm League have ah had difficulty generating votes for 
the candidates against the landlords.
Four tiers of local government exist in Jaffarabad—District Council, Town 
Committee, Municipal Committee and Union Councils. Due to lack of funds and 
pohtical circumstances, their performance had not been very effective as 
evidenced through its checkerboard past. The concept of local government can be 
traced to the Basic Democracies plan founded by the late Pakistani President, 
Ayub Khan. However, the institutions which he estabhshed were dissolved after 
Zulfiqar Ah Bhutto stepped into power in 1970. Later, President Zia ul-Haq 
reactivated the local government institutions throughout the country to elect 
tiers of the Local Unions and Tehsil Councils. Elections for the Local bodies in 
Balochistan were held in 1979, 1983, 1987, and 1991. On December 19, 1996, the 
local bodies were dissolved with elections pending.
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Box 5.1 Feudals In Jaffarabad
The Jamahs have wielded a significant amount of pohtical power in the district 
of Jaffarabad. The district was named after the late Jaffar Jamali, as is the name of the 
town ‘Dera Jamali Khan’ in the neighbouring district of Nasirabad. Oxford educated, 
the late Jamah was a large landowner whose legacy is carried out by his sons who are 
also educated ehte and weh travehed. The family continues to manage a significant 
portion of rice production in the district as learned through an interview with them. 
The brothers fear that national affairs are dominated too much by Punjabi pohtical 
leaders. They claim that these rulers have taken away the rights of the people of 
Balochistan. One example noted was given by the brother who formerly served as the 
Provincial Food Minister to the Province of Balochistan. He noted that not enough 
attention has been placed on the means of food production in the Province and that also 
irrigation was crucial and needed to be further developed to thwart a drought that he 
felt was imminent to the province.
Evidence collected through other interviews suggests that while the Jamali 
family may feel marginalised from Federal attention, the family’s control within the 
province is expansive, extending to the education sector. Some education field officers 
indicate that they have been approached and/or threatened by family members to hire 
unqualified relatives as teachers. Other evidence collected revealed that this family had 
been involved with education field officers and NGO representatives in site selections 
and school construction matters. While the feudals had made minor monetary 
donations to schools, they were in arrears in payment of the rent that they had 
promised to pay for two particular buildings in Jaffarabad. Their political power 
was also evidenced through the deference given to their name throughout the 
province, including their farmers as well as the fact that they have 
bodyguards/levies to protect them. Their power and influence have profoundly 
influenced education management and have done very little to support
decentralisation reforms.________________________________________________
Source: Personal Interview with Aurangzeb Jamali, Jaffarabad, February 22, 1998
Local government falls under the provincial government. The role of 
provincial government is substantial in relation to the management of district 
affairs, with fifty-six departments. There were approximately 4,136 provincial 
government employees in the district of Jaffarabad as of 1996. The district 
administration is comprised of a Deputy Commissioner (DC), an Additional 
Deputy Commissioner, three Assistant Commissioners or Sub-divisional 
Magistrates, Tehsildar(s) and Naib Tehsildar(s). The important departments are 
those of levy, police, anti-corruption, irrigation, construction and works (C&W), 
livestock (animal husbandry), labour, jail, public health and engineering, local 
government, health social welfare, forest and wildlife offices. Excise and 
taxation, the treasury office and education all come under the direct jurisdiction 
of the provincial government.
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The DC as head of the district has power over every department. However, a 
major role for the DC in socio-economic planning has not been fu lf illed for two 
reasons. One reason was the frequent transfers within the government 
administration, including the transfers of the DC himself. Another reason was 
that the DC is usually pre-occupied with issues such as law and order and 
revenue. It was reported that if the DC failed to appease the sitting MNA, MPA 
or Senator, he could likely be transferred. Other government officials were also 
affected by the pohtical manoeuvring of MNAs and MPAs. As one education 
officer pointed out, ‘In Jaffarabad, the MNA, MPA seriously influence the 
[education] department but I  tried my best to avoid their disturbances (Male 
SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).
Livelihoods
The majority of people living in Jaffarabad reside in rural areas and are 
socio-economically disadvantaged. Income is primarily earned through tenant 
farming, small land-ownership, livestock, petty labour and low-scale government 
work. The two primary urban areas are the towns of Usta Mohammad and Dera 
Allah Yar. The district has a measurable number of Hindu citizens who five 
primarily in these two urban centres. It is reported that a large number of 
shopkeepers in Dera Allah Yar are Hindu and commute back and forth from the 
neighbouring town of Jacobabad in the Sindh Province and speak Sindhi.
There were two economic classes of people in Jaffarabad as noted by 
respondents in Jaffarabad.
There are two kinds of people that I  find: very rich families 
(feudal) or very poor families. There are more poor families 
than the other kind of families. They have very low income and 
a very bad economic situation. During the year they cannot pay  
their expenses so they always live on loans. It is difficult for 
them to even send their kids to government schools... The 
middle class which is very rare, here, are sending their children 
to private schools locally which costs R s./100 to 150per month 
and the rich do not even send their kids to schools in 
Jaffarabad. They go outside the city or province or abroad 
(SCOPE M.D., Jaffarabad, 1998).
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Jaffarabad is an agricultural district irrigated by four major canals. It has 
the largest agricultural production among the districts in Balochistan with the 
largest area of cultivated land. Rice, wheat, cotton, pulses, and various 
vegetables are the major crops of the area. The majority of people of both rich 
and poor classes were employed in agriculture given Jaffarabad’s agricultural 
based economy. Figure 5.1 depicts one of many rice mills found in Jaffarabad.
Figure 5.1 Rice Mill in Dera Allah Yar
Source Personal Photo, Jaffarabad, 1998
Allegedly, the Jamalis as landowners {Zamindari) controlled most of the 
land by appropriating titles among family members and tenants to protect 
themselves against land reforms. A majority of this land was cultivated by two 
kinds of tenants- seasonal and permanent tenants who were in turn supported 
by another class of workers known as tillers. Tenants were either supervised by 
the landowner himself or by his family members. One education officer indicated 
that these labourers lacked awareness of educational opportunities because they 
spent all their time in the fields. 'Their life is  in stayin g with the landlord, i f  the 
relations g e t worse with one landlord th ey m ove to the other to earn th eir living.
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So these people are less oriented towards education. They live on hope for a 
promise of work the following year’ (SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).
In terms of education, one board member of the local NGO indicated that a 
key factor to reducing peoples’ motivation for acquiring education was poverty.
The trend of education is not very common here... obviously the 
government cannot provide such a large number of jobs and as 
a result; the people do not see any benefit of i t  [schooling]. I  
mean the youth are not getting jobs after getting education so 
when they look at the situation that after sending a kid to 
school for twelve years, they return to agriculture (farming) 
again so what is the use of wasting this time and why not busy 
them in agriculture from the beginning? On the other hand, 
these NGOs should motivate them to inform the community 
that the real meaning of education is not to get a job but to 
become an educated person in a society. And in this way, i f  we 
are educated well, we can perform better in agriculture (M.D.,
SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998).
The majority of the population were characterised as living in poverty in 
Jaffarabad and that many families could not afford to send their children to any 
school. Also attendance was known to fluctuate in certain periods of the year, 
and decline especially during the harvest period. Most of the children were 
helping their parents with the harvest and did not have time for both study and 
work.
Infrastructure
Under Federal administration, the institutions that actively function at the 
district level are the elections office, the utilities provider known as the Water 
and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), the post office and the railways. 
WAPDA is responsible for providing electricity to urban and rural areas. It is 
also involved in expanding the Pat Feeder Canal system. The gas office 
(Southern Sui Gas) is also a federal department. There are other federal 
government units such as Intelligence Bureau (IB), and Inter Service 
Intelligence Agency (ISI), but their role was characterised as less visible.
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Access in Jaffarabad to basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation, 
health and education was rated as being poor. Although the water supply in the 
district was viewed as adequate, the problem of clean drinking water and 
sanitation has remained constant. There were minimal water tanks and 
filtration arrangements, so that water could be purified. However most 
populations stored water from rivers and rain, which were not sanitary.
Sanitation facilities have not been managed or monitored through the Public 
Health Department. With the growing density of population that was recorded in 
1997, the lack of human waste disposal services poses a serious threat to society. 
Although the district has many canals, the deficient availability of potable water 
and subsequent purification were also considered to be problematic.
Despite the fact that three quarters of the district had electricity, a much 
smaller proportion of the population could actually avail itself of that energy 
source. From January 1992 to November 1996, a total of eighty-nine villages 
had been electrified by the WAPDA in Jaffarabad indicating that seventy six per 
cent of the inhabited area in Jaffarabad district was connected to electricity. 
However, as there was confusion over what constituted a village, statistics 
indicated an electrification rate varying from fourteen per cent to seventy six per 
cent. Considering the number of connections compared with the average 
household size of seven people, not even ten per cent of the population had 
access to electricity in 1997.
Poor health services in Jaffarabad resemble challenges faced throughout the 
province as manifested through complaints about the equity and quality of 
health services including the lack of staff—especially female, and the lack of 
access to health care for women. There were very few health facilities. 
Dispensaries that were in existence in towns were not staffed sufficiently. 
Villagers interviewed in this study made a special request for dispensaries in 
closer proximity to their village. They indicated their inconvenience of having to 
travel great distances to get medicine as well as medical attention (Abdul Latif 
Umrani, Jaffarabad, 1998).
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The supply of gas in the district extended to Dera Alla Yar, Sobhat Pur and 
Usta Mohammad. Few other villages were being provided with gas. However, for 
industrial and mechanical/agricultural purposes, electricity is the major source 
of energy. Both sources are used for cooking and heating purposes. Houses 
without electricity are reliant on kerosene oil and wood. The use of dung cake for 
fuel is very common among the poor, even in areas with electricity and gas. 
Middle and upper classes rely on diesel-powered generators for agricultural and 
domestic purposes in areas without electricity. Illegal electricity connections are 
common in the rural areas, in the sense that people have connected themselves 
illegally to the power grid or have sabotaged their meters.
In 1997, Jaffarabad had a high density of metalled roads, including a 
portion of the national highway, which extended from Quetta to the Sindh 
Province. These roads as well as a railway provide necessary linkages to large 
markets. The condition of these and rural roads, however, was poor as 
experienced by the author in travelling throughout the district. Observations of 
local respondents were also noted.
Mostly the roads around are katcha’ (dirt) and the main road of 
Jaffarabad is also not in good condition. Link roads are also 
katcha and the transportation that is available on main road is 
not available on link roads so mostly the donkey or cow carts 
are used to go to the villages. Tractors are also used as a means 
of transportation.” (M.D. SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998; see also 
Figure 5.2)
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Figure 5.2 Modes of Transportation in Jaffarabad
Source: Personal Photo, Dera Alla Yar, 1998
5.2 Education Administration
The Balochistan Local Government Ordinance of 1980 stipulated that the 
District Council of Jaffarabad would have express control of the following 
functions in relation to the education sector.
❖ Provision, maintenance and management of primary schools
❖ Construction and maintenance of student hostel buildings
❖ Payments of grants and subsidies to institutions and organisations 
engaged in the promotion of education
❖ Promotion of adult education (Bureau of Statistics, 1997)
In reality, however, these functions were not controlled within the district, but 
rather were organised or controlled centrally by the Education Department in 
the provincial capital. A majority of respondents acknowledged that education 
administration was centralised in the Province. One district officer articulated 
this in his account of some problems that his office faced with administration.
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This is the disadvantage of centralisation that we do not get 
furniture and books on time. This is one of the problems faced 
by our children (SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).
In the following sections, education administration in Jaffarabad is first 
discussed according to the institutions that facilitate the administration of 
education. Next, Winkler’s decentralisation-centralisation typology matrix for 
public education is used to identify the locus of control for activities in each 
component for public service delivery. It is hoped that this analysis will explain 
how and the extent to which the process of primary education administration 
was decentralised in the district. Before discussing institutions and the control 
dynamics, a description of the government school system is provided.
Government School System
Formal schooling in Balochistan is organised in a three-stage system of 
primary, middle and upper secondary or high school, and runs for a total period 
of ten years. Primary education comprises six grades, from kachi (kindergarten) 
to fifth grade. The age of entry into the system is varied, ranging from age four 
to age eight. On successful completion of all six grades, pupils are awarded a 
primary certificate. They are eligible then to enter middle school that runs for 
three years from grades six to eight. This is followed by two years of upper 
secondary or high school (grades nine to ten) ending in matriculation. There 
used to be mosque schools in the district but they were merged with government 
schools in 1993. A headmaster or headmistress manages middle and high 
schools. One or two teachers generally manage a primary school. In Table 5.2 
below, the enrolment figures for the four levels of schooling are given.
Primary Schools
The total number of boys’ primary schools in 1992 was 477 and increased to 
568 by 1997. The numbers of girls’ primary schools was 62 in 1992 and increased 
to 181 schools by 1997. The cost of schooling in the urban areas was different 
from the cost in the village. At the village level the cost was reported as being 
low because students were theoretically provided with books and other
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educational materials. As one respondent suggested, ‘a cost of Rs.200/- could be 
very helpful to the student and that the books a t the primary level could be 
bought easily with this amount’{SDEO Usta Muhammad, 1998).
Middle Schools
A middle school comprises four classes from fifth to eighth. In 1997 there 
were thirty middle schools for boys with an enrolment of 5,254. There were only 
four middle schools for girls that same year with an enrolment of 930. All Middle 
schools are government owned.
High Schools
In 1997, there were a total of nineteen boys’ high schools and four girls’ high 
schools. The total enrolment in the boys’ high schools was 2,610 of which 40 
were girls (Bureau of Statistics, 1997). There were three hundred female 
students.
School Buildings
The school buildings (except private schools) belong to the government of 
Balochistan. The primary school building may be donated by MPA funds. They 
are government owned or donated by the Members of the Provincial Assembly 
but still become the property of the Balochistan Government. A primary school 
comprises basically of two rooms. The majority of them, including the female 
schools, have boundary walls. There is little consistency in construction and 
style of school buildings, though all are made of bricks. The majority of them 
lack playing grounds, boundary walls (primary schools), and latrine facilities. 
The district map (Figure 5.3) shows that the majority of primary school 
buildings are located near water canals. This suggests that families with 
children tend to populate these waterways in terms of their livelihood already 
indicated as farming and general survival. The Balochistan Education 
Management Information System (BEMIS) Cell stationed within the Directorate 
for Primary Education in Quetta created the map through a school mapping
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initiative. The schools were mapped using a GIS system that beams the data via 
satellite to a database.
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Table 5.2 Statistical Overview of Jaffarabad Government Schools
Number of Students Enrolled in Educational Institutions
Number of Pupils
Enrolment 
Gn public sector)
1992 1997
M F Total M F Total
Primary School 22,205 4,691 26,896 22,042 11,473 33,515
Middle Schools 4,200 293 4,493 5,254 930 6,184
High School 1,247 57 1,304 2,528 294 2,822
Source- BEMIS Data, August ]992—Report #l; April 1997
Number of Educational Institutions
Number of Institutions
Schools 1992 1997
Level M F Total M F Total
Primary Schools 427 25 482 519 174 693
Middle Schools 27 4 31 30 4 34
High Schools 14 3 17 19 3 22
Source-' BEMIS Data, August 1992—Report #2, April 1997
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of Schools in Jaffarabad
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5.3 Local Institutions
The physical characteristics of primary education in Jaffarabad, while 
important to the proper functioning of education, are not the life of the system. 
The lifeblood of the system are those local institutions and their staff who 
manage primary education on a day-to-day basis. Local administration of 
schools in Jaffarabad was handled through the district education offices that 
consisted of government hired, ministerial staff and executive staff. The district 
education office is discussed in further detail later in the chapter. Also, one local 
non-governmental organisation exists in Jaffarabad and employs staff locally. 
Institutions, however, are not limited to formal organisations. For example, this 
study found that small groups were also either playing an administrative role in 
some community schools or in some way effecting administration negatively. 
Below is a discussion of local institutions that aided in primary education 
development at the district level.
Community Support Process (CSP)
In Balochistan, the female district education officer’s office and staff are 
responsible for supporting the process of the development of girl’s schools in co­
operation with villages and communities. In Jaffarabad, the female DEO 
reported that sixty-nine community girl's schools were functioning as of 1997 and 
that forty-five of those had been established in the 1996-97 period. She also 
stated her role and responsibilities inclusive of monitoring government girls’ 
schools and supporting the development of community schools. In this respect, 
the government officer’s role includes conducting the qualifying tests for the 
teachers, releasing the posts, verifying the building/structure and providing the 
certificate and conducting the opening ceremony of the school. The female DEO’s 
office is theoretically supposed to work in concert with the local NGO known as 
SCOPE in supporting the CSP process. An account provided by the officer 
implied that the two offices at first had not co-ordinated their work so well. ‘Now 
we prepare the work-plans together, she [NGO] does not herself come to do this 
but we do collaborate in these activities together now. But before this she [NGO] 
used to do the opening by herself and used to do the testing as well and used to 
send the papers for verification'(Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).
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Local observation suggested that the DEOs role soon became one of 
verification of the NGOs work. For example, the DEO would visit the newly 
formed village schools and ask students whether they belonged to this school or 
if they had been a part of another school. It was found that ten to thirteen 
children from nearby government schools were attending in order to meet the 
qualifying number of students for the CSP school. If the school did qualify, it 
could be opened. After completing the hurdle of verification, the DEO usually 
conducted an opening ceremony and sanctioned the teaching post on a three- 
month probationary period. Some confusion existed, at first, as to who was 
accountable for processing the final selection of staff/teachers.
When the first time i t  was initiated, nothing was decided and 
we did not know what to do and i t  was difficult then, but now it  
is clearer and we have defined the responsibilities for the 
DEO... We gave them these outlines and defined responsibilities 
of DEOs in the last workshop here at PED. We told the NGO to 
go and to complete the survey, make the list and find the 
teachers as well and when the case will come to us we will give 
the test to teachers and will verify the particulars thoroughly 
(SCOPE MD, Jaffarabad, 1998).
Tensions between the NGO and the district staff were evident, however. At 
one meeting, a field officer petitioned the Director of PED that he should abolish 
the NGOs role in developing the community schools. The DEO staff could 
establish these schools better than the NGO, she claimed, despite the additional 
resources the NGO possessed. The NGO could avail themselves of air- 
conditioned double cab vehicles and Rs. 200 per day as a travel allowance 
whereas DEO staff had small old jeeps and no petrol allowance the local official 
complained. ‘ Why not dissolve the NGO and channel those resources through 
the male and female district education offices to pay for good vehicles and 
petrol?’(Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).
The Society for Community Organisation and Promotion of Education (SCOPE)
Only one NGO based in the district of Jaffarabad supported primary 
education. The Society for Community Organization and Promotion of Education 
(SCOPE) was registered in September 1995 under the 1860 Societies Act. 
SCOPE is a Non-Governmental Organisation that promotes girl's and women’s
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education in Sibi and Nasirabad divisions. SCOPE was initially funded through 
contract sponsorship under the World Bank, and the Royal Netherlands 
Embassy and its goals and objectives include:
❖ To promote education for building up a strong workforce;
❖ To facilitate co-operation between government and people;
❖ To bring awareness of education among the people especially for female 
education and to promote school construction and formation of rural 
education committees to this end;
❖ To create atmosphere of co-operation and contact among females;
❖ To struggle for the improvement of literacy;
❖ To provide recreational activities; and
❖ To hold workshops and seminars.
SCOPE’S mission statement encapsulates these goals and objectives:
SCOPE is working for the improvement of primary education 
especially for females in Sibi-Nasirabad Region in which six 
districts are included: Jaffarabad, Nasirabad, Bolan, Jhal 
Magsi, Dera Bugti, and Sibi. SCOPE also seeks to make the 
parents responsible for the improvement of education and to 
bring co-operation between government and parents. (SCOPE 
Handout translated from Urdu to English, 1998)
SCOPE’S employee structure has three administrative classifications. At the 
top is the Management Development Specialist (MD), which is SCOPE’S Chief 
Executive. This position is responsible for all the administrative affairs and the 
implementation of the Institute. The second tier of employees is the Master 
Trainers/Field Co-ordinators. Their role is to train the field staff of the institute 
and to make sure the administrative and planning affairs are performed. The 
final tier of paid employees is the Community Education Promoters/Facilitators. 
Their role is to bring co-operation between the government and the community 
and to organise and motivate the community at the grass-roots level. In working 
with the government through the DEO and other officers, SCOPE aims to help 
the government’s representatives so that the resources could be utilised in the 
best way.
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Box 5.2: SCOPE--NGO Capabilities
July 1995
Nov. 1995 to 
Feb. 1996
Dec. 1995 to 
June 1997
Sept. 1996 to 
June 1997
SCOPE formulated a four-month study in Jhal Magsi and Dera Bugti. 
Its main purpose was to get information about middle and matric pass 
female children in these districts and identify the villages where middle 
and matric pass female students are present. To find out the interest of 
parents in education and the source of income.
SCOPE opened fours CSP schools in Jhal Magsi District in which 194 
female students are studying and the parents group was organized and 
provided with training.
SCOPE formulated one thousand seven PTSMCs and opened 468 bank 
accounts for these committees.
SCOPE opened 29 CSP schools in which 1193 female children are 
studying and surveyed 155 villages.
SCOPE, with the cooperation of PEQIP, trained 72 teachers in 10 days.
SCOPE with the help of Allama Iqbal Open University formed two 
clusters (FATEH PUR and Noor Moh’d Mengal) in which 26 middle pass 
students would study until matric regularly. SCOPE is also training the 
rural education committees who have been giving schools responsibility.
Source: SCOPE Handout translated from Urdu to English, 1998
SCOPE’S objectives have been obtained with the help of the Education 
Department. All activities (see Box 5.2), given the funding base, were aligned 
with the PED annual workplan. Once a contract was signed, SCOPE’S procedure 
was to provide an annual action plan of implementation. When queried, a 
representative noted that SCOPE’S clients or customers were, in fact, driven by 
the donor source. ‘Since we are only working on education, PED decides for the 
customers of SCOPE' SCOPE’S foremost aim was to serve the young girls of the 
districts where it worked by facilitating the CSP process. However, there were 
plans to undertake other initiatives. However, they were planning to provide a 
two-year middle level education program for girls who had passed primary 
levels. ‘So we will be looking for the funding agencies for that project But a t the 
moment, PED tells us whether they (customers) should be boys schools or girls 
schools, what communities should i t  be, and what communities i t  should not bd 
(SCOPE MD, Jaffarabad, 1998).
In terms of the opening of CSP schools in Jaffarabad, SCOPE was faced with 
the challenge of coordinating its efforts with the provincial NGO known as the
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‘Society’. ‘The problem we were having with opening CSP schools here was that 
the Society teams were working on it  at the same time\ Neither of the NGOs had 
a clear understanding concerning the overlap in assigned territory and for this 
reason SCOPE invited the Society field teams to meet to discuss the 
identification of targeted villages for their work. However, co-operation was not 
offered except through a subsequent meeting between senior management of the 
Society and SCOPE. The respondent discussing this issue interestingly 
mentioned that the Society’s jurisdiction had subsequently changed. At the time 
of the interview, the Society was responsible for supporting the fellowship school 
programs, for the training of DEOs for community work, and for a new contract 
with UNICEF to strengthen regional NGOs such as SCOPE.
SCOPE considered training as one of its basic functions. A fraction of this 
training was extended to VECs and WVECs as pointed out by several 
respondents. The first phase of this training dealt with the roles and 
responsibilities that these committees had in management and administration of 
community support schools. SCOPE teams provided follow-up support in terms 
of monitoring the schools for which VECs and WVECs were trained. Subsequent 
training was provided regarding duties on the day-to-day tasks of the committees 
such as record-keeping, fund raising, school monitoring techniques, how to 
interface with and approach government officers particularly the DEOs and 
PED, and how to handle issues and problems pertaining to teachers. The next 
phase of training was actually a review of the progress of the committees with 
members of the committee in attendance along with DEOs and a review the 
content of the training programs that had transpired.
SCOPE also offered a basic teacher-training course that ran for ten days. 
Teachers’ needs were assessed by the NGO and passed to project staff in Quetta 
who developed a training package and SCOPE ran the training. These 
collaborators included the PEQIP programme in conjunction with the Mobile 
Female Teacher Training Unit (MFTTU). In 1997, seventy-two teachers were 
trained by SCOPE. MFTTUs were encouraged by PEQIP staff to try and 
replicate these training programs elsewhere in the province given their 
immediate success.
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These teachers did not know how to maintain the registers and 
when the first time a teacher comes to the classroom she does 
not know how to keep discipline, how to keep the room clean, 
and how to hang the charts. The teachers did not know at the 
beginning of the program what could be the purpose of these 
charts but after the training they understood i t  well (SCOPE 
MD, Jaffarabad, 1998).
SCOPE had indicated that its VEC and WVEC training had two streams. 
The first was a one-day training program that is run with both teachers and 
committee members. The other was the training that committee members were 
provided with to help distinguish roles and duties among the NGO, the VEC and 
the WVEC. This training enabled a process of charting activities and also a 
signature sheet for visitations. For each visit, members could check their 
responsibilities on the written chart and check how many of them had been 
completed. In terms of the outcome of this training, it was noted that at first 
members did not participate in these activities but later members were even 
assisting the teachers with projects such as the making of mud toys and helping 
children painting them. The training of the teachers enabled, in some cases, 
teachers to manage their own meetings without the help of SCOPE or other 
officers.
Speaking on the issue of SCOPE’S relationship with the district education 
officers, one senior SCOPE official claimed that they had a good working 
relationship with the DEO(M) and the DEO(F) despite specific problems 
encountered in the past. Conflict was pointed out that when SCOPE assumed its 
role of training government officials of the process of forming and working with 
the committees, the DEO did not always agree with management decisions. In 
one specific case, a DEO was asked to send LCs to the field for monitoring and 
training of CSP schools.
Our NGO’s main objective is to strengthen the education 
officers to such an extent, that i f  tomorrow the NGOs are 
removed, the DEO’s offce should have a capacity through 
Learning Coordinators (LC) that they can perform the 
monitoring and training of these CSP schools. (M.D. SCOPE, 
Jaffarabad, 1998).
In one particular case of conflict, the DEO had recommended that an office 
assistant should visit CSP schools instead. It was alleged, without proof, that
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they had received a complaint that this assistant had asked for money from the 
teachers in one of these monitoring trips. However, the DEO did not have solid 
evidence to prove this (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998). As far as collaboration 
with the agenda of public or government education, SCOPE saw its role as 
complementing the government system and not short-circuiting it. One 
community education promoter explained,
We are trying to collaborate with the people and government 
We are trying to make a link between community and 
government Community participation as a process is also 
important but we are also providing ownership to the 
community. We are bridging the distance between community 
and government We are not introducing anything that is new 
or something by ourselves, rather we are organising the links 
already there. People do not think that these activities are 
something other than the government process (SCOPE, 
Community Education Promoter, Jaffarabad, 1998).
Village Education Committee
The community school in the village of Abdul Latif Umrani (See Figure 5.4) 
was established on the January 1, 1997. The village education committee (VEC) 
consisted of five male members and five females. The school was established 
according to the process of the community support programme CSP (See 
Appendix III). It was further reported that the school had been built solely at the 
expense of the community. 'All of the members had a meeting and contributed 
their efforts in the construction of the school. All of the members did this job 
jointly. The male members constructed the school th em selvesexplained one 
member. PED’s response to the committee for submission of an application for a 
school was positive. They sanctioned the teaching post and it became a 
government sanctioned (paid) posting. Her probation period was three months. 
The building and the school were the responsibility of the community for three 
years from the date of the establishment of the school. After three years, PED 
would advise whether a permanent building should be constructed and 
supported under a recurrent budget.
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Figure 5.4 Village Education Committee, Abdul Latif Umrani
Source^  Personal Photo, Jaffarabad, 1998
The functions of the committee were acknowledged as being varied. One 
member explained that the teacher would make reports at their monthly 
meetings regarding any problems that she had faced. She also updated the 
committee as to the children who had not been attending regularly. Committee 
members would follow-up by making visits to the parents of these children to 
encourage parents to send the children to school. Minutes of each meeting were 
recorded. In this particular school, the teacher taught the VEC members how to 
write their own names, an accomplishment that one member proudly relayed. 
This respondents self-described role was one of checking and monitoring, i.e. to 
check the attendance of the teacher and students. If the students were not 
present, this member made it a personal task to go and find the students and 
bring them to the school.
Another issue that the school happened to dealing with at the time of the 
interview was the lack of supplies and books. They had petitioned PED for these 
materials. Females in the committee sat behind the males in the interview. 
However, when specifically asked what their role was in the committee, they 
included accompanying their children to the school each day and maintaining the 
hygiene or cleanliness of their children. They also discussed matters with the
169
teacher on an ‘as needed’ basis. The teacher’s father, and the village’s namesake, 
commented about the role of the women and commended their participation.
They support the teacher in every way. Whatever help is 
required by the teacher, the women support her and extend 
their co-operation. When the application was submitted for the 
approval of the school, the women supported i t  with all means.
Then they applied for sanction of a teacher’s post for school and 
the building of the school, they supported the teacher (Abdul 
Latif Umrani, Jaffarabad, 1998).
The majority of members interviewed desired to take on more administrative 
and managerial responsibilities of the school. ‘ We want more control and we can 
manage i t  ourselves in a better way’ was one response. Another indicated, ‘we 
can become more productive and we can do everything in a more innovative way’.
In terms of training and strengthening of the teacher and the VEC, it was 
reported that both had received training. The teacher completed a ten-day 
training programme offered by SCOPE, the local NGO that covered basic school 
management issues. She also received three months training by the UNICEF 
sponsored mobile female teacher-training unit MFTTU conducted in nearby Dera 
Allah Yar. Additionally she received three days of training in Usta Mohammad 
in how to maintain registers. Similarly, the VECs were trained in Dera Allah 
Yar. Their topics of training included their roles and responsibilities and the 
teachers responsibilities. SCOPE promoters visit the school periodically for 
monitoring of enrolment, teaching and curriculum, and cleanliness of the 
children.
When queried whether religious leaders or politicians placed any specific 
pressures on the school or committee members, respondents indicated that these 
problems did not exist. ‘ The school is running smoothly and they are happy with 
i t  (VEC member, Abdul Latif Umrani, 1998).
Parent/Teacher/School Management Committee (PTSMCsl
The formation of PTSMCs was based on the premise that parents have the 
right to demand proper education for their children. The role of parents is not a
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surrogate for the government officers’ role in monitoring schools and teachers but 
is rather complementary. Additionally, PTSMCs were viewed as fulfilling a need 
in the educational system to supplement district management.
Our objective was to improve the standard of education and 
teaching methods. Only through PTSMC, we had a chance to 
get closer to communities to get to know them and to solve their 
problems with mutual co-operation. And in that programme we 
also told the communities that i f  government is helping you in 
all aspects to provide education to your children then they 
[communities] should also add their efforts to it, e.g. to buy 
some books for their children too and check i f  the teacher is 
regular and doing a good job (Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar,
1998).
The first PTSMC was inaugurated in Jaffarabad with parents from a local 
community, the DEO (M) and DEO (F) and other education officers, a 
management development specialist representing the local NGO, and a 
beneficiary participation consultant from the PED in attendance. These officials 
gave speeches to convince the community of the importance of the PTSMC in 
education.
We tried to influence them through different examples, like 
when a goat goes to the pasture and on return when the owner 
does not get the milk from the goat; he confronts the shepherd
for not getting the milk. I f a goat’s milk has that much
importance why not a child’s education? In the same way the 
parents must make sure their children are getting proper 
education (Male SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).
Fifty-four PTSMCs were initially established and provided with 
instructional kits worth Rupees 1,400 each as a reading and writing allotment. 
Rupees 2,00017 were to be provided to the teacher of each of these PTSMCs for 
school maintenance and repairs. We told the teachers that with this amount we 
cannot buy your efforts but this is just to motivate you to work a little bit more 
for the schools (SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998). This account by a government
officer corroborates the one provided by SCOPE. A representative explained that
the DEO was instructed to ‘draw’ and ‘provide’ these initial disbursements to the 
committees in the first six months of their formation. After this period, bank 
accounts were then to be established for each PTSMC so that future
17 The Treasury Office kept a small percentage in the amount of Rs.100 from each Rs. 2000 
disbursement. So in effect, each PTSMC only received Rs.1900.
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disbursements could be deposited directly into these accounts. It was further 
explained that the bank accounts were opened but the PTSMCs had no money. 
The female DEO explained why.
This amount which was for reading/writing material, we 
provided the schools with boxes [instructional kits] and chairs 
and the money lying with us for repair is still with us except 
one school, we provided the repair budget to only one school in 
Sobhat Pur and the rest of the repair money is with us. They 
told us that when these schools set their accounts in the bank 
then we can release this amount to the schools. These schools 
have not set the accounts so Rs. 36,000 is in the government 
account of the DEO. We told the NGO many times to take this 
money from our account but she [NGO] said let them first set 
the accounts and then we will take this money. (Female DEO, 
Jaffarabad, 1998)
Confusion also seems to emerge in terms of DEO’s and the NGO’s role in the 
formulation, monitoring, training and maintenance of the committees. Responses 
from both district officers and NGO officials were contradictory. Both accounts 
indicated that DEOs were given the money to distribute to the committees. 
However, SCOPE representatives indicated that they were given a contract by 
the Government to establish the committees, provide training and arrange with 
each committee to establish bank accounts.
DEOs draw the money and DEOs spend the money during the 
next contract of the PTSMCs for ten months. PED signed the 
contract on that basis the PTSMCs opened their own accounts 
and that's why this next contract we are focusing on bank 
accounts (SCOPE M.D., Jaffarabad, 1998).
District officers argued that their learning coordinators (LCs) formed the 
committees, but the government (PED) did not send the money nor were the 
communities enabled to deposit the money in the bank so the programme was 
terminated. One former officer indicated that only the paperwork had been 
completed on the process of the PTSMCs and that the NGOs should have done 
more to support them. No specific advice as to how this was to have happened 
was offered. A SCOPE officer indicated that, during their first six-month 
contract with PED, PED issued a letter concerning the formation of PTSMCs 
that all TA/DA and POL would be paid to the LCs who would be participating in 
the fieldwork along with the NGO. However, PED never disbursed any funding 
for this purpose. Subsequently, for SCOPE’S next ten-month contract, the DEOs
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refused to conduct any work on PTSMC development. SCOPE, however, 
reportedly complained to the PED upon which some payments were made. These 
payments were made most likely as a result of those individuals who had been 
able to approach the one officer in PED who controlled all payments. ‘ The one 
who knew [the right person] got the money, you know that’s how i t  goes, and 
payment were not made to those who did not have the approach (M.D. SCOPE, 
Jaffarabad, 1998).
Despite a report prepared by SCOPE on the progress of development of 
PTSMCs, it was reported by a SCOPE representative that only thirty or forty 
percent were active. The respondent explained that the other defunct PTSMCs 
were not functioning and that the NGO did not have a link with these. Another 
representative of SCOPE confirmed that, as of February 1998, SCOPE no longer 
had a contractual obligation to form PTSMCs leaving district officers to manage 
them. ‘In short I  would say that the PTSMCs where the LCs are active on their 
own are functional otherwise other PTSMCs are not functional in the area 
anymore'(Ibid 1998). Another reason given for the programme’s termination was 
that communities had been challenged by the GOB to deposit the same amount 
of money that was being allocated by the GOB.
In terms of active committees, information was provided that only one 
PTSMC had been functioning in the district from April 1996 to the time of the 
interview in 1998. She claimed that only two PTSMCs were remotely 
functioning.
I  visited one in Sobhat Pur, we called them at 10:00am but even 
at 8:00pm only four women turned up and the third day we 
could make one female PTSMC in Sobhat Pur and that was a 
failure too. I  visited Noshki for making a PTSMC but there I  
made male PTSMC, which was a success and they had even 
utihsed their own money on schools since 1995 (Female DEO, 
Jaffarabad, 1998).
Prior to June 20, 1996 approximately eighteen PTSMCs were reportedly 
formed but none were formed after that and in the opinion of the respondent 
there were no functioning PTSMCs in early 1998 (Ibid 1998). This evidence is 
contrasted with a SCOPE report (Parveen ca.1997), however, where 123 
PTSMCs were listed as organised and functioning. In fact, detailed information
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was given in the report as to the names of each committee member and their 
respective schools. The female DEO argued that these lists were of individuals 
who played no part in the running of the schools. She went on to argue that the 
NGO’s method of forming the PTSMCs had been flawed. First she reasoned that 
men should have been contacted to be members given that they would be more 
inclined to do school maintenance and repairs of the schools. Secondly, she 
pointed out that the need had not started with parents’ desire to monitor and 
participate in school affairs.
Villagers used to say that their kids come to school so why 
should they bother about it; so they [NGO] used to go to the 
community and deliver several lectures about the programme 
and could only influence a few women. The Pathan women were 
illiterate, and they had their own work in the Geld and at home, 
so why should they be coming to school. The community used to 
say that the NGO and government have already taken our kids 
to school and now they are wasting our time, why? (Female 
DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).
Thirdly, PTSMCs were criticised as being committees on paper only.
So they have not formed the PTSMC at the school but in the 
communities by sitting outside the schools they have formed 
these committees. Just one resourceful person in the 
community used to bring a few women and she used to write 
their names and that’s it, and this is why they are a failure 
(Ibid 1998).
It was not only parents who were unenthusiastic. The teachers unions saw 
more parental involvement as a threat. Evidence of apprehension concerning the 
further development and sustainability of the PTSMCS was found. The teacher’s 
associations came to reject the PTSMCs. One SCOPE officer admitted that had 
the teacher’s associations been co-opted at the beginning of the programme, they 
might have been more co-operative. ‘In this way we sidelined the teachers 
uniond (M.D. SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998). Further elaboration of the unions and 
their organisation are presented later in the chapter.
The discussion so far indicates that the PTSMC scheme failed in Jaffarabad. 
It held the promise of community involvement with the management and 
administration of both boys’ and girls’ schools but lacked commitment on a 
number of fronts. Evidence revealed that it was not a scheme voiced or even
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considered by communities, rather it was a role that had been decided for them 
from the top. This is not to say that they were of no value. Below are some 
isolated accounts of some of the benefits of PTSMC organisation.
Successes of PTSMCs
Communities, through PTSMC organisation did help to maintain some 
schools for example hand pumps were installed for drinking water from their 
own limited resources. Also, it was reported that some parents worked 
voluntarily at the schools, put up shelters on their own, and built barrier walls. 
Other tasks performed included whitewashing the buildings and paving the mud 
roofs. Even teachers and students assisted in the construction projects. Anecdote 
was given that even women crossing to a particular place to fetch water nearby 
where community meetings were held would curiously stand close to see what 
was happening. Community promoters would eventually talk to the women and 
instruct them as to the purpose of the meetings further advocating parents role 
in the activities of the local school.
Other examples of success were shared. In Sobhat Pur, the PTSMC for the 
boy’s middle school installed a telephone in the headmaster’s office, and they 
collected and deposited approximately Rs. 10,000 for the purpose of establishing 
a matriculate level examination hall. It was the first examination hall in Sobhat 
Pur. They also developed a petition to the Deputy Commissioner for the building 
of a barrier wall around their school. This school’s PTSMC had even given 
warnings to the headmasters to stop cheating at all levels. The parents and 
members of the PTSMCs conducted a very large meeting that involved a 
community mobilisation consultant from Quetta.
Unions
Several officers described teachers’ unions as counterproductive and corrupt 
in terms of local education administration. The largest union in Balochistan was 
the Government Teachers Association (GTA) with a smaller splinter organisation 
known as the Watan Teachers Association. These unions had elected bodies with 
elections transpiring every two years. All teachers were members of the unions 
and would elect local officers at the district level. The Union became powerful as
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membership fees began to underwrite their activities. Because of their political 
strength, one officer of SCOPE indicated that rapport had to be maintained with 
union leaders to leverage continual support for education activities. One 
education officer noted that unions were notorious for their illegal activities. 
Some were listed.
❖ Bogus teacher certificates as a means for employing unqualified teachers;
❖ Illegal testimonies;
❖ Teacher transfers to suit personal and political agendas; and
❖ Controversy surrounding duty or tax on union members (Former Male 
DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).
Strikes, notices, processions were other actions taken by the unions that 
disrupted the education system locally. One incident was recounted that a PED 
official wanted to make a visit to observe the teacher cluster programme but was 
prohibited from doing so by the union (In-charge, In-service Teacher Training, 
PED, 1997).
With regard to teachers unions and PTSMCs, it was told that at the time of 
the first disbursement of funding, SCOPE directly approached them and asked 
them what the basis was for their resistance to PTSMC formation. SCOPE 
further advised the unions that their role should be one not of resistance, but 
rather one that monitors whether the PTSMCs are getting their full allotment 
from the DEO’s office.
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5.4 Education Services and the Distribution of Control
So far we have provided local accounts of the extent to which experiments 
with decentralisation had collapsed. Now we turn to the more systematic 
analysis of what elements in the administration system changed. Below is an 
assessment of the data or responses to interviews according to Winkler’s (1989) 
key public service categories. The discussion for each category begins with a 
definition explaining what activities were subsumed under the respective 
headings. Data will then be presented against these categories that would help 
form a snapshot judgement of whether these activities have been decentralised 
and, if so, to what extent. Finally a summary will be provided to express what 
the data tells us about the state of decentralisation for each component with 
reference to Jaffarabad.
Supervision
In Jaffarabad, as was the case in all administrative districts in Balochistan, 
government schools were managed and supervised through district education 
offices. One male and one female officer who, with the support of their 
subordinate officers and ministerial staff, handle the administration of schools 
for boys and girls respectively headed these offices. In the district school system, 
the majority of the schools were government-run schools that came under the 
direct supervision of the District Education Officer. The female district 
education officer also supervised schools within the neighbouring district of 
Nasirabad.
One account of relations among district officers was positive.
We [DEO, ADEO and I] have very good relations and have good 
teamwork where DEOs lead and we follow commands (Male 
SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).
In contrast, other accounts suggested that the delivery of primary education 
had not been such a smooth process. ‘It may be everybody’s opinion that 
Jaffarabad is better than other districts but i t ’s not that good and not easy to 
manage or handld (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998). The example of threats to 
transfer one particular DEO was cited. The DEO explained feudalist attempts to
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influence her decisions and actions. ‘ The day I  don’t do their work, I  will be the 
worst person for them and they will ask to transfer me’. Specifically, this DEO 
had been requested to transfer teachers based on nepotism. The DEO further 
explained her dilemma.
I f  I  do something wrong a [feudal] will transfer me, I  am not 
afraid of him. I  have told him to transfer me i f  he feels like but 
I  will not do any illegal work. A poor teacher is requested to be 
transferred out and their [feudal] relative to be accommodated 
at his/her place. Why should I  do that? A poor person does not 
have any support so I  should sack him/her, no I  will never do 
that. A few weeks back [feudal] called me and instructed me to 
transfer the few teachers...I refused so they threatened me to 
be transferred from here and I  told them to transfer me, I  don’t  
care and I  don’t want to stay here in this kind of condition 
(Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).
Figure 5.5 depicts the organisational structure of the offices for both the 
male and female DEO for Jaffarabad. Physical offices for both the male DEO 
and his subordinate SDEO are located in close proximity of each other in the 
town of Dera Alla Yar. The female DEO also had an office in Dera Alla Yar. 
These offices contained several rooms including a storeroom for supplies and 
unused or broken furniture. Also contained in these buildings were the physical 
offices for staff, and a small kitchen. In the male DEO office, there was a room 
where a computer was being kept but the door was usually locked.
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Figure 5.5: Jaffarabad District Qffices-Organisational Charts
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The relationships depicted in the organograms from one hierarchical level to 
the next formally exist but evidence was provided indicating that there was no 
accountability along these lines on a day-to-day basis. Education officers in 
Jaffarabad all claimed that they had little control especially over the hiring, 
firing and transferring of teachers.18
As some from the teachers' community are on the job they get 
salary, but they don't fulfil their duties at all. No one inquires 
about this; they are accountable to no one. They go to ministers, 
secretaries and The Chief Minister, but no one asks them from 
whom they have got permission to go there. Nowadays all the 
personnel in government departments are appointed with the 
consent ofpoliticians i f  they have even one per cent interest in 
that posting. Even [local] police are appointed with their will.
So teachers also get appointments on their consent. It is very 
hard to work in this kind of atmosphere. We have to mostly 
deal with the community. We are working this out without any 
powers and shelter {SDEO, Usta Mohammad, 1998).
Expressed here were concerns that community pressures as well as the lack of 
official control placed education officers in an awkward position.
Other daily management problems were expressed. Concerning the 
distribution of books, furniture and reading and writing materials, more than 
one officer complained that were these tasks assigned locally, their provision 
would be more efficient and timely.
Total power and control is centralised. I f  we had some authority 
at district level, we could have solved our minor problems on 
our own at this level. For instance, we take the example of 
material, the books, furniture, reading writing material and 
other requirements. The educational year is in its third month 
but we have not received books fom  PED. Our children don't 
have books, takhti, slate or taat to sit on. The teacher has no 
chair or table for himself It is because of the centralisation of 
power (Ibid 1998).
One female education officer criticised the power structure in the provincial 
education system but gave some recommendations on how this could be 
improved.
18 See discussion in Chapter Three regarding August 1993 ruling giving Provincial 
Minister of Education full control for hiring, firing and transferring of teachers in 
Balochistan.
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This centralised system is not good, one person has the power.
This kind of centralised system is wrong. All should be working 
together so i t  should be decentralised.... We can buy the 
furniture and can provide i t  there to schools by ourselves. They 
do not give us any TA/DA and no cash and send the furniture 
from there [Quetta]. I f  they give us the cash as compared to the 
same rate of what they purchase in Quetta, we can buy the 
material here and the fare [transport costs] will be saved as 
well but they do not do that.... They mention a lot of furniture in 
the documents but we hardly get ten chairs and ten desks in a 
year, so where does that money go? (Female DEO, Jaffarabad,
1998).
As introduced in chapter three, job descriptions and service rules had been 
distributed to field officers. In 1994, they were revised and heralded for their 
potential function in aiding field officers with their required work. When queried 
about the validity of these manuals, however, education officers in Jaffarabad 
were critical. The response given by one SDEO is representative:
It is on paper only. Nothing is acted upon; there is no question 
about it. All the terminations, transfers or punishments, all the 
rules exist only on paper (SDEO, Usta Mohammad, 1998).
In terms of training for education officers, respondents revealed that 
training for management and administrative duties was negligible. While some 
training was provided to officers for the opening of schools, PED had neglected 
to solicit areas in which education officers specifically needed support. ‘PED 
directs and schedules the training but they never ask our demands and what we 
are doing and whether we need refresher training after every three months’ 
(Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).
Despite the lack of general training to field officers in their roles and 
responsibilities, one officer explained that training had been provided to male 
learning coordinators. He indicated that they had entertained detailed 
discussions with LCs over their job descriptions. In fact, they had conducted a 
three-day training session with LCs for the specific purpose of discussing how 
they were to provide guidance to schools (Male SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).
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In short, control of day-to-day resources and staffing remained in the hands 
of PED and powerful local figures such as politicians and feudals. Another issue 
pertaining to the supervision function of field offices was the control of teachers.
Budget Allocations
Senior education official and field officers were in agreement that prior to 
the establishment of the PED, field officers had more budgetary discretion than 
they did at the time of their interviews. Regular budget allocations stopped once 
PED came into existence in 1992. Earlier in her career (prior to 1992), the 
female DEO, as a headmistress was even given a budget for use at her school 
with more discretionary spending than she had as an officer. She indicated that 
prior to 1992, DEOs were ‘powerful and had all kinds of control’. Examples of 
the type of discretionary power needed to run their offices more efficiently were 
given.
We only need the monthly budget for petrol, TA and 
maintenance that we will spread all over the area and provide 
guidance to schools everywhere in the district We are facing 
economic problems at our office. Due to non-availability of 
funds, our Geld staff are sitting in the ofGce. We do not need 
any control on furniture but some basic funding to go to the 
Geld is necessary. And about our stationery, until last year we 
used to get i t  but we have received none this year. We even 
have to look around for ballpoint pens that we can use. The 
DEOs ofGce is covering 335 schools and teachers ask for plain 
papers or other working papers but no use, and we do not have 
any kind of stationery now. And for the schools and the children 
the important and necessary things are Taat [matting], black 
board, desks, Takhti, slate, ink or chairs for the teachers (Male 
SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).
Officers felt that they should be allocated funding for repairing their 
vehicles as well as maintenance funds to support the field visits that they and 
their subordinates were conducting. Due to fewer visits to the schools, the field 
staff had started receiving reports of absent teachers and the schools were 
subsequently adversely affected.
One officer offered a budget solution for ensuring that these expenditures be 
incorporated into the recurrent budget. He calculated that twelve months of
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petrol, oil and lubrication (POL) for vehicles and repair costs for the same period 
should be figured and that this amount should be used as the placeholder in the 
budget. In previous years, funds were released four times a year based on 
specific budget requests and monthly progress reports were submitted. At the 
time of the interview, however, the officer indicated that officials from PED had 
requested that petitions for disbursement of funding not be sent and that 
instead, Rs. 5,000 to 10,000 at no fixed amount would be sent at the discretion of 
PED. In fact, repeated several times was the implication that PED was in 
arrears in meeting budget needs of field officers, for motorcycle maintenance, 
POL, and travel allowances. One officer claimed: ‘they (learning coordinators) 
have spent from their own pockets to meet the expenditure of held for two years, 
but how long can they keep i t  up? Now all their bills are lying stuck with PED 
(Male SDEO, Usta Mohammad, 1998).
The allegation that maintenance funding was in arrears was reiterated by 
other officers. One claimed that reimbursement for expenditure from the 
previous three years had not been provided.
Our outstanding bills are with the primary education 
directorate for two years now; they get bills from us every now 
and then but have not cleared any bill. As far as we are 
concerned we cannot get together on the matter. In m y own 
case as I  am using the vehicle and attending to the field, we are 
getting along by borrowing from our Mends and relatives (Ibid 
1998).
It was admitted, however, that a tranche of Rs. 10,000 had been distributed 
to this officer for POL that was suggested would allow them to operate for three 
or four months on a reduced activity schedule.
In terms of payment of utilities for district offices, one DEO commented that 
the officers paid the bills for electricity and telephone but that the process 
involved submitting the bill along with the request to PED. Once the funds were 
released, the DEO paid the bill to the treasury department. This particular 
officer, however, indicated that the budget and funding for this particular line 
item would be released only provided that funds were available.
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In short, budgeting control from the point of view of the district office had 
been centralised not decentralised since 1992 with DEOs losing what limited 
budgeting discretion they did have.
Monitoring of the Curriculum
In 1992, the Primary Teachers Alternate Training course (PTAC) was 
arranged which in the opinion of field officers yielded some very good short-term 
results especially for the training of LCs. Subsequent refresher courses on 
curriculum content were provided by PED in Quetta which required staff to 
travel from Jaffarabad. The main problem with the training was the fact that 
TA/DA (travel allowance/daily allowance) allegedly was not being reimbursed. 
Alternative accommodations had been made in terms of beds being provided for 
the participants but the teachers preferred the TA/DA and thus boycotted the 
training. These courses were not only discontinued for participants from 
Jaffarabad but for other districts as well. Training programs were found to be 
implicitly useful given the chance of teachers, LCs and other officers meeting 
their colleagues from other districts and the visitation to other schools afforded 
to participants travelling to the provincial capital.
In terms of decentralisation, the DEOs felt that they could have developed a 
teacher training courses at the district level.
We could have organised the teacher training better, with less 
expenses than any team or master planner coming from Quetta 
making lots of expenses in this regard. Our LCs have been 
master planners in terms of teacher training, they know a lot 
more about problems of teachers than a person or team coming 
from outside. Even now whatever problems or shortcomings we 
have in our project, are being pointed out from here (Male 
SDEO, Usta Mohammad, 1998).
The Teacher Mentoring Programme
In 1996, a teacher, mentoring programme known as the Primary Teachers 
Mentoring Programme (PTMP) was developed for Jaffarabad. Prior to this, a 
small cluster concept had been piloted. The idea for the small cluster
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programme originated with one officer in Jaffarabad who had participated in a 
study tour of Indonesia and Malaysia. Upon returning home, the officer 
discussed a plan with his supervisor. Together they drafted the objectives of the 
programme that were decidedly student-based rather than teacher-based:
❖ To find a way to motivate a kid who runs away from school;
❖ To make module lessons less expensive;
❖ How to differentiate between the intelligent and weak students;
❖ How to teach kids through the module approach;
❖ How to contact parents;
❖ How to maintain school records (some teachers were not able to issue 
leaving certificates);
❖ How to discipline teachers; and
❖ How to improve teaching practices such as where to stand in the 
classroom, how to hold a book at the blackboard, how to adjust the fight 
in the classroom for students, how to improve handwriting, how to detect 
and motivate non-productive students.
(Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998)
The planning process for the mentoring programme also included 
consideration of district management tasks which the government through PED 
could not solve locally such as addressing lack of drinking water supplies at the 
schools, the clearing of thorns and other obstacles in pathways that lead to 
schools.
In regard to the training of teachers, the DEO and SDEOs explained about 
each super cluster and told them about its importance. The fifth grade core 
course curriculum was placed in front of the teachers and asked they were asked 
openly if they felt any problem in teaching especially the instructional materials 
so as to avoid the habit of rote learning. So through different practical examples 
we taught students different lessons. That was the small cluster programme 
that was a great success at first but failed because of monitoring constraints. As 
one officer indicated, ‘We just cannot visit them in the Geld due to lack of 
resources’(Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998).
Using the model of small clusters, PTMP/super clusters came into being 
whereby experienced teachers and assistant sub-divisional education officers 
(ASDEOs) were chosen to be the mentors. The criteria for selection of mentors 
was described by one respondent as those individuals who were well educated,
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were highly respected among their peers, were the cleverest among their 
colleagues and possessed a strong command of their subject area. A total of 618 
primary schools had been divided into ninety-three small clusters (sixty-two in 
Jhat Pat and thirty-one in Usta Mohammad). Field staff visited these units on 
the 25th of every month at the cluster centres.
Activities on this day were described. Teachers used to spend their first two 
hours at school and then they would come together at a centre to participate in 
the programme. These sessions focussed on a variety of topics.
❖ how to improve the teaching methods;
❖ how to control first-time students;
❖ how to compel students to take interest in their studies; and
❖ how to motivate the parents to send their children to school regularly.
(Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998).
Monthly meetings were held at Dera Alla Yar district headquarters and at 
the mentoring centres. In attendance were male and female DEOs, male SDEOs 
and LCs and the mentors. Together, these individuals would spend one day in 
meetings and two days in workshops to solve educational, syllabus, and 
curriculum problems. One SDEO pointed out a blackboard in his office used to 
facilitate meetings whereby these issues were discussed and solutions were 
worked out together. When issues arose that could not be solved or explained at 
the local level, they were escalated to PED in Quetta. The SDEO gave an 
example that there had been some confusion concerning the name of a common 
tree to the area that was featured in the curriculum and called Kirar. The team 
sent a leaf sample to the PED for guidance in determining the name. PED was 
not able to help so the matter came back to the district and was finally solved by 
an experienced teacher who knew that the tree was called Karir in Urdu.
Problems like this and other basic mistakes in the curriculum 
of PED happen. So through this [mentoring] programme we 
also guided PED in developing the curriculum. Most of the time 
we solve these problems locally' (Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar,
1998).
This particular mentor was responsible for thirty-eight teachers in his 
cluster. He indicated that the ideal ratio was approximately thirty to forty 
teachers to each mentor. Healthy competition was said to have existed among
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the clusters and that competitions in debates, education quality and in 
examinations existed at the cluster level, sub division level and at the district 
level.
Respondents considered the results of the programme to be positive. The 
following statement characterised the positive outlook on the programme.
As far as primary education is concerned I  must accept that i t  is 
a great stride towards the improvement of education. Each 
month these dream teams come here and prepare an advance 
lesson together. They discuss the question and issues together 
and try to solve them as well. They try to teach the local 
teachers with the help of the educational modules and 
especially during the two-day workshop that they hold here is 
very beneficial to improve the teaching methods. We were also 
provided with opportunities to learn (Ibid 1998).
The application of the mentoring programme to teachers training beyond 
the primary school system was cited as an outcome of the mentoring initiative. 
Teachers from middle and high schools were making demands for similar 
programmes to meet their needs. Also, field officers were reliant upon mentors 
to assist them in handling minor local issues. In many cases, if problems were 
reported to the education officers, they would contact the mentor responsible for 
the problem in question.
Here then, staff monitoring has been successfully decentralised—at least as 
local informants saw it. The mentoring process is depicted in the poster shown 
in Figure 5.6 below. A tree has been used to symbolise the mentoring process. 
This diagram is a good illustration of decentralisation through a process that is 
not top down. Instead, the foundation that is represented by PED provides and 
nurtures the process of training and mentoring that eventually reaches the 
leaves that in this instance represent the students.
What stands out about the mentoring experiment is that it was ‘home­
grown’. A local official brought an idea back from a visit and implemented this 
idea. It was not introduced by an outside agency with financial backing. The 
NGO facilitated this local initiative, it did not originate it.
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Figure 5.6 Decentralisation and the Mentoring Programme
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Interview data suggest that costs being incurred by mentors for getting to 
the local training programmes had been subsidised largely out-of-pocket 
although an award of Rupees 2000 had been paid to the nine mentors who 
directed each centre. One mentor indicated that he was not paid any travel 
assistance for coming to the district headquarters for the monthly meetings.
I t is twenty-five kilometres from m y home and I  do not even 
demand this travel allowance because they are like m y own 
children and lean do this for them. I  have a motorbike with me.
I  spend my own money on petrol and I  do not even demand 
TA/DA (Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998).
Costs incurred, however, in actually facilitating the training program were 
somewhat ambiguous. Although some respondents indicated that they were 
happy with the programme despite having to front travel costs, the cultural 
undercurrent in this mixed response implied that most likely that training costs 
had also not been reimbursed but that travel reimbursement was more of an 
issue.
We think i t  is highly appreciated, and we wish i t  to continue 
because i t  is in the benefit of our children. I  must also mention 
here that all the concerned persons in this programme are 
working wholeheartedly beside the TA/DA interest. I  believe, 
that these LCs sometimes travel more than seventeen 
kilometres to attend these workshops and have never claimed 
extra TA (Ibid 1998).
As to the partnerships developed under the cluster programs, most 
responses were favourable. The story was told of how the mentoring process had 
been introduced to SCOPE. The cluster programme was first introduced by 
education officers who then introduced the implementation process. While the 
NGOs had basically worked with female education, they still had a good working 
relationship with officers and were open to collaboration according to one source.
SCOPE did experience union interference in the work that they conducted 
on the formation and the orientation of these sessions. The unions reportedly 
told teachers not to attend these meetings and, in fact, restricted thirty to 
thirty-five teachers who were to participate. This issue was referred to a board 
member of the NGO who had strong acquaintances with union members. At one
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specific meeting, the union agreed to back off from preventing teachers from 
attending the training. The union complied, however, with the caveat that they 
would continue their opposition of community initiatives and teachers meetings 
as far as the newspapers were concerned for the sake of maintaining a fagade of 
union antagonists (M.D. SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998).
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the extent to which decentralisation has occurred 
under several administrative functions in Jaffarabad. Figure 5.7 has been 
adapted to illustrate the findings—namely that according to evidence collected
Figure 5.7: Centralisation-Decentralisation Typology Matrix for Public
Education In Jaffarabad
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in the district of Jaffarabad, powers for supervision, budget allocations were 
centralised from PED. The monitoring of the curriculum was to some extent, 
more decentralised through the experiment of the mentoring programmes that 
had been fostered by local officials. Funding for these programmes, however, 
was not at the discretion of the officers running the programmes. The universal 
response in terms of local government representatives was that they possessed
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very few powers, if any, to manage primary education effectively within their 
district jurisdiction. Their authority for the administration of staff including 
teachers was viewed as irrelevant given the district interference of feudals and 
the lack of lower-tier, staff accountability due to nepotism with provincial 
officers.
Tensions between the local NGO and the DEOs that arose over jurisdiction 
for the development of community schools suggests a lack of clear policy 
guidance for the initiative. Additionally, the Society, at the centre, and SCOPE, 
located in the district, were identified as experiencing problems in coordination 
of work that was meant to be decentralised. Local interference caused by 
feudals, unions, and politicians also handicapped local administration in 
Jaffarabad. These factors played a major role in formulating the administrative 
culture that was found to exist in Jaffarabad.
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Chapter 6
Case Study: Barkhan
There is a big communication gap existing between 
education Geld officers and the Directorate for 
Primary Education. What are they doing in PED?
What do they want us to do? I  want to improve the 
system of education in m y area but I  don’t have the 
powers and I  cannot do i t  alone.
Female Education Field Officer 
Barkhan, 1998
Traditionally, there was an expectation in Balochi culture of receiving haal 
or ‘information’ from visitors of other settlements. Given the proclivity of 
movement of Balochi tribes, news was often verbally shared by anyone visiting 
from another settlement—in fact, it was expected (Baloch 1987:78). This 
tradition is still prevalent among the tribals in rural Balochistan given the 
distances that still exist between villages or settlements. Communication of this 
type, however, is not swift and is often hampered by poor infrastructure, e.g., 
few phone lines and impassable road conditions. Poor communications, in terms 
of both public and private interests are severely impacted. Given that Barkhan 
District is considered a tribal territory of Balochistan, the reliance of word-of- 
mouth alone has impeded the effective and efficient delivery of public services.
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The delivery of public education is one such service where local education 
workers claimed that the flow of information from the ‘centre’ had been 
infrequent and lacking. Also, to their knowledge, no education policy had been 
developed or shared with them through formal communication lines. In this and 
through other expressed concerns, they felt they had very little power with 
which to control the affairs of the district since information of important 
directives or other matters were infrequently passed along.
This chapter presents empirical data concerning the district of Barkhan and 
is divided into four sections. The significance of selecting Barkhan as a case for
this study will first be introduced.19 Secondly, this chapter introduces local 
institutions associated with primary education in the district. Thirdly, the locus 
of control over management functions of primary education system is analysed 
in connection with these district institutions. Evidence collected through 
interviews, documents and personal observations will be used to identify the 
locus and level of control that the district had at its disposal. Finally, theoretical 
conclusions are drawn to answer the primary and secondary research questions.
Similar to data collected in Jaffarabad, the information concerning Barkhan 
was collected at two levels. At the district level, the author conducted 
unstructured interviews with education officers, NGO representatives, villagers 
and community notables. In addition to these interviews, the author 
documented field observations and took photographs. Reports and other 
documents were collected from offices that we visited. At the central level, 
BEMIS data were provided. Together, this information provides the corpus of 
evidence for the case study.
6.1 Background
Barkhan District is located in the Zhob Division of Balochistan and gained 
its status as an independent district on December 31, 1991. Barkhan is slightly 
larger than Jaffarabad with an area of 3,411 sq. km that. It is situated along the 
eastern border of Balochistan next to the Dera Ghazi Khan district of the
19 The Barkhan discussion relies heavily on the 1997 Bureau of Statistics Report; LAFAM data; field 
observation notes and semi-structured interviews that were documented in 1998.
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Punjab Province and is surrounded by four other districts. Barkhan Town is the 
headquarters of this district (Bureau of Statistics 1997:8).
The district consists of one main valley, called Barkhan, and several smaller 
valleys, which are separated from the main valley by low ranges of hills running 
in a southwest direction. The hills in the district belong to the Suleman range. 
The principal hills are known as Kala Pahar in the north, Karwada, Bibar, 
Jandra and Mar or Mukhmar in the west, Andari and Sukha in the south, 
Phulai and Khawaj in the east, and Mazara, Tagha, Dig and Deka in the centre 
or Rakhni areas. Some portions of these ranges are rocky and not easily 
accessible (Ibid).
The early history of the Barkhan district is obscure. The name of the district, 
Barkhan, is derived from Baro Khan, the founder of the Barozai family of 
Pannis, who either ruled this area on behalf of the Governors of Sibi or owned it 
himself. In the time of Moghul rule under Akbar’s leadership, it was called 
Janjah. A Jat community of Hindus (caste) inhabited this area. They had 
allegedly mixed with a small Pathan tribe that had migrated from Vihowa, a 
neighbouring district known today as Dera Ghazi Khan.
Socio-Economic Indicators
Socio-economic data for Barkhan are displayed in Table 6.1. What is known 
about the district has more to do with cultural and geographical matters as 
opposed to economic indicators, although most available data are unreliable as 
suggested above. The annual growth rate is shown at roughly six percent, which 
is the highest of all the districts in Balochistan. This statistic, however, is 
tempered by the finding that Barkhan was the fifth least populated district in 
the province. Barkhan, in fact, is sparsely populated (in contrast to Jaffarabad) 
with an estimated population for 1995 of 147,599. Roughly thirty-two per cent of 
the land in the district is arable rendering the agriculture sector as very 
nominal in Barkhan.
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Table 6.1- Socio-economic Indicators for Barkhan District
Area 3,411 sq. km 
(341,113 hectares)
Population 147,599 (1995 NIPS projection)
Density (1995) 42 per sq. km
Population Growth (from 1981 to 1995) 6.4% Annual Growth 
(NIPS projection)
Employment per Sector (%) 70% Agriculture
30% Government Services and
Informal Sector
Average Household Earnings in 
Agriculture Sector
Rs./1,500 (£19)/month
Area Cultivated 16,859 hectares
Access to Water 20% of population are serviced by 
water schemes
Source- Bureau of Statistics, 1997
Social Organisation
Social organisation in Barkhan is mainly tribal. There are three main tribes 
in Barkhan district: Khetran, Marri and Buzdar. The principal tribe is the 
Khetrans which are divided into three main clans: Dharas, Ispani and Phaliat 
(Government of Pakistan 1972:15). Khetrani is the predominantly spoken 
language. The Marri and Buzdar tribes who have settled in Barkhan speak 
Balochi. People living in and around Barkhan town mostly understand Urdu as 
well as Siraki and Pashtu (Bureau of Statistics 1997:12).
Family and kinship are the most important social institutions, which 
command loyalty of its members. The tribal system has a characteristic social 
pattern in which each tribe is united and organised under a sardar, who is the 
social and cultural leader of the tribe. Each clan or section has a chief or 
tumandarand a headman or wadera. The Jirga system is the principal system of 
tribal responsibility. Rawaj (tradition) is accepted as law. Jirga membership as 
well as posting of sardars and levies passes from father to son (Shah 1988).
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Ethnic or tribal identity remains the potent force for both groups and 
individuals. The Jirga System is static and curbs ambition, as a result of which 
tribesmen tend to compromise with fate. Society is modelled on the 
authoritarian structure of the Sardari system, governing the relationship 
between the male members of the tribe. The hierarchical system of authority 
flows downward from the Sardar to the youngest male members of the tribe. 
However, the Sardar’s role has changed over the years from one of defenders of 
tribal independence to one of mediation between the tribe and the state.
The political organisation of the tribal system is built upon two principles: 
hereditary authority and a personal bond of allegiance, in which loyalty is 
exchanged for protection (UNICEF 1995:12). The persistence of tribal politics 
and the continuing power and influence of local chiefs or sardars have been seen 
to affect and change the working of the established parliamentary system. Many 
of the elected representatives are sardars and tribal chiefs. The sardari System, 
however, is said to be in a transition stage undergoing changes due to economic, 
social and political independence permeating society, commercialism and rapid 
urbanisation (Bureau of Statistics 1997:19). In rural areas and especially among 
uneducated people, however, the Sardari System is still very influential.
The tribal set-up is rigid and tribal affiliation is prominent. Birathri or 
brotherhood still exists very strong pitting one tribe against another. The people 
of different tribes have not yet developed any social connection to bring them 
together. This disconnection leads to a low level of tolerance for any opposition. 
For over a century, the Marri and Khetrani tribes were involved in family and 
inter-tribal skirmishes that resulted in casualties and continued enmity (Ibid).
In order to protect their property, almost every family in rural areas is 
equipped with traditional arms. Another reason for keeping arms was the tribal 
disputes, which were very common among the people. In various instances 
during my field trip to Barkhan, I observed the public display of arms. On one 
occasion a pick-up truck full of men each carrying weapons stopped beside my 
vehicle. As Barkhan is a tribal area, provincial rules required that a security 
guard (who carried an automatic weapon) accompany me, as an
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outsider. My security guard, while eating lunch at a roadside chai khanna 
(restaurant) near Barkhan Town, prepared his gun with the clip as a man 
approached me since we were not sure of his intentions. In the photo presented 
in Figure 6.1, a representative of the Government Teacher’s Association is 
shown with his weapon that he carried with him at all times, including the 
interview which I conducted with he and other education officers.
Figure 6.1- Image of a Tribal Society
Source: Personal Photograph at Basti Azmat Sheher, Barkhan, 1998
Livelihoods
Almost seventy per cent of Barkhan’s population are engaged directly or 
indirectly in some sort of agriculture or animal husbandry. A smaller percentage 
of the population are engaged in the informal sector. Mining and industry are 
almost negligible, except petty trades in which very few people work. 
Respondents in Barkhan independently claimed that farmers earned roughly 
Rs./1,500 per month (£25 in 1997).
The primary crops grown are wheat, fodder, vegetable, jaw ar (cereal), onion, 
garlic, melon and fruits. The major fruits harvested are apples, almonds, plums, 
apricots, pomegranates and peaches. The average production per hectare is low 
compared to the provincial figures. The reason for low average production is that 
the majority of the farmers are tribesmen who have little knowledge about
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improved varieties of seeds and fertiliser. Most farmers use traditional methods 
of planting crops such as bull and oxen for ploughing.
Due to the law of inheritance, small land holdings are further fragmented, 
which makes the land economically less profitable for cultivation. The yield per 
hectare can be increased through the use of better quality seeds, fertilisers, 
pesticides and better irrigation facilities. One hurdle to agriculture, however, is 
that Barkhan is faced with monsoon rains during March which sometimes 
brings such harsh weather as hail that destroy the crops (Male DEO, Barkhan, 
1998).
The production in barani (non-irrigated) areas fluctuates depending on 
rainfall, and thus the income for the farmers becomes uncertain. The marketing 
system is not developed and commission agents exploit the farmers by 
determining prices. There was a reported need to improve the marketing system 
and to assist in the establishment of farming market committees, so that the 
produce could be sent to the correct market, at a proper time and in preferred 
quantities. Farm-to-market roads are poor rendering access to markets very 
difficult (Bureau of Statistics 1997:35).
Livestock is the second source of income in the district. The people mostly 
keep sheep and goats, but also other animals like cattle, donkeys, camels and 
horses. These animals play a vital role in the economy of the district and provide 
food of rich nutritional value such as milk, meat and their by-products like wool, 
butter, oil, cheese, curd, skin and intestines. There are problems in the 
development of livestock sector with regard to grass and feeds, health facilities 
and marketing. Farmers reportedly dispose of large numbers of sheep, goats and 
cows during a hard year when sufficient grass and fodder are not available.
Farmers with cattle generally keep only three to six animals but some have 
more. The herd size of other animals varies, depending upon the availability of 
feed. Men, women and children supervise the grazing of these animals. Since 
this work is largely a family enterprise, these services are not compensated. 
Women look after the animals within the house. They also collect fodder and 
perform duties like milking of goats, sheep and cows.
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The extent of child labour varies between urban and rural areas. In rural 
areas, the absence of education opportunities leave children with no alternative 
but to participate in the work-force at an early age. They perform tasks such as 
grazing of livestock, weeding and harvesting of crops. In urban areas, children 
work in small restaurants, automobile workshops, tailoring shops, carpenters 
and welder’s workshops and auto engine shops. The children join most of these 
jobs as apprentices, so that after some years they will be able to work in their 
own businesses. Employers exploit this situation by treating them as trainees 
and paying them low salaries. In addition, children are required to help carry 
water (particularly girls) and fire wood. From an early age on, girls are involved 
in the daily routine of domestic work. During their mothers’ pregnancies and 
childbirth, they remain at home and perform a variety of household chores. 
Absolute poverty and the lack of social security have been attributed as the key 
influences of child labour.
In the absence of updated census figures, the exact nature of growth of 
population and migration is not known. The underdevelopment of agriculture 
and livestock sectors and the absence of industries result in little job 
opportunities; the labour absorption in these sectors is insignificant. 
Unemployment figures were also found to be increasing. The only alternative left 
is self-employment in the informal sector. One respondent commented that some 
individuals were involved in smuggling goods from Quetta through Barkhan and 
across the border to Afghanistan (Female DEO, Loralai, 1998).
Gender Roles and Relations
According to the 1973 constitution, all Pakistani citizens are equal, with no 
distinction based on gender alone. The State may, however, make special 
provisions for the protection of women and children, which show up especially in 
labour legislation. The constitution ensures the full participation of women in all 
levels of civil of society. Women have the right to vote and to hold office, with a 
quota of seats reserved for women in national and provincial legislative bodies. 
But constitutional guarantees of equality have been superseded in many 
instances by discriminatory legislation or have not been enforced in actual
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practice. Also the force of custom most often prevails over even the most 
enlightened official laws, making it difficult for women to claim the legal rights 
they are guaranteed (UNICEF 1995:47).
In most social circles men hold a monopoly of power in the public arena. In 
the political domain, local level chiefs and tribal authorities are always men, as 
are the members of local councils of elders or jirgas. It is rare to find examples of 
parallel women’s groups, from which women leaders may emerge and collective 
action planned. Men also set the terms for moral and cultural values. Religious 
authorities are always male and local cultural codes of honour stem from a male 
value system that often have components based on the subordination of women. 
These may include denial of women’s rights in matters of property and 
inheritance that are recognised in Islam, and exclusion of women from 
consideration as equals in maintaining social order (Ibid:39). The general 
characteristics of a tribal society are prevalent in the district as in other parts of 
the province. Barkhan society is patriarchal and male dominated. The role of 
women in decision-making is negligible, as men make the majority of the 
decisions. Their community role is also limited to a great extent as their social 
interaction outside the immediate household is limited. There are some 
occasions, like births, death, illness, marriages, etc. which serve as one of the 
few socially sanctioned forms of mobility available to women. These occasions 
provide women with a forum for exchange of information and ideas and 
improvement of social ties and alliances between themselves.
Economic participation of women differs from that of men. Women are 
traditionally engaged in household activities such as cooking, washing and 
fetching water and wood, taking care of the children and other dependent 
members of the family, and producing handicraft articles. Men do most of the 
outdoor work. A very small proportion of the female labour force is engaged in 
agriculture. Lack of education facilities and social and cultural bindings are the 
main constraints for women’s active participation in economic activities (Ibid: 19).
Women’s status in society is very low. They are treated as an asset and are 
at the mercy of their husbands and relatives. A woman is not allowed to inherit 
property except in a few middle class families. Polygamy is still practiced by
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many men. Sometimes it is socially approved to take a second wife, for example if 
it concerns the widow of a brother or other relative. In tribal society, people 
prefer to have more male children. This burdens women with multiple 
childbearing, affecting her and her children’s health. The position of a newly wed 
woman is often precarious, as she is both young and an outsider in the family. A 
woman without children always remains an outsider and the fear of her husband 
taking a second wife haunts her (Bureau of Statistics 1997:20).
Bride price has been a social phenomenon in Barkhan. In some cases more 
than Rs. 100,000 (£1,250 in 1997) is paid. The result is that men who cannot 
afford to pay the bride price have to wait until they are over thirty years for 
marriage. But the custom of paying bride price is slowly fading away among the 
educated classes. It was reported that if the husband dies, his family would sell 
her to another husband instead of returning her to her original family (Female 
SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).
Women are poorly represented due to socio-cultural public barriers. 
Constitutional and legal rights that are codified are not sufficient to change the 
attitudes of the society towards the role and rights of women.
Infrastructure
In Barkhan district the condition of physical infrastructure and the 
provision of local services are weak. The maintenance of roads is poor. There are 
one hundred eleven kilometres of metalled road and three hundred forty eight 
kilometres of shingled road in the district. Thirty-six kilometres of the metalled 
is national highway, the rest is provincial road. The Federal Government 
maintains the national highway. The maintenance of shingle roads is the 
responsibility of provincial government. Except for the national highway, roads 
are not properly maintained, due to lack of funds.
The main sources of energy are kerosene oil, electricity, wood and liquid 
propane gas (LPG). For fighting purposes electricity and kerosene oil are mostly 
used, for cooking purposes wood/bushes, LPG and dung cake. In urban areas 
mostly electricity and LPG are used, whereas in rural area, where electricity is
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not available, kerosene oil, wood/bushes and dung cakes are used. Natural gas is 
not available although there is demand for it. Since the district is located far 
away from the main gas pipeline, it is too costly to supply gas. The district has 
no railroad or airport. Industrial development is negligible considering these 
deficits to Barkhan’s infrastructure.
Water-borne diseases are common. Lack of sanitation and lack of potable 
water sources are health risks. Health services are inadequate to meet the 
health requirements in the district. The number of health care facilities is 
limited and unevenly distributed, especially for women and children. Lack of 
female doctors and workers, who are unwilling to work in rural areas, add to the 
health problems faced by women in the district. Social and cultural constraints 
preclude women from seeing male medical practitioners. In Barkhan, maternal 
and infant mortality rates and fertility rates are relatively high. The concept of 
family planning is rarely promoted. Provision of services is concentrated in 
urban areas and severely ignoring the rural areas. The emphasis is on medicinal 
more than on preventive measures. The health care facilities also lack provision 
of clean water and sanitation. Working conditions are poor and human resources 
are limited as are medicines and supplies. Financial constraints also add to their 
weak capacity.
Means of communication are not spread to the interior of the district. PTV 
transmission is not available at all. Telephone facilities should be extended. Fax, 
courier and telegraph facilities are not available for public access. Although 
some areas are linked with the national power grid station, most areas are 
deprived of electricity. The supply of electricity for agricultural purposes is so 
limited, that out of the total of seven hundred forty tube-wells only twenty-three 
are electric generated and the rest are diesel fuelled.
The poor development of infrastructure is basically a result of a lack of 
resources. A major constraint is the weakness of institutions, lack of adequate 
planning, inappropriate choice of technologies and lack of involvement of 
communities.
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Selection of Barkhan
The selection of Barkhan as a case study was made for several reasons as 
described in Box 6.1. According to the April 1997 School Census, Barkhan had 
less than half the number of primary schools located in Jaffarabad. The 1997 
data indicate that there were 335 government primary schools in Barkhan, the 
lowest of all twenty-six, education districts. Barkhan’s total primary school 
enrolment was 10,838 students.20 Upon consultation with technical consultants 
who worked in Balochistan in 1997, Barkhan was rated among the bottom three 
least effective administratively. Barkhan is a Winter Zone District with the 
school period lasting from 29th February to 16th December to accommodate 
extreme climates of these areas in contrast with Jaffarabad, which is a Summer 
Zone District.
The previous section provides more background on social issues within the 
district than on the economy of the district. This discussion suggests that the 
socio-economic condition of Barkhan is quite underdeveloped; a finding that 
makes the selection of Barkhan District for analysis interesting when 
considering the notion of decentralisation of public education.
Barkhan, as a case study, illustrates the dire social and economic outlook 
that shadows many districts throughout Balochistan. In terms of education, 
Barkhan has shown promise in its preliminary success at enrolling girls in 
primary schools within the period of study (see statistical data presented below). 
However, the social impediments to girls’ schooling and the power that tribal 
leadership wields in society raises noticeable concerns for the future of 
administration of education in this area. These two issues are germane to the 
discussion of decentralisation and provide insight into what types of societal 
processes could help or hinder the efficient management of primary education at 
the local level. The research question asks how is it possible to apply plans for 
the decentralisation of primary education in an assumed highly centralised 
environment.
20 BEMIS Data are inconsistent as to the precise enrolment figures. Varying BEMIS documents 
indicate conflicting figures.
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Box 6.1:_____ Rationale for Case Selection
Barkhan has been selected as one case in a multiple case study research
approach. The rationale for its selection follows:
❖ Barkhan District belongs to the smaller districts in the province and has a 
relatively small population. The estimated population growth rate is higher 
than the one of the province as a whole and the population density is about 
twice the density in the province as a whole;
❖ Barkhan scores low on the indicators related to agricultural production. The 
absolute value of agricultural production and the value per hectare are the 
fifth lowest in Balochistan indicating a high level of poverty;
❖ The District holds a position in the middle with regard to the pupils/teachers 
ratio in primary schools, while the enrolment figures are relatively good for 
boys and bad for girls;
❖ Reports from PED project staff indicated that Barkhan has shown little 
success in local management and collaboration among local institutions 
involved with primary education administration;
❖ The coverage of the population by water supply schemes belongs to the 
lowest in Balochistan;
❖ Barkhan represents a ‘winter zone’ district in contrast to Jaffarabad that is a 
‘summer zone’ district; and
❖ Fairly poor infrastructure is evident in terms of roads and communication.
Source: Bureau of Statistics, 1997________________________________________
The remainder of this chapter develops the educational portfolio of Barkhan 
describing statistical data; enumerates the roles of educational institutions in 
Barkhan; and relays evidence to answer the question of the extent to which 
decentralisation has been achieved according to Winkler’s matrix.
204
6.2 Education Organisation in Barkhan
The organisation of primary education in Barkhan resembles that of 
Jaffarabad and most other districts in Balochistan. For example, the number of 
female schools is significantly less than boys schools, district education officers 
are the government officials responsible for the administration of education, 
dropout rates among both sexes of students is high and literacy among boys but 
especially girls is dangerously low. This section provides a statistical overview of 
government schools in Barkhan.
Government School System
Primary Schools
In Barkhan district, the total number of primary schools in 1997 was 378, 
out of which 306 schools were for boys, 38 were government girls’ schools and 40 
were CSP community girls’ schools. Of all primary schools in the district, 250 
schools had one teacher, fifty-seven schools had two teachers, thirteen schools 
had three teachers, and two schools had four teachers and two schools had more 
than four teachers. The remaining schools are unaccounted. In 1992, the total 
number of primary schools for boys was 267. In 1997 the number was 306, which 
shows an increase of fifteen per cent. Over the same period the number of girls’ 
primary schools grew from twelve to seventy two, showing an increase of an 
extraordinary five hundred per cent. Forty of the new girls’ schools were CSP 
schools and could account for the fact that an increase of 156% in girls’ 
enrolment was achieved between 1992 and 1997 so quickly. Boy’s primary 
enrolments grew by 37% starting at a primary enrolment of 5,889 in 1992 and 
increasing to 8,075 by 1997 (see Table 6.2 for Barkhan school enrolment figures).
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Table 6.2 Statistical Overview of Barkhan Government Schools
Number of Students Enrolled in Educational Institutions
Number of Pupils
Enrolment 
(in public sector)
1992 1997
M F Total M F Total
Primary School 5889 1081 6970 8075 2763 10,838
Middle Schools 1323 75 1398 1252 66 1318
High School 545 16 561 739 22 761
Source- BEMIS
Number of Educational Institutions
Number of Institutions
Schools 1992 1997
Level M F Total M F Total
Primary Schools 267 12 272 306 72 378
Middle Schools 13 1 14 13 2 15
High Schools 5 1 6 6 1 7
Source- BEMIS & DEO
Number of Teachers in Educational Institutions
Teachers Number of Teachers
Level 1992 1997
Primary School 432 436
Middle School 120 164
High School 55 134
Total 607 734
Source: BEMIS
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M iddle Schools
The total number of middle schools in the district in 1997 was fifteen, out of 
which thirteen were for boys and two for girls. In 1992, the number of middle 
schools was fourteen. The new school was a girls’ middle school. At the middle 
level, dropout rates are quite high, especially for girls. To reduce the dropout 
rate, private examination at middle level has been banned.
High Schools
The total number of high schools in the district was six during 1992 
increasing to seven in 1997. The new school was a boys’ school. Only one girls 
high school was in existence and high school dropout rates were high, again 
particularly for girls.
As shown below in Figure 6.2, the distribution of primary school buildings 
falls in the main valley of Barkhan that spans the length of the district. The 
Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS) Cell stationed 
within the Directorate for Primary Education in Quetta created the map through 
a school mapping initiative. The schools were mapped using a GIS system that 
beams the data via satellite to a database. As shown on the map, a majority of 
the schools appear to be located closely to roads suggesting either that only 
accessible schools could be mapped or that populations are more concentrated 
along roads which serve as both economic and communication links.
It is due to the distribution of population in this area, the tribes 
are scattered like this. To some extent the road also is the 
reason, as many schools are built on the roadside (Male DEO,
Barkhan, 1998).
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of Schools in Barkhan
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School B uildings
Except the schools in urban areas, most of the primary school buildings in 
the district are in poor condition. There are forty-seven shelterless primary 
schools, with classes held under a tree or out in the open air. The primary school 
buildings are poorly ventilated and dimly lit and made of mud and straw only. 
Overcrowding in these buildings is the norm. The majority of the schools have 
only two rooms to accommodate six grades and are characterised by a dearth of 
even the most basic equipment, such as blackboards, chalk, and mats for the 
children. Most are lacking as well in basic facilities like clean water supply and 
proper sanitation.
Figure 6.3: Primary School Building Under Construction Along the
Main Highway—Barkhan
Source: Personal Photograph, March 1998
The middle and high school buildings are to some extent in better condition. 
They are provided with facilities like water supply, toilet, playgrounds etc. Some 
of the middle schools are without a compound wall, however.
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MPAs (members of public assembly) and MNA (members of national 
assembly) have influenced the location of construction sites for schools.
The construction and site selection is totally influenced by the 
political powers. I f  the people have support of MPAs and MNAs, 
they can have a school, i f  not then there is no school for them 
(GTA Representative, Barkhan, 1998).
Also, for some schools local people have donated the school building. It was 
observed in one PTSMC report that the people of Barkhan were more interested 
in getting schools built for personal use than a sincere motivation to improve 
education in that District. Local families, in fact, used the school buildings for 
guestrooms and storerooms (Muhammad 1996). During our visit to one school, 
the female SDEO had to ask one of the children playing near the structure to 
fetch the keys from his relative so that we could gain entrance for inspection. 
She later told us that the waderas (tribal heads) take the keys for the school 
buildings and that her only access to what in most other districts is ‘government 
property’ was through tribal leaders. Other evidence indicated that schools were 
being built sometimes with four rooms that in reality only had an enrolment of 
five to ten students.
The female SDEO gave an insight into the power that the Waderas had over 
the construction of schools built under the CSP program.
The waderas have a heavy involvement, because these 
community support process, our schools, are opened with their 
consent, until i t  is their will they cannot have these schools.
Waderas are the sardar [chief] of the tribe and have the say in 
all m atters of the area. In each and everything, he decides what 
is to be done (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).
Other Education Data
According to 1997 data, the average pupil/teacher ratio in Barkhan district 
was 18:1. The ratio for boys’ primary schools was 25:1 and for girls’ primary 
schools the ratio was 27:1. The pupil/teacher ratio at primary level in 
Balochistan was 24:1 for boys and 43:1 for girls. So when compared to the whole
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province the ratio in Barkhan was higher for boys and considerably lower for 
girls.
With respect to middle schools, the pupil/teacher ratio for both sexes in 
Balochistan was 22:1. The ratio in the district was 9:1, which is better than the 
whole province. It could be due to high dropout rates. The pupil/teacher ratio at 
high school level for both sexes in Balochistan was 7:1, while the ratio in the 
district is 6:1. Again the ratio looks better for the district, but the low ratio may 
again be attributed to high dropout rates and also to non-availability of schools 
for admission seeking students at high school level.
The average completion rates in Balochistan are six years to complete grade 
five, another three years to complete grade eight and yet another two years to 
complete high school. More-or-less the same figures are true for the district.
At middle school level the dropout rate for boys in the district is eighty-three 
per cent and for girls it is ninety-seven per cent. At high school level the dropout 
rate for boys is forty-four per cent and for girls is fifty-nine per cent. Dropout 
rates are high due to variety of reasons. It includes poor learning conditions and 
inappropriate teaching methods, irrelevant curriculum, corporal punishment 
and failure to pass from one grade to the next, leading to discouragement. Lack 
of support from parents and the need for children’s labour at home are also 
contributing factors. The reported cost to attend a government school is only Rs. 
20 per year (£0.25 in 1997) (Female DEO, Loralai, 1998). This cost is a fraction 
of average earnings of farmers in Barkhan but becomes a large expense when 
factored over a large number of children per household.
6.3 Local Institutions
The characteristics of primary education in Barkhan, while largely 
similar to the other districts, are distinct in character given the specific socio­
economic and even cultural dynamics of the district. Local institutions in 
Barkhan and their effectiveness at managing the process of education were
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assessed according to the available resources, staff, and social dynamics 
prevalent at the time of the research.
Female District Education Office
Because of the low number of girls schools in Balochistan, female district 
education officers are not posted in all twenty-six districts. Given the smaller 
distribution throughout the province, the female DEOs are responsible for 
covering three to five districts within a division. Female administrators are 
therefore doubly constrained: first, by the vast geographical territory falling 
under their jurisdiction; and second, by their having to rely (for cultural reasons) 
on the availability of very few staff members to assist with school supervisory 
visits, and appropriate transportation (World Bank 1993:7). Barkhan District is 
one of these districts in Balochistan that is managed remotely by a female 
district education officer who sits in a neighbouring district office. Figure 6.4 
below illustrates the hierarchical connection between the Barkhan Sub- 
divisional Education Officer and the Loralai Female DEO.
Figure 6.4 Female District Education Office, Loralai 
Organisation Chart
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Source: Female DEO, Barkhan, 1998
212
The female DEO for Loralai commented that she needed more employees 
to help supervise the one hundred thirty one schools that reportedly fell within 
her Loralai jurisdiction. She also was responsible for the supervision of SDEO 
offices in two other districts (Musa Khel and Barkhan) that were also under­
staffed.
The SDEO for Barkhan was found to be working in an office in Barkhan 
Town. As shown in Figure 6.4, she was managing a staff of one assistant, one 
driver, and one other servant who worked as a night watchman to guard the 
office. The SDEO also had an assigned government vehicle for use in travelling 
to schools and other official business. In her interview, she indicated that she 
and her Learning Coordinator would spend on the average ten days per month 
visiting schools in the ‘open’ season. Her experience prior to her two years as 
SDEO was the position of headmistress at Barkhan Girls’ High School. The 
SDEO mentioned that she prefers her former position of principal at the Girls 
Government High School because of the fewer headaches associated with her 
former position as compared with the SDEO post. In the observation made in 
this study, she spent more time in her old office (principal’s office) than in her 
new one but this could have been the case due to the teacher—training that she 
was involved with at the Girls High School. However, when she unlocked her 
particular office for the first time during our visit, it appeared that very little 
business had been conducted there. There was only a large empty desk and very 
little other office furniture.
There were two posters on the door of her office. One was an announcement 
concerning the community support process (see Box 6.2 below). This poster was 
significant in that it provides guidelines to community members to assess 
whether they are entitled to the development of a community school for their 
particular village.
However, while the intention of this notice was to peak interest, anecdotal 
evidence suggested to us that the process had not been as clear-cut as claimed 
on the poster. During our visit to the office, a man approached us and
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complained that many schools were built in favour of the waderas. He further 
indicated that in his area, which he described, as deserving of a school had not 
received one despite the fact that he had petitioned PED for a long time to build 
one. Each successive year he was promised a school and/or put on a list but one 
had not been constructed. Other people who were standing around us during 
this discussion also started complaining that they had been waiting for nearly 
two years to get a government school building sanctioned in their area.
Box 6.2 Community School Advertisement
Information for the Public
❖ Do you have a girls’ primary school in your village?
❖ If not, then do you have a middle or matric pass girl in your village?
❖ If yes, then do you have 25 or 30 school going girls in your village?
❖ If yes, then do you want to teach your girls?
❖ If yes, then will you be willing to donate a piece of land for the construction 
of school to the government?
If your village meets the above conditions, then submit your request to the DEO 
(Women’s) office, or contact the ‘LAFAM’ office directly.
Address: LAFAM (Registered), Poultry Farm Road, Loralai.
Fax/Telephone: 0821-410525
Source: Translated from Urdu; based on personal photograph taken in Barkhan, 1998
The second poster on the SDEO’s office door was a quote from the Quran 
that talks about a time that wealth and human satisfaction will preoccupy people 
from doing good (See Box 6.3).
Box 6.3 Poster Against Corruption 
Prophet’s Saying (PBUH)
A time will come upon the people when their purpose will be their stomach, and 
wealth would be their honour, and women will be their Kibla (their desire), and 
income would be their religion. They would be the worst people, and they will 
not have anything in the hereafter.
Source: Translated from Urdu, based on personal photograph taken in Barkhan, 1998
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The irony of this poster was that it was found attached to a building that 
was most likely a product of and a haven for corruption. This government office 
had been constructed in August of 1997 (approximately six months prior to our 
interview). Construction was accomplished with substandard materials and we 
observed that water leaks had caused shorts in the electrical hardware 
surrounding the light switches/electrical outlets. Other cracks and leaks were 
apparent. A few men who had gathered in the courtyard in front of the building 
approached my interpreter to inform us about the poor condition of this 
building. Construction data in Balochistan indicate that cheap materials are 
generally purchased and used to construct buildings while the major proportion 
of the funding goes to contractors.
In this building, we also observed that a store room contained ‘new’ 
classroom furniture but in very poor shape due to poor construction and low 
quality materials, i.e. the chair upholstery was ripped, tables broken, 
chalkboards were falling apart (See Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.5: "New" Furniture in Storage-Barkhan
Source: Personal Photograph, March 1
This furniture was to be distributed to the teachers for their schools but was 
in such bad shape that it could not be used, thus it was in store. The poster (Box 
6.3) is again haunting in that the quality of the furniture was substandard due to
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the corrupt practice of using cheap materials to benefit those exchanging the 
money for it (GTA President, Barkhan, 1998).
Another observation at the SDEOs office was made concerning the 
disbursement of female teachers’ salaries. The task of this periodic 
disbursement had been delegated by the SDEO to her assistant who was male. 
On one of our visits to her office, this superintendent was handling the 
disbursement of salaries. Cash was lying around on his desk and crowds of men 
were gathered around him to collect the salaries for their sisters, wives or 
daughters. The female teachers rarely collected their salaries because women 
were not able to travel in public (see Figure 6.6). The SDEO clearly did not feel 
comfortable being around such a large gathering of men on this day that she 
accompanied us to her office. Professional reasons for her uneasiness will be 
explained in greater detail below.
The DEO/Loralai listed her roles and responsibilities inclusive of monitoring 
government girls’ schools and supporting the development of community schools. 
In this respect, the government officer’s role included conducting the qualifying 
tests for the teachers, releasing the posts, verifying the building/structure and 
providing the certificate and conducting the opening ceremony of the school.
Figure 6.6: Collecting Female Teachers’ Salaries in Barkhan
Source: Personal Photograph, March 1998
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Male District Education Office
Whereas this study found female education officers controlled by male and 
wadera dominance, the male DEO and SDEO officers, in contrast, were observed 
as being heavily influenced and even controlled by the leadership of the local 
teachers union. At most points of contact that we had with the education officers, 
the head of the GTA (teacher’s union) was always present. The Union’s role in 
the education system will be explained in greater detail below. However, at this 
point it should be noted that the power that the Union wielded over teachers 
rendered the government management structure powerless. In fact, the DEO 
office served little more than a satellite or field office of PED by which to 
distribute school materials, furniture, and to disburse teacher salaries. The DEO 
and SDEO were observed as being merely figureheads for the management of 
education in Barkhan. The power dynamic could be a result of the fact that the 
post of DEO was a fairly modern creation established in 1993. The Union and 
the tribal leaders presumably were in control of matters relating to education 
administration for this area before the installation of the male district education 
office although this assumption could not be confirmed. The notion that the 
DEO’s authority had encroached on the pre-existing power structure carries 
some validity given the anecdotal evidence described below.
On our visit to the education field offices, we witnessed the distribution of 
furniture and salaries. In front of the SDEO’s office building were small clusters 
of chairs, tables, water containers, chalkboards, mats, etc. The office building 
was unprotected by barrier walls and the teachers were storming the yard in 
small pick-up truck swarming around the piles and loading the materials. One 
man was waving a piece of paper at us and telling us that this was the list of 
materials for his schools but he only received fifty per cent of what he had 
requested. The president of the district teacher association was present talking 
to the teachers and in some way supervising the distribution of the furniture. He 
pointed out that most of the furniture and materials were damaged indicating 
that PED ‘gets rich’ while sending this junk to them. ‘ They tender i t  from there, 
appoint contractors and by the time they get here i t  is broken and completely 
unusable'. He encouraged me to photograph the poorly constructed furniture 
(see Figure 6.7).
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We then proceeded to the DEO's office nearby. It had a barrier wall and we 
found that the SDEO was occupying a desk and office in this building because 
there was no barrier wall at his office that might afford some security for him. 
In fact, the SDEO indicated that his office was being used as a storeroom. While 
we were sitting in his office, the DEO ordered the peon to fetch tea. Upon 
returning to the office where we were sitting, the peon exclaimed that the 
teachers were not only taking the furniture, but that they were also taking 
everything out of the storeroom. The head of the teacher’s union was also sitting 
in the DEO’s office with us and indicated that the furniture that was being 
distributed would most likely never make it to the schools, but that the teachers 
would be taking it to their homes. He noticeably took no responsibility for this 
practice.
Figure 6.7: Distribution of School Furniture in Barkhan
Source: Personal Photograph, March 1998.
The DEO was sitting at his desk with the SDEO sitting at his right side. 
There were a lot of people given that this day was a busy one with the 
distribution of salaries (first of every month) and furniture. The SDEO 
periodically signed papers for visitors. The president of the District Teachers
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Association, who was sitting in the office, appeared to be running the operation, 
giving orders. He was obviously regarded as a decision-maker.
Figure 6.8 Male District Education Field Office, Barkhan 
Organisation Chart
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Source: Male DEO, Barkhan, 1998
In terms of staffing, the DEO/SDEO’s offices are well positioned. The 
organisation chart shown in Figure 6.8 indicates that the number of staff for 
such a small district should be sufficient for doing the work required. In fact, 
both field officers confirmed that all posts had been filled and that none were 
vacant. The SDEO explained that he was basically responsible for 
administration in the entire district of Barkhan and supervises one ASDEO and 
five learning coordinators. Each learning coordinator was responsible for 
inspecting sixty schools each given the total number of boys’ schools was three 
hundred and six. The DEO appeared to be more removed from the system of 
administration, an observation revealed by his own reaction to questioning that 
the ASDEO and five learning coordinators were ‘concerned with the SDEO’ and 
not his office (Male DEO, Barkhan, 1998). The ASDEO was reportedly obligated
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to provide monitoring tasks. The male DEO claimed that the ASDEO had to 
inspect primary schools including Mosque schools. His inspection would include 
a check on whether the teachers were present or absent, their capability of 
teaching and he would provide advice when called upon by the teachers. There 
were five learning coordinators (LCs) at the time of the research who were held 
responsible for monitoring primary teachers in appropriated clusters of sixty 
schools each. It was a requirement that each of the five LCs visit their sixty 
schools each month. It was pointed out that the LCs normally only spent ten 
days in making these school visits (Ibid). The learning coordinators 
responsibilities included assisting teachers with problems encountered in 
teaching the curriculum and handling any other problems facing the teachers.
Two other anecdotal facts that support the DEO’s distance with the 
workings of the district are described. First, in an interview with an education 
administrator in Quetta, it was reported that the DEO/Barkhan was rarely in 
Barkhan physically and that he had spent most of his time in Quetta with his 
family. The other fact that a bed and heater were found in the DEO’s office 
would suggest that he might not have a permanent residence in Barkhan Town, 
although this latter observation could not be confirmed.
Other staff members were observed working in the DEO’s office, however 
many rooms seemed to be shut. Although electricity and a telephone line was 
available in Barkhan Town, no computer had been delivered to the DEO’s office 
even though one had been promised by a PED representative. It was reported 
that no staff member was qualified to use a computer although the 
superintendent had requested training.
Community Support Process (CSP)
The concept of community participation is not new in the district according 
to the Bureau of Statistics Report (1997). The practice of collective labour at 
harvest time and other periods of labour peaks were noted as common among 
people in Barkhan. Irrigation activities, such as digging and management of 
karezes, are centuries old and were generally carried out together. Communities 
have served important functions in many areas, and fluid irrigation systems,
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including the construction of minor earth filled dams, were built and 
rehabilitated by the beneficiary communities. All users of these water schemes 
contributed labour and funds according to the size of the land they held. Such 
institutions were considerably weakened and began to disintegrate to some 
extent, following state interventions in rural development. These interventions 
in turn have fostered the expectation among the people that the government 
should provide funding and development projects for them. This dynamic has 
reportedly led to a social environment in which people are inclined to remain 
indifferent towards their fellow tribesmen and others for cooperation. This 
historical summary serves as context against which innovative beneficiary 
participation programs in education were to be confronted. Ironically, the CSP 
program as it became known throughout the province, began in the Zhob 
division with CSP schools and teachers identified in Barkhan.
In Barkhan, the NGO (LAFAM) in co-ordination with the female education 
officers were the responsible agents for supporting the process of the 
development of girl’s schools in co-operation with villages and communities. 
Initially, it had been conducted through the support of the Society. The Female 
SDEO for Barkhan described the process:
The NGOs come and see the whole process through, both 
LAFAM and the people from the Society. There is a survey o f 
the whole village in which they see what is the number of girls 
and whether a school can be opened. Then they come to me and 
tell me that we have conducted a survey and that there are fifty  
girls there who want to go to school and that you should test 
the teacher. Then we take the teacher’s test and i f  she passes 
we say OK, otherwise we give her a chance for one or two 
months (Female, SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).
LAFAM’s organisation and its activities in support of development and 
management of primary education are described below. Other community 
institutions where evidence has shown some education management activity 
both positive and negative are also described below, e.g., village education 
committees, PTSMCs, and the teachers’ union.
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Light of Awareness for Fair Advancement of Mankind (LAFAM)
Only one NGO was identified as actively supporting primary education 
development in the district of Barkhan. Although based in the neighbouring 
district of Loralai that is the division headquarters for the Zhob region, Light of 
Awareness for Fair Advancement of Mankind (LAFAM) had been working in 
Barkhan district at the time of this research. LAFAM was established in 1992 
and was registered in 1994 under the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies 
Ordinance of 1961.21 In 1994, LAFAM worked under OXFAM funding for the 
prevention of drug abuse in the town of Loralai. LAFAM, in fact, was a drug 
abuse treatment and rehabilitation centre. LAFAM’s policy document (1996) 
indicates that it was a non-governmental, non-profit, non-sectarian organisation. 
It is further stated that the organisation consisted of ‘volunteers dedicated and 
committed to health, education and management professionals’. LAFAM’s 
mission—statement suggested that community participation was a desired 
outcome of their work:
LAFAM is working for the sustainable participatory 
development of semi-urban, rural and tribal communities of 
Balochistan (LAFAM 1996).
Further, LAFAM’s goal statement, in terms of its work in the education sector, 
also subscribed to the notion of participation:
The goal of LAFAM is to ensure parents participation in an 
organised way to acquire their ownership of existing 
Government schools for effective utilisation o f existing 
resources for enhanced quality and environment for education 
(LAFAM, 1996).
According to the account of LAFAM’s Field Manager, the NGO went 
through a significant transformation in its first five years. In 1992 a few doctors 
and professors together raised the concern that the town of Loralai was 
suffering from an epidemic of drug usage by local youth. In particular, there
21 LAFAM was initially registered under the name LoralaiAwamiFalahiMarkaz 
(Loralai People’s Welfare Centre). The name was changed to reflect a more regional role 
it was assuming in terms of social support. That is why the name ‘Loralai’ was dropped 
and the new name substituted. The acronym ‘LAFAM’, however, remained unchanged 
(LAFAM interview, 1998).
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were a significant number of heroin addicts. At that time, they established the 
NGO of LAFAM to aid in eradicating the drug problem. In 1992, LAFAM was 
registered through the Social Welfare Act of 1956 soon followed by the induction 
of the mandatory Majlis-e-Amala (Board of Directors). With an initial 
membership of forty-five individuals, seven members were selected as the first 
Board. The Board was responsible for overall policy-making process. They also 
established a direct education centre for initiating a social mobilization process. 
Awareness campaigns were launched in the community of Loralai as a means 
for combating heroin and other drug addiction. Additionally, the founding 
members started treatment centres given that a majority of the members of the 
Board were doctors. OXFAM and the European Union continued their financial 
support of LAFAM through 1996. From 1993 to 1996, more than 100 patients 
were reportedly treated and cured and most of them were reportedly 
rehabilitated in this region.
Box 6.4: LAFAM-—NGO Capabilities
1992 LAFAM established in Loralai under OXFAM support.
1994 Registered as a non-governmental, not-for-profit 
organisation.
1994-96 Drug Abuse Treatment & Rehabilitation Centre operational.
1995
Department of Education, Government of Balochistan 
Primary Education Project contract for the establishment of 
PTSMCs.
1996 Drug Abuse Treatment & Rehabilitation Centre closed.
1995-97 Contract awarded for Royal Netherlands Embassy sponsored project: Primary Education Quality Improvement 
Project (PEQIP).
Source: LAFAM Policy Manual, 1996 & LAFAM Interview, 1998
Representatives of LAFAM indicated in their interview that organisational 
problems (undisclosed) caused the termination or closing of the drug abuse 
treatment and rehabilitation centre. Transitional issues were also noted at the 
beginning of the education work. For instance, Board members were described
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as having some difficulty in administering policies that dealt with development 
agencies as opposed to charitable efforts conducted under the OXFAM support.
At about the same time, LAFAM had begun to transition into its role in 
supporting primary education development in the region of Zhob. In 1996, PED 
approached LAFAM with a contract to establish twenty-eight to thirty girls’ 
community schools in the Zhob region.
The contract between the government and LAFAM was extended for the 
1996-97 fiscal year. The terms included formation of PTSMCs in the remainder 
of schools within the Zhob region. Other requirements included the 
restructuring/strengthening of committees already formed by June 30, 1996 
involving such tasks as clustering of schools, cluster training, information and 
promotion campaigns and opening of bank accounts in the name of PTSMCs 
(PTSMC Briefing Document 1997).
In terms of LAFAM’s performance, the Loralai Female DEO commented that 
she was very satisfied with their work in establishing community schools.
Actually, I  am satisfied with the performance of the CSP 
schools. They are very good. There are so many people involved 
in the establishment, like VECs, WVECs and the promoters.
The NGOs are also involved in the establishment and their 
performance is very good. That is why these schools are doing 
well. There is continuous monitoring which is the main cause of 
the success of these schools (Female DEO, Loralai, 1998).
The Female SDEO for Barkhan also commented that she felt her 
relationship with LAFAM to be a very good one claiming that, ‘they cooperate 
with us and we cooperate with them’. LAFAM members, while indicating that 
there was a good relationship with the DEO and SDEO female officers, felt that 
the partnership of the NGO and the DEO seemed somewhat unbalanced. In fact, 
the development of a partnership with the government was considered ‘difficult’ 
(LAFAM representative, Loralai, 1998). The explanation was that LAFAM field 
promoters first had to mobilise communities for the creation of CSP schools. The 
communities in turn had to face the challenge of organising schools and 
communities against the hurdles of tribalism, tradition and customs of local 
society.
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. . .when we reached to the government there we faced the 
problem. Because we have prepared the community. We have 
mentally prepared them for the partnership. So when they 
reached there, i t  was difficult for government to accept the 
partnership with community (LAFAM representative, Loralai,
1998).
It is noteworthy that the statement above shows that Government officials 
were apparently consulted at the end of the process of community development. 
Had the NGO co-opted the government in the community process, the 
Government-to-Community relationship could have been strengthened and 
perhaps government would have not felt alienated from the process and the 
communities. The statement, most likely, was referring to the Government not 
coming good on its promises of the timely release of the salaries for new teachers 
rather than for its provision of funds for the PTSMCs (Ibid). The latter 
explanation was validated with a personal experience by one of LAFAM’s field 
promoters who was interviewed. He indicated that request for orders from the 
government to post teachers had been submitted three times. Finally after a 
year, the orders were released.
LAFAM representatives, however, cited other problems that their 
organisation had faced. One was that the BOD, in their opinion, was too removed 
from the implementation of the activities of forming CSP schools, materials 
distribution and the formation of PTSMCs. It was further claimed that the BOD 
was only interested in meeting the targets but not too readily available to help 
deal with field promoters and their issues. Issues included the lack of 
transportation to get to the villages,22 bad road conditions and difficult terrain, 
inclimate weather, responsibility for a large territory of six districts in which to 
conduct work, and the difficulty in finding potential teachers for the CSP schools, 
etc. On the other hand, LAFAM representatives claimed that they had reached 
their ‘targets’ which were the opening of schools in some very ‘far flung’ areas. It 
was also felt that the organisation had developed important links with 
communities that would have been difficult for a central organisation such as the 
Society to establish.
22 Under the PEQIP contract, two vehicles had been promised but not delivered.
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This is what we have achieved with decentralization... we 
believe we are quite close to the communities. Communities are 
close to us. And the same communities LAFAM has found quite 
easy to approach as opposed to other NGOs (LAFAM 
Representative, Loralai, 1998).
Village Education Committee
Village Education Committees (VECs) were reportedly formed for only the 
CSP schools. ‘These committees are formed by parents whose children are 
studying in the school so that they can understand the problems o f the 
children... so they know their own children and their own problemd (Female 
SDEO, Barkhan, 1998). This officer, however, indicated that she had never 
personally participated in a VEC meeting. She claimed that she only visited the 
CSP schools and would inquire of the teacher of the school if there were any 
problems and about the attendance of the students. Little evidence could be 
found to determine the actual scale of VEC/WVEC activity in Barkhan. In the 
interview at LAFAM headquarters, we met a VEC member from a neighbouring 
district. However, no committee members could be found for an interview.
Parent/Teacher/School Management Committee (PTSMCs)
Regarding PTSMCs in Barkhan, more quantitative information was found 
concerning projected targets than physical evidence of their existence and 
operation. The genesis of the PTSMC process in Barkhan was explained.
The PTSMC project was launched in 1995 when PED approached LAFAM’s 
Board of Directors to consider undertaking this activity. The Board was 
interested given that LAFAM had already been involved in field activities such 
as drug addiction prevention. The Board considered education to be ‘good cause’ 
for a region such as Barkhan where school conditions were quite bad. As of June 
30, 1996, the PTSMC initiative was formalised under a contract between PED 
and LAFAM.
The initiative, however, was met with various challenges. The teacher’s 
associations were reportedly rejecting the establishment of PTSMCs. 
Specifically, the Teacher’s Union (GTA) in Barkhan wielded strong influence
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against the formation of PTSMCs. Union members made threats to district 
education officers, sub-divisional education officers and learning co-ordinators to 
halt the formation of these committees. On different occasions, union members 
warned government officers not to go along with LAFAM facilitators to the 
villages to prepare the establishment of PTSMC committees. The GTA also 
distributed a circular to all teachers encouraging them not to co-operate with 
PTSMC facilitators (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).
Because of these pressures, teachers were not generally cooperative with the 
formation of the PTSMCs. The unions played an active roll in discouraging 
teacher participation in them in that they came to know that the PTSMC 
program was an open threat to illegal work in education. The union (GTA) 
reportedly influenced teachers and parents from time to time to oppose the 
PTSMC program and threatened NGO fieldworkers from doing the work of the 
PTSMC. Respondents indicated, however, that parents and teachers had a deep 
interest in improving education through PTSMC development despite the 
opposition. Thus, there has been some clear evidence of the people’s desire to 
change the education standards of their area.
Commenting on her observations of the effectiveness of the PTSMCs, the 
female SDEO explained that they had not been successful. She indicated that 
she did not involve herself in forming these committees because she knew that 
once the implementers such as the promoters sent from LAFAM and Society, 
had left, that she would be held accountable for any problems.
I  was not involved a t all in any of that, because I  knew that I  
would be held accountable. That is how they work and go away, 
whereas I  have to stay here. Thus when these people came to 
make PTSMCs I  never went with them (Female SDEO, 
Barkhan, 1998).
In fact, she noted a personal experience of where some waderas had 
approached her and claimed that the PTSMCs had each wasted Rs./lOO that had 
been collected to open their bank accounts. The waderas’complaint was that the 
money had not been used by anyone for the benefit of the schools.
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At the time of the interviews in 1998, no activity for the development of new 
PTSMCs or the training or development of new ones had taken place. One 
officer reported that there were a large number of committees but that without 
further instructions and funding to handle the management of the schools, the 
members were helpless. According to a report prepared by LAFAM, as of June 
1996, fifty-five PTSMC committees had been established in Barkhan. 
Additionally, the report documented ‘formation dates’ and ‘verification dates’ for 
each committee entry, the same date is recorded for each category on all the 
PTSMC committee entries suggesting that while committees formed (with 
names of members) had been written on paper the day of the initial visit, that no 
evidence existed as to their progress over time.
By spring 1997, it was reported that LAFAM was no longer actively setting 
up PTSMCs (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998). The male DEO even described 
them as being failures. The claim was made that although PED had provided an 
initial disbursement of Rs. 2000 to each PTSMC for school materials, there was 
never any follow-up with funds or support.
LAFAM’s reasons for PTSMC failures had more to do with poor government 
follow-through than the poor performance of the NGO. Representatives of 
LAFAM claimed that just as they had mobilised communities to form CSP 
schools, so had their work been in forming the PTSMCs and that the 
Government had failed in its commitment to the partnership of providing 
funding for the committees to function properly. In any case, the blame for 
PTSMC inactivity seemed to be pointing in two directions. The communities 
were blaming the NGO with the frequent fine of questioning: 'you [NGO] said 
that now we will be involved... we will be given the opportunity to plan for our 
schools, to be decision makers in our schools... to look after our schools, we have 
been offered accounts. The NGO in turn has blamed the Government for not 
providing the follow-up support. LAFAM emphatically stated that PTSMCs were 
no longer active in Barkhan as of the date of the interview (LAFAM 
Representative, 1998). Thus compared with Jaffarabad, even less was 
accomplished in the development of school committees to aid in the development 
of local schools.
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Unions
In various data collected, the Government Teachers Association (GTA) was 
noted as being an extremely powerful force and influence in the control of 
education administration in Barkhan. These data include photographs, 
observations, and the interviews conducted with LAFAM. When contrasted with 
accounts given by government officials, however, differences of opinion emerge. 
For example, female district officers made no mention of union control over the 
DEO’s work. Even the male district officers were silent on the matter but with 
good reason, given that the head of the GTA made himself present during their 
interview. In fact, his presence at this and all other meetings with the male 
education field officers supports the argument that the GTA was heavily 
involved in the day-to-day business of primary education management. This 
anecdotal evidence presents an image of a culture where a strong association 
existed with strong leadership and a popular subscription to it by a majority of 
male teachers. This culture was also found union activity in Jaffarabad in 
Chapter Five
The GTA also opposed the establishment of PTSMCs. A representative for the 
GTA explained why:
The government teachers also opposed these PTSMCs. In our 
opinion i t  was waste of time and money. We are of the opinion 
that when DEO, SDEO, ADEOs and Supervisors are present, 
there is no need to set up an extra body. Whatever programme 
is proposed to be implemented m ust be implemented through 
this structure. There is local politics prevailing in the area, i f  
someone has personal differences with teacher he will complain 
against the teacher. The community members were only on 
paper, actually they did not work. According to m y knowledge 
no PTSMC is active now (GTA Representative, Barkhan, 1998).
LAFAM personnel characterised the GTA as not fully understanding the 
role of the NGO in the development of primary education in Barkhan.
They [union] have a fear that NGOs are emerging as a parallel 
government. That is not true. We say that the involvement of 
government is indispensable for the sustainability o f this 
programme. So we are o f the opinion that NGOs could never be 
replaced by the government. I t is  not possible. The major role of
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NGOs is to facilitate this process. Now problems are there in 
the process of facilitation. NGOs have never liked to be parallel 
to the government, neither is i t  possible. So i t  is due to this fear 
that they are not cooperating with the NGOs (LAFAM 
Representative, Loralai, 1998).
Unlike the union reaction to the development of PTSMCs, CSP schools were 
not being pressurised by the GTA. The female SDEO claimed that the success of 
the CSP schools could be attributed to the fact that teachers of CSP schools were 
not members of the GTA. Normally, teachers who were already members of the 
union would not be hired to teach in CSP schools. She claimed that only 
teachers whose children were studying in the CSP schools were posted, so that 
the needs of the particular school could be best diagnosed by this close 
association.
Summary
As predicted, this impoverished district had even less fertile grounds for 
devolution. This summary of the devolving experiments in Barkhan 
demonstrates their failure on an even greater scale than Jaffarabad.
6.4 Education Services and the Distribution of Control
Below is an assessment of the data or responses to interviews according to 
the functions of the institutions administering education in Barkhan. As in the 
Jaffarabad case, Winkler’s model is used as a backdrop for analysing the process 
of education administration according to public service categories. Data will be 
presented against these categories that would help form a snapshot judgement 
of whether these activities have been decentralised and if so to what extent. 
Finally, a summary will be provided to express what the data tells us about the 
state of decentralisation for each component with reference to Barkhan.
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Supervision
For Barkhan, supervision in both female and male offices was limited with 
little to no power or authority. In other words, perfunctory tasks were performed 
such as visiting schools, disbursing teachers’ salaries and materials, etc. 
However, no real power or authority existed for making decisions concerning 
planning budgets and hiring and firing of staff. All district officers interviewed 
shared this notion. The male district officers further indicated that they had no 
real powers and added that they had been centralised by PED (Male DEO, 
Barkhan, 1998).
Management and administration of primary education in Barkhan was 
characterised as being more a monitoring function in contrast to an 
authoritative role of manager. The female DEO indicated that management to 
her included a variety of tasks.
... to check the efficiency of the teachers a t the school, supplying 
of material (books, furniture etc.) to the schools, random visits 
to the schools and to check whether the teachers are regular 
and teaching the classes, to meet the teacher and know their 
problems, to help them and communicate these problems to the 
higher authorities... this is the description of m y job (Female 
DEO, Loralai, 1998).
In terms of training that might enable her to better perform these duties, 
she indicated that none had been provided. She further mentioned that she had 
encountered many problems and requested training to handle them but her 
requests were not answered.
The female SDEO for Barkhan made similar claims. She first observed that 
the bureaucracy was highly centralised from PED. We have no real powers, we 
cannot do anything which we want, e.g. transfers, appointments [for teachers]; 
purchasing, everything is centralised’ (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998). The 
Officer’s Guide that prescribes responsibilities and powers was rendered 
irrelevant. The SDEO further stated that, in reality, these powers did not exist. 
‘ Those things are in the book and we do not have so much authority as is  written 
in the book’(ibid).
231
For example, she told that she should have the authority to grant leave of 
absence to teachers. In reality, she had been told (undisclosed source) that she 
could not grant any leave over ten days that all other leave requests had to be 
escalated to the female DEO’s office or even to PED. All teacher transfers, she 
noted, had to be handled by the Director at PED. In terms of teacher 
nominations, it was pointed out that individuals with political connections could 
get appointments without the consent of the designated government authority. 
The female SDEO said that if there is a need for a teacher that she does write up 
a nomination letter to PED but usually this request is superseded by local 
politics. The political pressure was also felt when pay of teachers would be 
stopped due to absenteeism or if a teacher were suspended for whatever reason, 
political influentials would force the pay or reinstatement of the teachers 
(Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).
The male officers confirmed that the Provincial Minister of Education had 
assumed all appointing and transferring powers. The notification, described in 
Chapter Three, was the governing document providing this authority. The 
authority basically removed the authority from the local district officers. The 
greatest challenge to managing primary education in their opinion was the 
political pressures that they faced.
We cannot construct buildings according to our will. We cannot 
punish a teacher for his wrong doings. We cannot work 
smoothly under the political pressures. We face pressure from 
both sides [government and outside] (Male DEO, Barkhan,
1998).
In short, there have been significant obstacles to supervisory functions in 
Barkhan.
Budget Allocations
In terms of budget allocations, a very clear and direct response was given 
that very limited budget authority had been granted to the education officers. As 
indicated by one field officer, she did not have discretionary funds especially for 
procurement of materials. In fact she called for the adoption of a more 
systematic procedure:
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...to  know how many books are required in m y district, they 
must ask this kind of questions. They should get written 
demand from us on how many books or furniture we require for 
schools of our region. They ju st don’t do so, they send books or 
furniture or other supplies without any prior estimate of the 
requirement. There is no systematic way. That’s why people are 
facing problems in the district with our schools. They provide us 
with some budget to purchase office stationery, but a system  
must be set up for supply of books and furniture for the schools 
(Female DEO, Loralai, 1998).
The Loralai DEO further indicated that the coordination between her office 
and the Barkhan SDEO’s office was lacking in terms of distribution of materials 
to the schools. Accounts from the male district officers, however, indicated that 
the distribution process was systematic but that the actual receipt of the 
materials had been random.
They provide whatever textbooks, reading/writing material, 
furniture like chairs, tables, desks, Taat... according to the 
enrolment, according to the BEMIS record, then we prepare 
lists and send to them, and they provide the material. 
Sometimes they call us and we submit the list there and they 
send us the required material. [The delivery] is irregular (Male 
DEO, Barkhan, 1998).
Some funding was made available to the Barkhan female EFO. She reported 
that she did have a bank account for the distribution of teachers’ salaries. These 
funds were not discretionary; however, she also reported that she received a 
small amount of funds for stationery (Rs. 200) and a one-off allotment of Rs. 
5000 for fans, heaters or for wood to burn. Otherwise, equipment, materials and 
other items are sent to her without her direction or without any prior notice. The 
male district officers also indicated that they received funding once annually for 
teachers’ salaries, POL (petrol, oil, lube), TA/DA (travel allowance/daily 
allowance) and office stationery. The process for the disbursement of funds, as 
explained by the officers, was standard. Bills were prepared and submitted to 
treasury offices. On the basis of these claims, the teachers’ salaries were 
released to the drawing officer (normally the ADEO) in cash from the National 
Bank of Pakistan in Barkhan. Salaries are then given to the teachers on the 
first of every month as witnessed and described above.
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In short, a minimal amount of budgeting had been devolved to education 
officers and none to local schools.
Monitoring of the Curriculum
While it is true that primary level curriculum is developed at the national 
level, evidence collected in Barkhan suggested that the capacity existed for its 
development or at least the development of supplementary materials by the 
education officers, locally. One officer indicated that the material is sent and 
that teachers were expected to teach it. The SDEO further indicated that she 
would write down problems experienced with the curriculum to be submitted to 
PED at the end of the year. The most compelling evidence, though, for the local 
development or at least participation in the development of the curriculum was 
that the officers had been mostly trained first as teachers before they become 
officers. So the experience base for monitoring the curriculum had been 
developed, at least, in Barkhan on the female side.
...Kachi Qaida (Kindergarten level curriculum) was originally a 
very [difficult] booklet which the teachers were having difSculty 
teaching: Now they have come out with the new Qaida, in 
which they have tried to teach with the help o f cards and 
pictures, but in that they have not given the method for the 
teaching. Now, there has been some training. I  got training 
from there and then gave training over here. Because we could 
not find anybody here so I  did the training m yself so I  can 
observe how these teachers teach. Now, I  am training them 
again... (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).
This is an example of a local initiative in Barkhan that was locally 
sustained by a government district officer.
When asked what the procedures were for measuring the performance of 
students the following process was described. The Loralai DEO indicated that 
students were tested three times a year on a quarterly basis. The teachers who 
are given a model or sample question paper created these tests by the learning 
coordinators. The students who pass these tests are then promoted to the next 
class. In terms of actual participation in the development of curriculum and 
textbooks, however, the DEO claimed that they had none. The female LC for
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Barkhan was also responsible for training teachers how to maintain their 
registers and logbooks; and to perfect their admission procedures and other 
teaching methods. The LC did not have her own vehicle and so she was 
restricted in her travelling to conduct this work. Usually the DEO and the LC 
would make school supervisory visits together.
On the male side, it was reported that local teachers prepared the 
examinations for classes one to five. For classes six and seven (middle schools) 
the heads of the middle schools and headmasters of the high schools prepared 
the examinations. However, in reference to the curriculum, the male officers 
were in agreement that they had no participation in the development of the 
curriculum.
Teacher Training
In terms of teacher training, the education officers’ responses compared that 
they had very little control over the training and that the Directorate of Primary 
Education mostly controlled the design and timings of these trainings. All 
officers indicated that they only had the authority to nominate teachers for the 
training program but that the budgeting for the training and the training itself 
was controlled from PED.
Commenting on her subordinate’s constituency of approximately seventy- 
two girls’ schools in Barkhan, the Loralai DEO exclaimed that with only one 
learning co-ordinator to assist her, ‘how [could] she manage to coordinate these 
schools in Barkhan?’ But when the DEO had visited less than half of her 
subordinate’s schools, she found that the performance of these teachers were 
less than satisfactory. She described that teachers were absent and that the few 
present were not performing satisfactorily.
In April of 1997, a validation examination was administered to determine 
whether the teachers holding positions in Balochistan were competent. The 
other purpose was to validate the credentials of the teachers to ensure they had 
the valid matriculation pass and identification papers to prove that they were 
the authorized teachers for their particular schools. The Balochistan Times 
(February 15, 1998:p.l) reported approximately one year later that twelve
235
teachers had been removed from Barkhan District. In total, one hundred and 
ninety teachers had been ‘sacked’ for all of Balochistan. The Loralai, female 
DEO remembered administering the exam and told that only a few of all of the 
teachers actually appeared for the exam and that some ultimately failed. It was 
her job to issue the termination letters to PED. These letters, in actuality, were 
recommendations since she did not have the ultimate authority to fire them. She 
also mentioned that she received pressure from the people to reinstate those she 
had recommended to be fired but she indicated that she ‘diverted the pressure 
towards PED’ (Loralai, Female DEO, 1998). Her actions perhaps illustrate a 
time when the central authority can facilitate a needed buffer between her and a 
hostile constituency.
In Chapter One, the point was made that sometimes quality education has 
no correlation to any systematic decentralisation plan (Hannaway 1995). This 
situation implies that if a 'school level' decentralisation effort were to 
presumably effect quality instruction in the classroom, quality would have been 
the result of more localised inputs rather than the decentralisation effort itself. 
Box 6.6 illustrates one teacher’s efforts in Barkhan that were found to be 
successful but not resultant of any special public service rendered by the 
Government.
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Box 6.5: An account of supervision of female teachers in the Barkhan area
You know that too many schools were ju st on papers. The village malik 
(leader) and some relatives of their teachers were taking the pay o f these 
ladies (teachers). Some ladies were even sitting in the Punjab Province 
because the Barkhan area borders the Punjab. And I  was so worried about 
this situation. You know that about 2  lak Rupees (£2,777) were being 
wasted on those teachers and I  refused to give them their pay. I  took 
severe action against them. And I  gave all those names to the newspapei 
and I  terminated those teachers. And the number of these teachers was 
about fifty-three. I  was so upset seeing this situation that in reality 
education was not being done. And there was no output...and then we 
started that program...the CSP school program, the community support 
program. You know, we started this program from those girls who were 
given the UNICEF sponsored Mobile Female Teacher Training Unit, two- 
months training in 1990. And they were waiting for their orders. Those 
were 20 girls in that area: Loralai/Barkhan, Musakhail area.
We called those 20 girls and we took their test. I t was very disappointing 
because they told us lies that they were belonging to some villages. They 
only wanted to get positions of Junior Varsity Teachers. And you will be 
surprised to know that only 8 girls were from the villages and the rest 
were from Loralai, from the city. Some were from Barkhan also. There is  a 
small village called Nahar Kot in Barkhan. I t was very astonishing that a 
lady (teacher) had died there but she was getting pay. She had been deaa 
even for four or five years. And I  closed that school also. Also in Nahar Kot 
there was a girl of that village who also got this training, MFTTU training. 
And we first started the school with this girl. That was an excellent school. 
And she was an excellent teacher. You know that she was teaching in hei 
home to so many girls. A t first, she was not our teacher, but she was 
teaching the girls of the community. This was something hopeful for us. 
She got the MFTTU training and she passed the test. And first o f all we 
started there this CSP School with that girl. She got two months MFTTL 
training and until now that school is going on very well.
Source: Personal account by former Zhob Divisional Education Officer, 
December 1997)
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Other District Administration
Communication between PED and the district offices was unanimously 
reported as neither being regular or efficient. Communication, however, has two 
directions and when asked how often she communicated with PED, the female 
DEO responded, ‘not very regular communication, i t  is on an as needed basis, 
whenever they need something or you need something (Female DEO, Loralai, 
1998). She also suggested that she possessed the capacity to accept more 
responsibilities indicating that she knew better than anyone the needs of her 
schools. Social pressures, however, were reported as dashing even the current 
authority of this DEO. In fact, at one point she had to petition the Deputy 
Commissioner for a security guard at her home and accompany her around town 
because she was feeling threatened by various community members. She had 
been constantly approached by people to perform illegal favours such as 
providing to them the ghee (cooking oil) that was to be distributed for a local 
food program handled by her office; transferring of teachers illegally, and even 
the transfer of her own staff. She intimated that members of her own staff were 
politically backed by local influentials who were watching her every move. 
Should she make one judgement not in their favour, she felt that she would be 
punished. She also reported that a week prior to the interview, her office 
storeroom had been burgled and that one thousand cans of ghee had been stolen. 
She suspected her own staff of the theft.
6.5 Conclusion
In this case study we have reviewed the institutions that are essentially 
responsible for primary education in Barkhan. This chapter has also analysed 
district administration according to public service categories in an attempt to 
answer the question of how education was managed and to what extent 
decentralisation had occurred over the time period the study covered.
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Figure 6.9 offers a graphical response to this question. Evidence collected 
concerning Barkhan’s administration revealed that district officers felt isolated 
given the remoteness of the district from PED. District officers maintained 
representational roles for the government but assumed very little power, 
authority or control for day-to-day activities. As in Jaffarabad, interferences 
from unions and tribal leaders impeded what little capacity the officers did 
possess to manage.
Figure 6.9: Centralisation-Decentralisation Typology Matrix for Public
Education In Barkhan
Public Education 
Service Categories
Supervision
Monitoring of the 
Curriculum
Budget Alloca tions
Other District 
Administra tion
(continuum for locus of control)
Centralised
✓
Mixed Decentralised
Source: Adapted from Winkler, 1989
From 1992 to 1997, evidence from Barkhan suggests that the community 
support process through the work of the Society, LAFAM, the female education 
officers and consultants from PED was beginning to give communities a voice in 
the affairs of their own schools. This active role was being first played out 
through the communication with communities and inquiries about the needs of 
families for education through door-to-door surveys (CSP Case Study 1997; 
Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).
These developing local institutions, however, were short-lived especially the 
PTSMC scheme. While evidence supports that these institutions were initially 
established by the Society and LAFAM (approximately fifty-five), none were
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active at the time of the study. In fact, initial deposits of funding were made 
available but were given without direction. Without this support, communities 
in Barkhan were unable to sustain any activity.
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Chapter 7
Education Administration in Balochistan: 
An Analysis of Organisational Variables
In Western education systems, conventional wisdom would say that schools 
could be made ‘better’ through reforms developed by their existing managing 
institutions. Chubb and Moe (1990) argue that institutions, however, cannot 
solve the problems because they are in fact part of the problem and the key to 
better schools is institutional reform. This argument was brought out very well 
in the case of educational development in Balochistan. In a way, institutional 
reform there took a ‘backseat’ to international attention that focussed instead on 
the deplorable educational indicators. Low primary attendance, low literacy 
rates, low female participation rates all dramatically displayed a problem that 
needed solving. Rightly so, something needed to be done.
In prior chapters, we have looked at the experiment of educational 
development in Balochistan that was cloaked in the shroud of decentralisation. 
We have reviewed the policy process from the ‘top down’ to implementation at 
the district level to determine the success to which decentralisation worked in 
the centralised environment. To an extent, the results have presented 
themselves but to help clarify the picture, however, this chapter develops the 
analysis further through a set of organisational variables. The variables were 
first identified in chapter one but have been instrumental to the structure of the 
research. Thus, this chapter is organised around this structure. In the first 
section, we briefly revisit the process undertaken to coordinate variables,
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questions and theory. Secondly, aspects of organisational reform are conveyed 
through an in-depth discussion of the variable analysis. Finally, practical 
lessons brought out in this analysis are presented.
7.1 Institutional Reform: Deconstructing the Panacea
It is noteworthy that in this study the World Bank was the primary donor to 
the BPEP initiative in Balochistan. Although the World Bank had been involved 
in decentralisation initiatives through the 1980s and 90s in public 
administration reforms, it had established no formal policy on the matter. As 
Prud’homme admonished, ‘the Bank needs to develop an analytical framework 
to clarify the issue, monitor the experiences undertaken and the design of 
research efforts in this area, and provide better-founded policy advice’ 
(Prud’homme 1994:1).
In terms of institutional reform, the World Bank had recognised in its 1997 
Annual Report that effective government institutions were the key to economic 
prosperity. In its assessment of the report, the Economist pointed out that this 
seemingly ‘new’ knowledge was behind the times. It argued that the state had 
been a strong force in poorer countries for at least half a century so the question 
was raised as to what governments need to do to become more effective. The 
Economist; summarised the 1997 Report to find out.
Beyond matching role to capacity, the Bank believes that 
governments need to make more of an effort to improve then- 
own capability. This means designing effective ways to check 
arbitrary state action, through independent judiciaries for 
instance. It also means building a better bureaucracy. 
Bureaucracies that are dominated by political appointees and 
that pay civil servants meagre salaries are more likely to be 
inefficient and corrupt, the Bank contends... And, yes, 
encourage civic participation, so the state works in partnership 
with its populace...The test will be turning such...words into 
practical policy advice (.Economist; June 28, 1997:93-4).
For improving our knowledge of governments under decentralisation 
initiatives sponsored by the World Bank, there is a need to deconstruct the 
process of policy formulation governing such an effort. The implication of the 
case of Balochistan is that while grounded research on parents’ readiness to
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educate girls existed (Rugh 1998; Thomas 1996), the format for doing so did not 
take into consideration formal policy measures that needed to be in place to 
institutionalise the reforms for managing access although they did mention 
them to be lacking.
In this study we have attempted to construct a tool for analysing whether 
institutional reform has taken place and if so to what extent. The analysis first, 
incorporated first basic and widely accepted definitions of decentralisation (see 
Box 7.1).
Box 7.1 Decentralisation Construct
1. True Decentralisation only occurs when local decision-making bodies have 
control over financial resources (Midgley 1986:33). A local body has its own 
budget (Mawhood 1983:9).
2. A decentralised local body should have a separate legal existence (Mawhood 
1983:9).
3. A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial 
resources. This includes quantity of finances handled. Number and 
qualifications of the staff employed. Power to decide over expenditure. Power 
to vary revenues. Decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion, discipline 
(Mawhood 1983:9).
4. Decentralisation can be observed through the behavioural patterns of 
participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy 
(Mawhood 1983:xii).
5. Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on political, behavioural, 
attitudinal and cultural factors.
-Most important among these is commitment of local officials to 
decentralising development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of 
rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs 
and behaviours were compatible with decentralised administrative 
arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200).
6. Decentralisation is a result of the transfer of planning, decision-making or 
management functions from central government and its agencies to field 
organizations, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public 
corporations, area-wide or regional development organizations, specialized 
functional authorities or non-government organizations (Rondinelli 1981).
To formulate a healthy analysis, these general statements were then 
changed to interrogatories. Discovery is a useful way of determining greater 
confidence in the generalised statements of decentralisation. To guide the data 
collection for this study, variables of organisational analysis were used as a way 
of categorising the interrogatories in similar broad areas. Box 7.2 below
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illustrates this categorisation through a matrix. This matrix was a key element 
included in the case study protocols.
Box 7.2 Data Analysis Matrix
Organisational
Variables
Theoretical Construct/Inquiry Evidence
Task
(1) Has decentralisation occurred in any form over five 
years of intensive donor support from 1992 to 1997?
(2) What was the state of primary education 
management across Winkler’s functions of education 
when the project began? Has the nature of 
management changed from 1992 to 1997?
Structure
(3) What evidence exists that education functions and 
decision-making authority have been legally and 
informally transferred from the centre to the 
district/community/school level? (Rondinelli 1981; 
Mawhood 1983)
Procedure
(4) Do local decision-making bodies have control over 
financial resources? Are discretionary funds available? 
Is a budget developed locally? What is the quantity of 
the budget handled locally? (Midgley 1986; Mawhood 
1983)
Personnel
(5) A decentralised local body should have the authority 
to allocate substantial resources. This includes 
quantity of finances handled; number and 
qualifications of the staff employed; power to decide 
over expenditure; power to vary revenues; decisions 
over the staff-appointments, promotion and discipline 
(Mawhood 1983:9). What level of authority do local 
bodies have over subordinate field officers, ministerial 
and other staff, i.e., teachers’ appointments, promotion 
and discipline?
Culture
(6) Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on 
political, behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors. 
Most important among these is commitment of local 
officials to decentralising development, the quality of 
local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward 
government, and the degree to which traditional 
customs and behaviour were compatible with 
decentralised administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 
1983:200). To what extent did these factors play out in 
Balochistan?
(7) Was decentralisation observable through the 
behavioural patterns of participation, the means of 
access for individuals to the bureaucracy? (Mawhood 
1983:xii)
An analysis of decentralisation and its effect at the ground level is one way 
of determining whether it is such a positive model for education development. 
Mai-Brith Schartau's (1993) framework for decentralisation shifts the attention
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from the macro dichotomy between a national government and its state or 
provincial institutions to the micro level where State or provincial authorities 
relate to the district and school levels. It is based on the belief that many 
important decisions must inevitably be made at the school level because it is at 
this level that professionals close to pupils can decide what to do and how to 
implement goals set at a higher level (p. 229).
As indicated in Chapter One, she declares that at all levels; good 
management is an important tool to reach the goals of efficiency and 
productivity. Schartau states that management is a vital function of the 
organisation and lists five variables for analysing it:
1 Task
2 Structure
3 Procedure
4 Personnel
5 Culture
These variables have been used to analyse the process of primary education 
administration in Balochistan, Pakistan.
7.2 Aspects of Organisational Reform: The Evidence
To complete the matrix above, it has been necessary to analyse the 
empirical data collected for each variable and their respective questions. Below 
is a summary of the evidence.
Task
The ‘Task’ variable was used to deconstruct two general aspects of the 
primary education system. First, it analysed policies that would influence 
decentralisation. Second, this variable was used to analyse the degree to which 
subsequent functions of the primary education system were decentralised. The 
functions that were undertaken throughout the system were fundamentally 
driven by plans whether they were formally or informally prescribed. Given the 
normal sequencing of policy development followed by task implementation, in 
general, it was implicitly important to clarify Balochistan’s education policy 
before analysing the functions of tasks of education administration.
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While Pakistan’s constitution granted its provinces responsibility for 
administering public education, this provision in no way guaranteed full 
decentralisation of education services down to the district level as was 
anticipated and hoped for through Federal planning ideology. Despite goals and 
objectives influenced by donors, formal provincial policy was never fully 
developed for education administration. In fact, analysis of the data collected in 
this study revealed that formal primary education policy did not exist prior to 
1997 in Balochistan. Respondents including government sources, district level 
staff, technical consultants, and World Bank officials all independently made 
this claim. Instead, workplans were developed that drove task implementation. 
After 1993, World Bank task-managers monitored programme activities. They 
focussed their concern on a variety of issues such as criteria of selection for 
teachers, and the efficient use of funding for the construction of schools. 
However, policy prescriptions or goals for primary education were more a result 
of project workplans than a provincial education policy.
Two specific tasks illustrated a partial relationship between the province 
and the national policies of education reform such as the establishment of the 
Directorate for Primary Education and the development of field operational 
manuals for education administration. However these tasks were accomplished 
in Balochistan through the bidding of the donors rather than through a 
commitment to any formal provincial policy or plan.
From 1992 to 1997, these workplans drove the implementation of tasks that 
were meant to improve and reform the delivery of primary education. A policy 
vacuum resulted with tasks being allocated and controlled politically through 
patron-client relationships. Given that no formal policy language could be found 
in written or any other form, it is only possible to measure the extent of 
decentralisation according to task objectives and their implementation. From 
the perspective of respondents located at the ‘centre’, once PED was established, 
a majority of the planning for district education and administration shifted to 
the centre. The statement was made in the context of curriculum development 
that ‘PED was doing things for teachers and DEOs rather than having them 
take initiatives and responsibilities. The respondent felt that as a consequence
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to the control of tasks from the centre, decentralisation initiatives were being 
introduced under the BPEP programme.
Other tasks were centralised with the establishment of PED. Prior to 1992, 
more discretionary budget power and control existed at the district level. 
Respondents at both PED and the district offices confirmed this. Reasons for 
centralising the control of activities included distrust of DEOs in handling their 
budgets and procurement honestly; the mishandling of teacher selection; and 
training. Respondents believed the scaling back of DEO controls for these, 
however, as being less a consequence of corruption than the fact that certain 
officers within PED had amassed extraordinary power. Through the dynamic of 
an externally funded program operating within a government agency, the 
possibility of amassing power and control for a range of activities became a 
reality—a profitable reality at that. This reality, however, must be properly 
characterised as having evolved as opposed to being innate.
From the perspective of two contrasting districts, the assessment of 
decentralised tasks bore relatively similar results. In both districts, DEOs were 
handling education administration functions to varying degrees of success. 
Officers in both districts, however, similarly claimed that no real authority or 
power existed for making decisions concerning planning, budgets, and 
personnel. They perceived their role as being functionaries rather than decision 
brokers. They further believed that they understood and were more aware of 
their own local administrative realities better than PED for which they should 
be granted more authority to handle. Two major functions were pointed out as 
being responsibilities without control. These were monitoring of schools and 
distributing teacher and staff salaries. Any further discretion or authority in 
these and other areas had not been at their disposal.
The NGOs that were operating in these two districts had aligned their 
functions to the activities prescribed by the ‘centre’ (PED) through the BPEP 
program. Because their mandates or orders were being taken from the centre, 
the allocation of tasks between the district offices and theirs was sometimes not 
clarified and competition resulted. This is further evidence of a policy vacuum. 
Had a clear vision of stakeholder roles been decided and communicated to all
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parties through a provincial education policy, DEOs would possibly have had 
fewer grounds for resentment towards the activities of the NGOs. These 
resentments tainted relationships in both districts.
NGO activities were observed in two areas, teacher training and the 
formation of village committees and community schools. The analysis of their 
capacity for decentralisation bore contrasting results. In Jaffarabad, both 
SCOPE and the district education offices had successfully undertaken training 
programs. SCOPE had involved themselves with the training of committees for 
management tasks related to community schools. The DEOs were successful in 
launching a ‘home-grown’ teacher-mentoring program sustained through 
volunteered resources. These activities proved that educational tasks were 
capable of being planned locally—a step towards pure decentralisation.
On the other hand, in Barkhan, it was observed that all activities were 
clearly centralised. PED had sent their own team to train local teachers with 
marginal to no involvement of LAFAM or the DEOs. LAFAM felt that it had 
been ‘successful’ through the relationships it had established with communities 
and the committees it had formed. However no links had been established 
between the NGO and the district education officers to sustain centrally driven 
programs. In fact, at the time of the field study, little evidence was found of 
active local committee engagement in local school administration. LAFAM staff 
indicated that they felt they had ‘completed’ their work by documenting the 
formation of committees in the PTSMC initiative but was not aware of further 
instructions for training or nurturing these committees, a task it felt was meant 
for the DEOs to handle. The DEOs on the other hand were not inclined to 
engage in committee development for fear of local political repercussions. This 
dysfunctional process was further aggravated by the local political environment 
where Waderas and a teachers union clearly controlled all educational activities 
and where PED centrally controlled the procurement of supplies and educational 
materials.
The research questions that influenced the data collection according to ‘Task’ 
variable are presented below and is followed by a brief summary.
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(1) Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over five years o f intensive 
donor support from 1992 to 1997?
Based on the evidence of this study and based on a strict theoretical 
definition of decentralisation, no formal primary education decentralisation 
occurred between 1992 and 1997 in Balochistan. Functions of decentralising 
proportions were carried out and objectives met such as the establishment of the 
Directorate of Primary Education, the teacher mentoring program in Jaffarabad, 
the CSP school scheme including the development of VECs and PTSMCs to 
greater and lesser extents in Jaffarabad and Barkhan. However, these activities 
had centralising tendencies. The definitions of decentralisation expressed earlier 
in the theoretical construct help to elaborate this finding.
a) If we strictly apply the theoretical definitions of decentralisation, it only 
occurs when local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources 
and when the local body has its own budget. Also, the local body would have a 
separate legal existence (Mawhood 1983:9).
b) A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial 
resources. This includes quantity of finances handled. Number and 
qualifications of the staff employed. Power to decide over expenditure. Power to 
vary revenues. Decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion, and discipline 
(Mawhood 1983:9).
c) Decentralization can be observed through the behavioural patterns of 
participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy (Mawhood 
1983:xii).
d) Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on political, behavioural, 
attitudinal and cultural factors.
-most important among these is commitment of local officials to decentralising 
development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward 
government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were 
compatible with decentralised administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983: 
200).
e) Decentralisation is a result of the transfer of planning, decision-making or 
management functions from central government and its agencies to field 
organisations, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public 
corporations, area-wide or regional development organisations, specialised 
functional authorities or non-government organisations (Rondinelli 1981).
(2) What was the state of primary education management across Winkler’s 
functions of education when the project began? Has the nature of 
management changed from 1992 to 1997?
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As illustrated below in Figure 7.3, Public service delivery in Balochistan from 
1992 to 1997 was centralised. The evidence presented in this thesis provides the 
justification for this assessment.
Figure 7.3 Centralisation-Decentralisation Typology Matrix for Public
Education In Balochistan
Public Education 
Service Categories
Supervision
M onitoring o f the 
Curriculum
B udget Alloca tions
O ther D istrict 
A dm inistra tion
(continuum for locus of control)
Centralised
y
y
y
Mixed Decentralised
The state of decentralisation in Balochistan’s primary education system 
additionally can be analysed according to other variables that take into 
consideration structural and/or legal arrangements between the central and 
local authorities that would make some indication of reform. This is presented in 
the next variable of analysis below.
Structure
The ‘structure’ variable measures the distribution of authority and the 
relationship between different roles or layers of administration. On the surface, 
the claims made that over 500 community girls schools had been established in 
Balochistan, the formulation of village education committees and women’s 
village education committees and PTSMCs, would indicate that decentralisation 
reforms have been realised with the possibility of these institutions receiving 
financial control and other responsibilities for primary school administration.
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However, a closer look at the relationships and operating procedures of the 
various levels of governance indicates otherwise.
From the highest level, education policy guidelines were established and 
included provisions for decentralising administration. As stated earlier, the 
provinces were constitutionally authorised to develop and manage their own 
education affairs. However, local politics and environmental and cultural 
constraints often sidetracked the translation of policy from the national level to 
implementation at the provincial level. Additionally, donor agendas and 
financially tied advice steered the development process but neglected to 
establish fundamental provincial education policy. Rather, benchmarks 
embedded in workplans served as policy markers. Some of these, like the 
establishment of PED, were expected to facilitate decentralisation.
The creation of PED had structural implications that led to centralising 
tendencies rather than furthering decentralisation goals. As a newly created 
institution, PED drew powers of education administration to itself rather than 
devolving these powers and controls out to the districts. It is true that the 
appropriate distribution of authority among different layers depends on the 
capacity of each level to foster decentralisation. As one respondent summarised,
‘ The current system of administration with its  emphasis on control and top- 
down communication has been described as having an infinite capacity for 
obscuring and killing initiatives and innovationd. The provincial Department of 
Education controlled the activities of PED only as far as politically or financially 
beneficial. Six policy statements included in the 1992 National Education Policy 
were analysed earlier in this study. Of these policies, one had a negative impact 
on the rest. The appointment of personnel at the district level, especially 
teachers, was a goal that was retarded by the fact the Minister of Education 
retained this power. That district government officers were not able to legally 
hire, fire, or transfer staff was reportedly a large impediment to local 
administration. Consequently, movement towards administrative 
decentralisation never fully materialised.
Likewise, the Curriculum Wing of the Federal Ministry of Education held 
full power for another function—the development of the national curriculum.
251
Although each province could develop its own supplementary materials, the 
Federal control of curriculum ignored local capacity within PED and the 
districts for managing all aspects of curriculum design and development. The 
development of formal primary school curriculum at the provincial level with 
nationally approved objectives would have eased the burden of developing a 
supplementary curriculum that often competed with the national curriculum, 
anyway.
Institutionalising reforms towards decentralisation were not always the 
easiest of goals for PED. Especially when agencies and units in and horizontal to 
PED were tasked with similar responsibilities. The example given was that of 
the Textbook Board, the Bureau of Curriculum and Extension and the 
Balochistan Instructional Materials Design Cell within PED. On the structural 
side, there were difficulties in determining the appropriate division of 
labour/responsibilities between these agencies and the functions of teacher 
training and curriculum development.
Other functions of PED exhibited centralising tendencies. In assessing the 
structure of district administration in Balochistan and its relationship to PED, 
it is apparent that little evidence of decentralisation existed from 1992 to 1997. 
One source illuminates this finding:
I f  you... want to take the power out of the hands of the 
Secretariat in Quetta and devolve i t  to a person further out; I  
don't think that anybody's confronted that y e t...I  think that 
decentralisation is geographical rather than authority, power 
and accountability (CTA, BPEP, 1997).
The claim was repeatedly made by DEOs that their ‘hands were tied’, that 
they had no decision-making authority to procure even stationery for staff in 
their offices. The DEOs had no legal control for financial matters other than 
distribution of salaries. In Jaffarabad, government officials reported that a 
majority of their tasks had been centralised at PED. These tasks included the 
procurement and distribution of materials and furniture. They further felt that 
controls in these areas would allow them the flexibility to handle minor 
management problems at the least. Officers in Barkhan believed themselves to 
be merely outposts with roles limited to some monitoring and distribution tasks.
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Both district staff felt that, structurally, DEOs had the charge to cover all the 
schools and territory of their district but that they possessed no power or 
authority with regard to staff and other resources. Both district staff also felt 
that they possessed no legal rights or authority concerning budgets and district 
finances. In contrast, Jaffarabad did initiate a teacher-mentoring program from 
its own district resources. This initiative illustrated that local provision of 
training was, in fact, more cost effective at the local level and therefore could be 
worth the reform necessary for this function to be legally devolved and 
exercised.
Given Barkhan’s distance from Quetta and its remoteness and its lack of 
infrastructure, staff there felt that they had no relationship with PED and that 
very little communication flowed in either direction. Additionally, external 
forces such as tribal leaders and unions contained or squelched any remaining 
authority that they might have possessed. Similarly, forces in Jaffarabad 
including feudal landowners and unions impeded the work of the district 
officers. So while the education department is represented geographically 
through the district education offices in twenty-six districts, powers for day-to- 
day management activities are extremely limited for a variety of reasons. In 
other words, geographical representation of government staff did not equal 
legitimate reform according to their perspective.
The structure and management of the community support process (see 
Appendix III) was shared among district officers, NGOs and communities. One 
source pointed out that ‘resource mobilisation’ of communities did not equal 
decentralisation. ‘Getting communities to kick in supplementary support for 
community schools does not necessarily leverage full control or authority o f local 
school management’. In fact, full control and authority had not even been legally 
transferred from top government levels to local district offices. Community 
organisation posed a threat to central power that communities would be 
monitoring teachers and schools—both tasks viewed as the responsibility of the 
government. At the beginning of the CSP initiative, NGOs and DEOs did not co­
ordinate their work that led to tension, suspicion and mismanagement.
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(3) What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making 
authority have been legally and informally transferred from the centre to 
the district, community and school level? (Rondinelli 1981; Mawhood 
1983)
The ‘centre’ institutions, or rather the state apparatus, were not willing to let 
go of its control, legally or informally. A lack of organised civil society and a lack 
of political will to decentralise formed a structure where no distribution or 
allocation took place in serious proportions. The structure of administration 
placed control at the centre and paradoxically through PED—an institution 
designed to decentralise primary education.
Procedure
As a variable, ‘procedure’ measures the methods used to carry out tasks of 
the primary education system. As observed in this study, innovative methods by 
which decentralisation tasks were undertaken were often challenged by a 
variety of forces. The treatment of this variable below will describe the most 
significant of these challenges
External forces significantly influenced the methods used to carry out 
administrative tasks more so than formal procedural guidelines. They were open 
to corrupt practice. The example was given by a majority of respondents that the 
Minister of Education manipulated the procedures for hiring, firing and 
transferring teachers. District officers were pressured to make these personnel 
actions happen. Interestingly, the World Bank had rebuked district actions on 
several occasions especially the hiring of teachers on a non-criteria basis clearly 
overlooking the legal authority that the Minister had partitioned for himself for 
making these staff appointments.
As mentioned earlier, Balochistan has been divided administratively into 
twenty-six districts each containing district education offices. Additionally, the 
Directorate for Primary Education was bifurcated from the Directorate of 
Schools in 1992. According to senior government officials and district education 
officers, however, the field offices had more authority and discretion prior to the 
establishment of the Directorate for Primary Education. Once this body was 
formed, the control of both financial and administrative tasks was pulled back to 
the provincial capital, although, little specific detail was available on the extent
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to which local authorities were active in managing administration and finances 
prior to 1992. In this respect, decentralisation had the opposite effect of the 
desired objective, to provide more efficient management of district government 
schools. Instead, DEOs lost controls as procedures changed.
Although the establishment of PED held the promise of decentralisation, 
standard operating procedures at PED challenged the possibility of reform. 
Procedures had been developed around donor guidelines and were streamlined 
by external advisors who carried greater clout than some of their government 
counterparts. Concurrently, officers within PED who had control of budgets 
developed their own operating systems with little accountability. These officers 
amassed certain powers that gave them procedural authority for handling most 
of the components of primary education financial matters. Although World Bank 
procurement and reporting guidelines were observed to be followed; the 
decision-making undertaken in carrying out these procedures was more 
ambiguously applied. For district officers, the service rules and job descriptions 
served less means for leveraging financial and resource transactions than the 
act of political lobbying with powerful individuals at PED.
Other controls were severely handicapped as well by the informal 
assumption of power at PED. Commenting on his experience with primary 
education administration in Balochistan, one government official said, ‘the 
bottom line is that people in position of administration are not able to defend 
procedures and the system’. The example was given of the Member of Provincial 
Assembly who puts pressure on the DEO to falsify enrolment data provided to 
the Directorate so that a school could be built.
In terms of financial systems and controls, one respondent closely associated 
with the financial office at the Directorate for Primary Education indicated that 
in his six—year association, he had never seen any guide to financial 
procedures. This respondent further claimed that the procedures he followed 
were learned from his ‘own experience’ and were based on whatever informal 
system was already operational. So that while workplans continued to call for 
devolving financial planning and controls to the districts and the training of 
staff to handle these tasks, the procedures (both formally and informally 
articulated) remained constantly controlled from the centre.
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Respondents located at the ‘centre’ in PED indicated that a challenge to the 
successful decentralisation of financial control to the district level would have to 
be a trained workforce adequately resourced with computers. Also, district 
officers were suspected of being corrupt. This was seen as a major impediment to 
developing the administrative capacity for local budget planning and control at 
the district level. Suspicion and distrust of local capacity for education 
administration also led to the evaluation of one donor official. Procedures for 
addressing decentralisation were questioned in a dramatic way. The official had 
suggested that district officers be bypassed and that NGOs and other agencies 
be used as the administrative arm of the government. Although this was never a 
serious policy position taken by the donor, it illustrates the distrust of the centre 
to relinquish control to the through the government’s official administrative 
system.
Conversely, respondents at the local level held a different view of their own 
capacity to handle procedures for decentralisation. The example was given of the 
‘home-grown’ teacher mentoring program initiative conducted in Jaffarabad. 
This innovative method of teacher training led to decentralisation reforms in 
that local knowledge, time and resources were utilised to address local problems. 
Also, officers at this level, especially learning co-ordinators, were valued as 
essential to district level supervision of teachers and initiatives such as the 
mentoring program. Local officers insisted that primary education could not be 
effectively managed alone from PED. District officers saw themselves as a useful 
mechanism for carrying out the business of primary education locally.
Greater challenges beyond the control of both PED and district officers, 
however, often outweighed district management aspirations for decentralised 
procedures. These challenges included:
❖ Local unions’ resentment and blockage of NGO and community organisations 
monitoring of government staff (teachers) and schools in Jaffarabad and 
Barkhan;
❖ Tribals and politicians in Barkhan and feudals in Jaffarabad interfering 
with school site selections and teacher appointments; and
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❖ Lack of any real authority behind the job descriptions that local officers were
required to fulfil.
Procedures, as analysed in this study were disjointed and often informal 
mechanisms were used for getting done the business of primary education. 
Donor support and advice offered some structure. However, centralising forces, 
be they culture, politics or other sources powerfully dictated an informal 
procedure for handling the fundamental business of financial management for 
the system. Answered below is the research question that solicited these data.
(4) Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? 
Are discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is  
the quantity of the budget handled locally? (Midgley 1986; Mawhood 
1983).
Procedures for accomplishing the tasks of primary education were 
conditional in Balochistan on the provincial government’s administration 
standards and adequate funding. The dissection of these two areas helps to 
address this related research question. Also, this question is easier to 
understand with the analysis of the funding process that starts with the Federal 
Government.
As we have observed, the Federal Government replenished the provincial 
recurrent and development budgets for all social sectors. This process, however, 
was not always guaranteed to be either timely or efficient, as described by 
several respondents. Additionally, external forces drove operational standards in 
the education sector. Politics and culture wielded significant influence on the 
appropriation, disbursement and use of funds that trickled down to the district 
level. Education finance in 1992 was a mysterious quagmire and as low 
educational indicators persisted in Balochistan, the donor community came to 
the rescue. As indicated in chapter two, though, poor achievement had more to 
do with low investment than the setting of unrealistic goals (Noman 1997) and 
this was evident in Balochistan. In fiscal year 1991 to 1992, Balochistan’s total 
expenditure on primary education as a percentage of its total development 
budget was only three and eight-tenths per cent in contrast to an ambitious 
National Education Policy.
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External donor funding aided Balochistan in reaching some of the goals 
addressed in the 1992 NEP. The establishment of PED was one such 
accomplishment. Primary education was subsequently centralised through this 
agency. Workplans were developed to bridge policy and implementation. 
However, these workplans were based more on donor objectives than any 
provincial strategy. Methods for implementing the workplans were 
operationalised at the discretion of government officials and advisors. The 
donors monitored activity through provincial staff situated in PED in the 
provincial capital.
Countering decentralisation and the spirit of the 1992 NEP, one of several 
goals was not accomplished. In particular the formal delegation of financial, 
administrative and personnel, management powers were never fully delegated 
to the district level. All respondents questioned in this study confirmed that 
between 1992 and 1997, district officers were responsible for disbursement of 
salaries and some local expenditure but held no discretionary powers over 
budgets. Hence, procedures for budget planning were analysed as being 
irrelevant.
Evidence was gathered that indicate district officers had not even been 
taken into confidence regarding systematic procedures for textbook procurement, 
school furniture procurement, office equipment and materials purchases, and 
vehicle maintenance. Procedures for acquiring these daily necessities were at 
the control of PED. It was observed that these items were distributed randomly 
with very little regard to formal requests.
Personnel
The variable of ‘personnel’ analyses the capacity of street level bureaucrats 
to work under devolved authorities. This variable not only captures the ability of 
the individual to handle tasks but also takes into consideration the 
accountability of the staff for their performance. In assessing the primary 
education system for staffing, the following findings emerged.
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In general, data indicated that the agencies responsible for education 
administration in Balochistan were inappropriately structured and staffed. 
Decision-making was centralised and politicised. Few officials at any level had 
clear spheres of responsibility and most lacked professional training for their 
posts. Lack of motivation, enthusiasm, and accountability were prevalent and 
strong political interests often interfered with opportunities for management 
reform.
The 1992 National Education Policy projected the following goals for the 
development of personnel in a decentralised context:
❖ The district education officer shall be delegated appropriate financial, 
administrative and personnel management powers;
❖ All supervisors, headmasters and principals shall receive training in 
techniques and methods of educational administration and financial rules 
before appointment;
❖ A manual describing the principles of educational administration and 
financial management shall be prepared; and
❖ A system of accountability and rewards based on performance evaluation of 
teachers and head of institutions will be developed.
As indicated in Chapter Three, these goals were never fully realised in 
Balochistan. Attempts were made to conduct training for field staff and field 
officers’ guides were developed. These guides, as indicated before, included 
ambitious job descriptions that comprised of tasks in five different categories: 
academic; administrative; financial; development; and supervisory. Officials of 
developed decentralised education systems in the West would have found the 
level of sophistication in these guides just as challenging. Hence, officers in 
reality had little authority, incentive or capability to fulfil all the expectations of 
government guides, much less donor workplans.
Prior to 1992 and the establishment of PED, no personnel were earmarked 
specifically for primary education. After December 1992 and the bifurcation of 
primary education from the Directorate of Schools, posts were created to fill the 
administrative and professional cadre needed to undertake the management of 
primary education including female posts. Male and female education officers
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were placed in the districts under the ultimate supervision of PED authorities. 
PED, in turn, was accountable to the Provincial Department of Education and 
faced political tempest with the numerous transfers of Secretaries and Ministers 
of Education—seven each—from 1992 to 1997. Respondents indicated that the 
power brokerage of primary education was at the centre or in Quetta, the 
provincial capital. The argument was made that postings closer to Quetta were 
preferred to those in the districts where officers felt marginalised and neglected.
It is true that in many organisations, personnel are an undervalued 
resource. In Balochistan, it was noted that staff was not necessarily 
undervalued given the importance placed on political alliances but rather their 
potential contribution to education administration was underestimated. That 
the study revealed the problem of political patronage in existence in Balochistan 
is no great surprise. Personnel hired not on merit or qualification basis is a 
common practice that dates back to colonial rule and was even recently legalised 
to a certain extent. An official order dated August 16, 1993 reigned all authority 
for hiring and firing teachers, ministerial staff, etc. to the Office of the 
Provincial Minister of Education. This notification is significant because service 
rules that were established giving these authorities to the district officers while 
on paper and included in field officers’ guides were not valid. In spite of 
numerous attempts at their annual mission meetings, and through memoranda, 
the World Bank was unsuccessful in compelling the GOB to transfer staffing 
controls to the district levels although it had promised to on several occasions.
By definition, a decentralised local body should have the authority to 
allocate substantial human resources to meet its task requirements. Given the 
patronage system and the power of politicians to hire, fire and transfer staff, 
however, this authority did not exist at the district level. One district education 
officer commented one morning when most of his administrative staff turned up 
late for work, that there was nothing he could do to challenge or correct this 
practice. Lack of accountability was not only noticeable among ministerial staff 
but also among teachers. A sub-divisional education officer highlighted this 
practice in his interview by his agitated response that how could teachers be 
accountable to newly developed monitoring bodies as suggested through PTSMC
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structures outside the government when they were not even accountable to the 
DEO and SDEO officers posted in the government hierarchy.
Other respondents from the education department indicated that the 
province was not ready to decentralise authority and power because the staff at 
the local level was not trained to handle the new responsibilities that would 
accompany the process. Local personnel were conducting the basic requirements 
of monitoring schools and teachers but lacked direction in terms of quality 
issues. Evidence was also found that personnel were not always being used 
efficiently. One respondent claimed that learning co-ordinators were being used 
as ‘peons’ or servants of the district education office. In contrast in Jaffarabad, 
LCs were an integral part of the teacher-mentoring program. In this regard, the 
proximity of staff, particularly DEOs to teachers, enabled the officers to know 
the difficulties and problems faced by teachers and other staff in the district. 
Decentralised authority to manage staff, however, was blocked by MOE’s and 
local politicos’ control over personnel.
These findings make clear that in Balochistan, central-controlling 
authorities underestimated the great potential that could have existed in a 
trained and qualified workforce. Value had been placed on staff only as far as 
the ‘pawn’ could be moved for political and financial benefit.
(5) A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate 
substantial resources. This includes quantity o f finances handled; 
number and qualifications of the staff employed; power to decide over 
expenditure; power to vary revenues; decisions over the staff- 
appointments, promotion and discipline (Mawhood 1983:9). What level of 
authority do local bodies have over subordinate Geld officers, ministerial 
and other staff, e.g. teacher appointments, promotion and discipline?
According to evidence collected, district officers had little to no authority 
over subordinate staff or material resources from 1992 to 1997. In Jaffarabad, 
Respondents at the district level indicated that they held no power over teachers 
or ministerial staff working in their offices. District officers also claimed that 
they were threatened and influenced by feudals to recommend teacher and other 
staff appointments. Compounding the lack of authority over personnel was the 
lack of control over finances. District officers indicated that a dysfunctional cycle 
had developed in Jaffarabad. Fewer resources such as POL and cash for vehicle
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maintenance and repairs led to fewer field visits. Due to fewer visits, reports 
had come in that teacher absenteeism had increased. It was also reported that 
some officers were using their personal funds and borrowing from relatives to 
support their transportation requirements to perform basic tasks such as school 
monitoring. One officer aired this frustration: ‘It is very hard to work in this 
atmosphere, with no powers to manage staff.
In Barkhan, corroborative evidence was collected. Officers indicated that 
they held no powers over personnel or material resources. One officer pointed 
out, ‘we have no real powers...everything is centralised’ (Female SDEO 
Barkhan, 1998). Added to this fundamental management constraint, female 
officers were disadvantaged given vast geographical territory to cover with too 
few personnel in the district to assist them in managing schools. On the male 
side it was observed that adequate staff existed but were not being utilised. In 
fact, because of the lack of control augmented by local unions and tribal politics, 
officers were observed as merely government puppets/representatives. It was 
even reported that the DEO was rarely in Barkhan but rather spent most of his 
time in Quetta. Additionally, it was pointed out that very little communication 
had been received from PED. With these constraints, management was 
characterised as not allowing the needed work to progress smoothly. 
Decentralisation was doomed in both districts from the outset of the 
restructuring of primary education.
Culture
There is a certain amount of disagreement in the social sciences as to the 
definition of the term ‘culture’. The totalist definition of culture is applied in this 
analysis. Vivelo (1994), of the totalist tradition, views culture as ‘an adaptive 
mechanism—as that totality of tools, acts, thoughts, and institutions through 
which a population secures and maintains itself (p. 16) He further suggests that 
this is the best way to view culture because it ‘focuses our attention on the 
organization and function of a people’s way of life rather than on the peculiar or 
curious nature of its custom’ (Ibid). No doubt, culture affects the extent to which 
decentralisation strategies through development initiatives will be effective in 
certain environments. Culture used as a variable in this study analyses the 
extent to which organisational and societal structures are compatible with
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decentralisation. Given the legacy of centralisation in Balochistan, management 
reform was viewed by a majority of respondents to be a process that could only 
be slowly introduced if possible at all. One senior government education official 
highhghted this point.
Complete decentralisation o f the management won’t  work 
because we are not used to i t  For centuries we have been 
experiencing centralised types of government and 
administration...since colonialism, even before that Therefore 
decentralisation, total decentralisation will not work because 
total decentralisation demands efficient establishment a t local 
levels that are presently absent (Principal—PITE, Quetta,
1997).
Donors and other agents, as planners, are found in this study as being negligent 
to certain cultural realities as exemplified in the following statement made by a 
former Directorate Official:
State functionaries are not interested in decentralisation... they do 
not want to part with their powers (Former Director, PED, 1997).
This statement reveals much about the culture of political organisation in 
Pakistan that is mirrored at the provincial and district levels. In fact, a recent 
Mission for developing an overarching social action plan for the province 
projected in their report that district officials were expected to become 
responsible for procurement of materials at the district level among other day- 
to-day activities. No mention was made, however, concerning legal adjustments 
to structures necessary for justifying these transfers of authority. More critical, 
however, was the absence of serious thought as to how to develop a change 
mentality among the constituency that would be responsible for such a cultural 
change. For this oversight, crucial consideration of culture has become a 
secondary issue. Answers to the following research questions will explore the 
‘culture’ variable further.
(6) Decentralization effectiveness is dependent on political behavioural, 
attitudinal and cultural factors. Most important among these is 
commitment of local ofScials to decentralizing development, the quality 
of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward government, and 
the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were compatible 
with decentralized administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200). 
To what extent did these factors nlav out in Balochistan?
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The primary education system in Balochistan was observed as being 
dependent on a leading figure. It was also a commonly held belief at the centre 
that people could not be trusted at the district level. This culture was 
antithetical to the way PED had been envisioned to work. It is easy to see how 
difficult to devolve downward when central authorities were imbued culturally 
with authority. The observation that a civil society did not exist combined with 
the centralised nature of the system comprised the central value.
Centralisation, however, was a prevalent mode of governance in Pakistan. 
From politics (historically dominated by a Punjabi civil service) to other facets of 
Pakistan’s geo-political existence, centralisation permeates from Prime Minister 
to peon level. In terms of finances, nationally collected revenues were controlled 
from the Federal level giving way to low appropriation and expenditure of funds 
for the social sectors in the provinces.
The structure, will, culture and the state apparatus at the centre were not 
willing to decentralise either right or wrong. The attitudes throughout the 
system were not conducive to decentralisation as a goal and this was brought 
out in the analysis of the functions of education public service delivery and the 
extent to which those functions had been decentralised. What was interesting to 
discover was the necessary conditions that were needed for the centre to let go of 
its power.
The World Bank had made the observation prior to the Balochistan Primary 
Education Program that education policy had been largely driven by Federal 
mandates which neither took into account the particular demographic, 
geographic and cultural conditions of the province nor were backed up by 
adequate evaluation, experimentation, or resources. Marked variations among 
districts and poor educational indicators testify to the absence of policies 
tailored to local needs.
The centralised culture of education administration in Balochistan prior to 
1992 was characterised by its top-down administrative structure. Additionally, 
there was an established bureaucracy and political structure that pre-existed 
any reform notions of decentralisation. These features severely proved to
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challenge functions that donors helped to develop for reforming education 
administration. In fact, they crept in to the way primary education was 
managed. Respondents observed that PED technical staff and officials were 
doing things for district officers and teachers rather than developing the 
initiative and responsibility at the local level. There was also a void of 
communication from the top to the district level. The lack of sharing information 
provided a culture of insulation and isolation for the local officers.
Senior provincial education officers often usurped their power and control of 
the education system in negative ways such as their legalisation of teacher 
appointments, dismissals, and transfers. Their passion for control was also 
exhibited in the refusal to disburse funding to the PTSMCs for reported fear 
that communities would be monitoring government authorities in charge of 
government schools—a perceived threat to power. Also, politicians and senior 
officials reportedly manipulated construction of schools to benefit their personal 
interests. The example was given of Members of Provincial Assembly who would 
force a decision of a school site without regard to enrolment data for that 
particular area.
The centralised nature of administration was evident in Jaffarabad and 
Barkhan as corroborated by a majority of respondents. Findings presented in 
earlier chapters conclude that DEOs did not have the necessary power and 
control at their level to manage the district affairs. Matters of control ranging 
from the insignificant task of procuring office stationery to the greater functions 
of hiring and supervising staff are proof. In Barkhan, centralising tendencies 
resulted from gender relations. It was observed that this particular district was 
male dominated as evidenced by the observation that the female district officer 
infrequently visited her office and that male family members handled all 
matters including the collection of salaries for the female teachers.
The culture of centralisation had other origins than the provincial 
government. Data collected form Jaffarabad and Barkhan illustrate this finding. 
In Jaffarabad, as indicated before, the feudal landowners wielded a significant 
amount of control over communities given their ownership of the land. This 
control spread to other areas as well including education administration. It was
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demonstrated that party politics were irrelevant in Jaffarabad and that often 
feudals filled the political positions such as members of provincial and national 
assemblies. MNAs and MPAs were reportedly transferring District and Deputy 
Commissioners in the districts of Balochistan and in this way interfering with 
local governance. Also, DEOs reported that MNAs and MPAs interfered with the 
administration of education. Historically they designated where schools would 
be built (Weiss 1991). The feudal culture encroached on DEO prescribed 
jurisdiction through nepotism in staff appointments as already discussed. 
District officers, in reality, were being held accountable not only to provincial 
centralised bodies such as PED and feudals, but also by local institutions such 
as teachers unions. The teachers unions were opposed to the PTSMC scheme 
fearing the erosion of their powers especially with regard to PTSMC committee’s 
monitoring of local teachers. For this and other reasons, unions contributed to 
the local culture opposed to participation and decentralisation.
In Barkhan, tribal cultures as well as the GTA union have over-powered the 
administration of the district officers. Observations and evidence very clearly 
showed that these officers had been stripped of all powers and control. The 
weak-existence of organised civil society was evidenced in law and order being 
controlled by tribals, the individual possession and use of firearms, lack of 
regard to school property as seen through the tribal squatting. The Waderas also 
heavily influenced the site selections of schools. It was also demonstrated on the 
day the school furniture was to be distributed with the teachers carrying away 
resources for their personal use. Tribal social organisation was modelled on the 
authoritarian structure of the Sardari System. This hierarchical system of 
authority flows downward from the leader to the youngest male members. 
Barkhan’s district culture was consequently one that bred a low-level of 
tolerance for any opposition. Community initiatives such as the PTSMC were 
feared as opposing local authorities. This finding was surprising given historical 
evidence of pre-existing community participation on irrigation schemes. Local 
participation deteriorated following state interventions in rural development. 
These interventions in turn fostered the expectation among local communities 
that the government should provide funding and development for them.
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(7) Was decentralisation observable through the behavioural patterns of 
participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy? 
(Mawhood 1983:xii)
The World Bank and other international agencies have characterised the 
Community Support Process in Balochistan as a successful and innovative
initiative in Balochistan.23 Orfield (1999) has indicated that international 
organisations and governments are promoting community participation through 
school management committees as a strategy for decentralisation, to improve 
educational effectiveness and efficiency in developing countries. However, as 
data in earlier chapters suggest, because the process of local management in 
Balochistan was reliant upon PED (the centre) for funding and control, aspects 
of effectiveness and efficiency had little chance to mature. The NGOs that were 
facilitating the CSP were dependent upon funding that came from PED and 
donor sources and therefore were completely accountable to the centre rather 
than their constituency for local initiatives. Village committees and PTSMCs 
looked for support and assistance from the NGOs and district government 
officers who were themselves subsumed under a centralised bureaucracy. 
Additionally, the culture or environment in which these local institutions 
worked did not have the capacity to manage such tasks as quality monitoring of 
teaching and budget and finance. Though the CSP initiative, communities were 
showing signs of participation through their engagement in building schools and 
rallying of support for education through the formation of local education 
committees. One village committee interviewed in Jaffarabad indicated that 
they wanted to take on more responsibilities and control of administration and 
management of their local school. This attitude of local participation suggests 
that education reform through decentralisation would have local support. 
However, other findings in this study conclude that attitudes of communities 
were influenced by strong government control from the top down and that this 
control had killed local initiative and had built a reliance or dependency by 
communities on the government as their caretaker. In other words, the culture 
was not ready for decentralisation. World Bank and other donor flag waving, in 
the long run, did not make a terrible amount of difference.
23 AED 1994; WB 1995, 1996; UNICEF 1997; CAI (Rugh)1998; USAID 1999
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Prior to the CSP initiative, there was little evidence of a culture in 
Balochistan that valued education, much less active parental involvement in the 
monitoring of the process. In this respect, the CSP and PTSMC activities did 
build an awareness of this role and the possibility of its effectiveness. Hence, the 
readiness for decentralisation had been fostered. However, in terms of strict 
interpretation as to what fully constitutes decentralisation, there had been a 
surge but faltering level of commitment by higher authorities for supporting 
local participation. Initially funding had been promised and mobilisation funds 
were advanced for PTSMCs. In the end, however, the funding evaporated. This 
initiative all but died out by 1997 according to evidence collected in both 
Jaffarabad and Barkhan.
7.3 Theoretical Perspectives, Practical Advice
The findings in this study, while revealing, serve a broader purpose than 
merely illuminating a story of decentralisation process in Balochistan from 1992 
to 1997. As elaborated below, theoretical claims are more readily accepted for 
advice when developed against a backdrop of real practice.
The detailed knowledge of the organisation and especially the 
knowledge about the processes underlying the behaviour and 
its context can help to specify the conditions under which the 
behaviour can be expected to occur. In other words, the 
generalisation is about theoretical propositions not about 
populations (Cassell and Symon 1997:225).
Chapter One reviewed and analysed theoretical claims about the process of 
decentralisation in public administration and then more narrowly within the 
education sector. Theoretical frameworks were presented that provided a basis 
for understanding and analysing decentralisation initiatives. This study 
adopted two specific models with which to analyse the case of Balochistan— 
Winkler’s Typology Matrix for Public Service Delivery (1989) and Schartau’s 
(1993) organisational variables for education. Winkler’s model aided in the 
functional analysis of Barkhan and Jaffarabad and the central PED’s role in the 
management of primary education. Schartau’s variables were presented in this 
chapter to frame an overview of the process of primary education administrative 
reform in Balochistan from 1992 to 1997.
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It is curious to note that significant funding and subsequent development 
plans in support of decentralisation have netted very few results in improved 
conditions and increased administrative efficiency. This dilemma makes the 
centralisation—decentralisation debate worth revisiting. As pointed out in the 
literature, ‘the question of centralization of control and the demand for 
decentralization in Pakistan have to be viewed in the fight of this struggle 
between the people and the rulers of Pakistan’ (Jahan 1972 quoted in Saqeb 
1985:33). Centralisation, and its legacy in Pakistan, when contrasted with 
modernisation, has some very powerful implications regarding policies for 
management reform in education. More theoretical conclusions will be presented 
in chapter eight. However, the following general observations can be made about 
the Balochistan experience.
❖ The very existence of education ‘policy* should be questioned in a 
decentralisation initiative.
In the U.S. context of public policy, it has been said that ‘most citizens 
encounter government (if they encounter it at all) not through letters to 
congressman or by attendance at school board meetings but through their 
teachers and their children’s teachers...Each encounter of this kind represents 
an instance of policy delivery’ (Lipsky 1980:3). If the latter part of this statement 
can be applied to the case of Balochistan, the existence of policy there is in 
serious question given the perpetually low educational indicators reported there. 
Of course, qualitative data collected for this study makes the point that no 
formal primary education policy existed prior to 1997 in Balochistan.
Nevertheless, educational services were being delivered to some extent as 
observed in the case studies. The evidence suggests that the delivery of public 
education had been non-plussed by prior attempts of external agencies to 
improve provincial delivery (see also Noman 1997). Hence, we have to ask what 
the policy climate was like for the province if the delivery was shown not to be 
affecting any real change in the indicators.
The World Bank suggested that from basic policy-making to day-to-day 
management, education agencies in Pakistan were inappropriately structured 
and staffed. They relate these deficiencies of the system to the weak
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institutional capacity of the provincial government. Yet instead of addressing 
improvements to the policy process, their influence and support seemed to be 
directed through implementation of projects and programmes as a quicker 
remedy. This observation leads to the next one about symptomatic solutions to 
development problems.
❖ Symptomatic solutions for development sometimes neglect root 
problems—decentralisation should not fall prey to this temptation.
Senge (1990) discusses an organisational concept of ‘burden shifting’. This 
concept is defined as an underlying problem in organisations that generates 
symptoms that demand attention. Senge argues that the underlying problem is 
difficult to address in these situations either because it is obscure or costly to 
confront. Hence, the burden of the problem is shifted to other solutions that are 
well meaning and ‘easy fixes which seem extremely efficient’ (p. 104).
Senge’s management principle is applicable in education development in 
Balochistan. In this case, poor social indicators specifically those related to 
education in Balochistan demanded attention if not by the Federal Government, 
then by external agencies. Balochistan’s inherited problem of centralist control 
and lack of a specific goal or policy of decentralisation could be characterised as 
its underlying problem. For Balochistan, the donor community stepped in and 
set benchmarks for the improvement of student enrolments, literacy rates, and 
school buildings to address the symptoms of poor quality of education in that 
province.
Solutions that address only the symptoms of a problem, not 
fundamental causes, tend to have short-term benefits at best. In 
the long-term, the problem resurfaces and there is increased 
pressure for symptomatic response. Meanwhile, the capability for 
fundamental solutions can atrophy (Ibid: 104).
Chapter Three exhibits the different iterations of development projects that 
have addressed primary education deficiencies in Pakistan. The broader 
implication of burden shifting in development is clear. All the financing and the 
external technical assistance possible cannot and did not make very much of a 
difference. Only when root problems are addressed in development can
270
fundamental changes have much of a lasting effect. Chubb and Moe’s (1990) 
argument that institutions cannot solve problems sometimes because they are 
part of the problem is applicable to the Balochistan case.
❖ Decentralisation reform requires institutional and cultural 
readiness
As pointed out in Chapter Two, Pakistan’s administrative cultural legacy of 
centralisation can be attributed to colonial rule. This legacy has also led to 
centralisation of the administration of education as claimed by Saqeb (1985). 
Reaction to centralisation and the social effects of it associated with bad 
governance has motivated among other initiatives, donor support through 
institutional reforms including decentralisation. This has been the case with 
Balochistan.
However, development strategies have not always been compatible with 
cultural and administrative nuances peculiar to a specific region (Rondinelli 
1983b; Crook and Manor 1998:302). Nicholson (1994) argues that the legacy of 
bureaucracies influenced by colonials may be ineffective as a result ‘of their 
inappropriateness to indigenous culture’ (p.68; see also discussion by Delen 
1999). Her criticism of donors’ similar lack of sensitivity to culture bears 
attention. For instance, she argues that long-term effects of development 
‘projects’ have been negligible in many cases.
The establishment of projects as separate administrative units, 
run largely by overseas experts as enclaves of efficiency, has 
proved in many cases to be ineffective When project funding 
ceases, there is little beneficial impact on local management 
capacities (Ibid:68).
Involvement with and empirical observation of the Balochistan Primary 
Education Programme (BPEP) support Nicholson’s claim. Field research for this 
study coincided with the near completion of BPEP, which had been underway 
for nearly eight years. (The Primary Education Development Project (PED) ran 
the first four years and BPEP the final term). Yet, respondents at the district 
level unanimously claimed their capacity to manage had not been greatly
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improved or helped. In one of my earlier business trips to Pakistan, a member of 
a village education committee in Pishin District directly asked me why projects 
come and go and the funding too. He associated the comings and goings of 
donors and funding, in his lifetime, to the dry Balochistan wind.
Cullen (1992) is cited for raising the point that the Weberian model of 
bureaucracy based on legal—rational, formal structures has been the baseline to 
which developing countries’ are compared (see also Little 1999). However, she 
then suggests that even in the West, the ‘ideal’ bureaucratic structure does not 
exist based on her research in the U.K. She found in organisations there that 
various forms of corruption did exist sometimes to a negative degree but that in 
other cases, ‘deviance’ was necessary to augment policy implementation by 
averting the inflexibilities of the formal organisational system. However, she 
claimed, in general, that deviance is not necessarily negative. When used 
effectively, it can be considered as ‘initiative’ in line with indigenous values. So 
if the colonial model of administration has been ingrained contrary to Pakistani 
culture, we have to ask whether some acts of perceived corruption could, in fact, 
be acts of initiative.
In Balochistan, central administrators perceived district education officers 
as being corrupt. However, their ways and means for getting resources at the 
district level could also be seen as ‘initiative’ given that they lacked control over 
financial and other resources at their level. Of course we could only assume this 
if the end-use of these resources were for the benefit of education development.
Nicholson concludes that ‘rather than comparing Third World bureaucracies 
to an ideal model and finding them wanting, it would be more productive to 
compare them to the cultures in which they are operating and find ways to 
improve the fit’ (Nicholson 1994:83).
❖ Geographical representation does not necessarily equal true 
decentralised reform
Prior to Pakistan's partition from India, colonial rule had ingrained a system 
of administration whereby central and higher authorities retained most of the 
power and where district and local authorities were posted as ‘agents of
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implementation of authority’. As Saqeb (1985) claims, ‘there was no provision for 
any public interest groups to share in the functions of policy-making, policy 
adoption or policy articulation’ (p.37). It is further claimed that ‘this type of 
administration, as expected, made people rely for everything on the government 
and killed their sense of initiative and responsibility’ (Ibid:37).
In terms of the provision of primary education, spatial or area divisions in 
Balochistan manifested themselves in two extremes: through the organisation of 
PED in the provincial capital and the district field offices located throughout the 
province. While the education department is represented geographically through 
the district education offices in twenty-six districts, powers for day-to-day 
management activities are extremely limited for a variety of reasons. 
Respondents claimed that they had; in fact, no local power to provide what was 
seen as a provincially controlled public service deliverable of education.
Centralisation is endemic in other social sectors in Pakistan. Noman (1997) 
analysed the health sector in Pakistan. He observed that there was no 
delegation of authority for operational decision-making at the district level.
Decision-making for matters such as programme budgeting and 
finance are restricted to the top level of the provincial and federal 
hierarchy. This kind of system obviously prevents local authorities 
from taking any initiative to improve health service 
delivery... Similar problems abound in the education sector 
(Noman 1997:283).
The claim was repeatedly made by DEOs that their ‘hands were tied’, that they 
had no decision-making authority to procure even stationery for staff in their 
offices. In assessing the structure of administration in Balochistan, it is 
apparent that little more than geographical representation existed. Although 
introduced earlier, the following quote illustrates this dilemma.
I f  you... want to take the power out of the hands of the Secretariat 
in Quetta and devolve i t  to a person further out; I  don’t  think that 
anybody’s confronted that yet...I think that decentralisation is 
geographical rather than authority, power and accountability 
(CTA, BPEP, 1998).
According to the theoretical construct presented above in Box 7.1, 
management reform is highly dependent on a number of factors including the
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transfer of planning, decision-making or management functions from central 
government and its agencies to field organisations.
In Balochistan, Siddiqi (1991) argues that since 1882, British external 
control of Balochistan established a pattern of central control and geographical 
representation. That centralised administration was inherited from colonial 
authorities in many developing countries is indeed a reality. The chance to 
experiment in the local planning and control of education, if practical at all; 
however, still remains a hopeful dream.
These general findings will be explored further in the next and final chapter. 
Answers to the question why decentralisation did not work in Balochistan begin 
to aid in constructing a more meaningful policy and implementation dynamic for 
developing education institutions.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
I  wouldn’t recognise the Balochistan 
problem i f  i t  hit me in the facef
Henry Kissinger 
Mission to Pakistan 
1962
It has been argued that strengthening administrative processes at the local 
level in less developed countries could improve access, participation and policy 
effectiveness. Obviously Pakistan’s planning language imp bed a certain amount 
of faith in this ideology of decentralisation:
We consider that the Government should visualise an active 
process of decentralisation...Planning in a free society must be 
based on a general consciousness of social purpose so that the 
people treat the plan as their own, intended for their benefit. They 
should have a sense of participation and be willing to extend their 
full support and co-operation in its fulfilment. Without the 
wholehearted participation of the people, the development 
programme will not achieve its full proportions; progress will be 
slow; and its benefits will remain open to question (Government of 
Pakistan 1958:103).
Smith (1986) stated that a regime's reaction to its inability to five up to its 
ideological message was often 'somewhat panicky' and took the form of
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centralised planning, public service training programmes, and technical 
assistance from overseas' (Smith 1986:457). This 'panic' has led to centralised 
control especially in post-colonial nations where the nation-states also feared 
losing a power struggle against the rights and self-determination of its varied 
ethnic constituencies. This has been the case in Pakistan (Baloch 1987; Jalal 
1998:231).
The purpose of investigating the extent to which decentralisation had 
occurred in the primary education sector in Balochistan largely responds to 
development rhetoric regarding the reform. Given the opportunities and hope 
that such a reform could offer, Pakistan, like many countries, had adopted goals 
for experimenting with it. Try as it might, however, Pakistan was not successful 
in breaking away from a legacy of centralisation. Balochistan, the largest 
province geographically in Pakistan, could be considered one of its most 
challenged provinces in conforming to a policy of decentralisation. It is largely 
rural making communication and the provision of public services extremely 
difficult. It is also faced with the self-determination, in these rural areas, of its 
varied ethnic constituencies as noted above. The hope that decentralisation 
could bring to Balochistan was emphasised by external donors rather than the 
harsh reality of the challenges facing it. These contrasting phenomena have 
provided an interesting backdrop for examination. This chapter first answers 
the primary research questions through a summation of the empirical evidence. 
It also draws out research-based conclusions through an evaluation of the 
research work itself and provides some insights for future exploration.
8.1 Lessons from Empirical Evidence
Problems were identified in chapter one in terms of the difficulty of defining 
decentralisation. That debate questioned whether management reforms 
associated with decentralisation are more likely to result in centralising 
outcomes. The research conducted on Balochistan is conceptualised in this 
debate. As specified in Chapter Two, primary research questions were raised 
regarding attempts to decentralise primary education administration in 
Balochistan from 1992 to 1997. This section sets out to answer these questions 
by taking a comprehensive look at the empirical evidence found in this study.
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Before we attempt to answer these questions, however, it is important to 
recognise that caution should be observed in the interpretation of these answers. 
While they are demonstrable statements, they are limited in depth and 
perception to respondents’ perspective in two districts and my observations 
through both working in Balochistan and conducting this field study. While 
careful attention has been paid to corroborating local district and provincial 
evidence that I gathered with other available data, albeit they were few, these 
answers are only specific to the two case districts’ relationship with the Primary 
Education Directorate. One should not try to generalise these findings to other 
districts and provinces in Pakistan.
Also, at a glance, the results as revealed through these answers could be 
judged as harshly critical of BPEP, donor interventions and any development 
that took place from 1992 to 1997; when, in fact, very little time had transpired 
during this time period in development terms. Maturity and sustainability of 
projected outcomes of BPEP should be analysed after 1997 and beyond to the 
end of the programme. Measurements have been taken based on preliminary 
objectives or goals that USAID and World Bank initially made in agreement 
with the Provincial Government of Balochistan and the process that evolved 
within a five-year period. It will be necessary to look at the nature of the reform 
after 1997 to see if any significant changes occurred.
1) How successful was the attempt to decentralise education 
administration in Balochistan?
Low literacy rates in the province especially among females (roughly three 
per cent) were a recognised deficiency in the late 1980s that needed addressing. 
External donor support focussed attention on this need through the 
improvement of primary education and thus after several unsuccessful 
education initiatives, USAID sponsored the separation of PED from a central 
Directorate of Schools, a claimed step towards decentralisation of education 
administration for Balochistan. The claim was validated in that financial control 
and control for personnel at PED was largely devolved to the newly formed 
branch under the supervision of the Provincial Department of Education. This
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measure was a successful attempt at decentralisation as far as structural 
changes that reached PED. Evidence gathered to analyse attempts to further 
decentralise administration to the district level suggests that little to no success 
had occurred.
As was argued in Chapter One, unless financial and administrative controls 
are shifted to local authorities, effective decentralisation does not occur. To this 
end, case study evidence presented in Chapters Five and Six revealed that this 
had not happened. Local officers could not plan their own budgets, allocate 
spending for office equipment and school materials; hire, fire and transfer staff. 
Rather, field officers were merely outposts or inspectors. Other determinants of 
decentralisation were not realised in Balochistan.
The environment and culture were not found conducive to decentralisation in 
Balochistan either. The case districts examined in this study had their own 
competing centralising forces as found in the control of tribal authorities in 
Barkhan and feudal leaders in Jaffarabad. Teachers’ unions also combated 
attempts at administrative decentralisation in their districts. They were actively 
prohibiting teachers from participating in local school committees, teacher 
training programs, and the formation of PTSMCs. Even local politicians (MNAs 
and MPAs) were found to manipulate school construction site planning and the 
hiring of field education staff in district offices as well as teachers. Power 
wielded in this respect overrides local officers’ authority to manage. In addition, 
‘central’ esteem of the districts’ capability of managing their own affairs was low 
as revealed in chapter three. Provincial officers, technical advisers and donors 
all claimed that local capacity did not exist for the full transfer of powers to be 
made further away from PED. Powers and controls were maintained within 
PED, in part, because of suspicion of local corruption and the lack of confidence 
in the district officers’ ability to manage.
Development efforts to increase participation of communities in the affairs of 
locally developed girls schools were initially successful. With technical 
assistance from PED and through local NGO guidance, girls schools were 
established in increasing numbers. Local village education committees and 
women’s village education committees were formed to help with school
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management tasks. Just as these initiatives were developed from the centre, so 
their demise would be through central neglect. Centralised funding and the 
dependency that local NGOs had developed on central and external funding for 
institutional support could not be sustained on the recurrent education budget. 
It was expected that the financing of community schools would be placed on 
recurrent budgets after a probationary period. Getting communities to donate 
their time, land and resources did not leverage structural changes for adjusting 
the locus of control of administration.
The organisational culture established at PED did not naturally foster the 
devolution of planning, budgeting and personnel functions and controls to the 
districts. The culture at PED had evolved into single authority hierarchies, e.g., 
powerful government officials and even technical consultants. In addition the 
Department of Education as represented by the Minister and Secretary of 
Education, despite their frequent transfers, retarded decentralisation through 
limiting the powers that field officers could hold. This finding has been repeated 
throughout the thesis but represents a fundamental structural element that had 
the potential of legitimising decentralisation. As determined in the textual 
analysis that compared annual provincial workplans with National Education 
Policy in Chapter Three, the Minister of Education’s legal role controlling the 
administration of personnel including teachers was one that ran counter to the 
spirit of national policy.
Chapter three described the education policy process and the lack of 
coordination between policy and implementation. While decentralisation had 
been a stated national policy goal, the very existence of a provincial education 
policy was in question. If the decentralisation of primary education 
administration was unsuccessful in Balochistan, we have to ask why?
Attempts to decentralise primary education administration in Balochistan 
were unsuccessful for several reasons. First, there was no genuine commitment 
throughout the system to see such a reform succeed. This is a strong assessment 
but one that is based on empirical evidence. State officials were not willing to 
part with their powers. This attitude was reflected in the way that 
administration had been carried out prior to 1992 when primary education
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received very little attention at all. After 1992 and the establishment of PED, 
albeit a step in the right direction, the commitment to devolve controls further 
out to the districts was low. Data suggests that benchmarks satisfying task 
implementation were developed at the central level to satisfy donor 
requirements but that there was little commitment to seeing the control of these 
plans flow down to the district level. In fact, because formal policy for education 
did not exist in the province, there was very little space for holding the GOB 
accountable for any commitments. This was brought out in the textual analysis 
of annual workplans of PED. Workplans were tied to donor agreements as 
opposed to provincial policy. Interestingly, senior education officials had agreed 
with external agencies to correct practices of nepotism and political patronage. 
However, these formal agreements did little to change actual practice between 
1992 and 1997.
Secondly, decentralisation attempts were unsuccessful because tensions 
existed between the opponents and advocates of the reform measure. This 
division was not only prevalent between provincial and district levels but was 
also found to exist within the districts. Opponents of the reform at the district 
level perceived their role and scope of control, in terms of education 
administration, as inherited and naturally placed. Unions, tribal leaders and 
feudal lords were never seriously considered as participants in the education 
system. Instead, their resistance to local management initiatives and their 
manipulation of administrative practices only fuelled crisis management 
responses. Nevertheless, these environmental and cultural opponents were not 
as instrumental in deterring decentralisation as the central opponents whose 
sphere of control pre-determined and limited district authority. The advocates 
for decentralisation were DEOs and other districts staff, NGO staff, and 
members of local communities. These groups were more valued, however, by 
central authorities for their geographical representation than their contribution 
to effective local management.
Finally, decentralisation was not successful in Balochistan because it was 
not technically feasible. The infrastructure required to sustain such a reform 
had not been adequately prepared. Respondents at the centre were partly right 
in claiming that the districts’ capacity to manage finances did not exist.
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However, little or nothing was done to remedy this. This study found that the 
‘potential’ for management existed but that actual capacity was weak. Staff at 
the district level complained that they had received very little to no training 
regarding any of their responsibilities in the time period between 1992 and 
1997. It was a technical oversight for the donors to require government 
institutions to improve the quality of education without first addressing quality 
issues of the institutions. The main reason, however, explaining the 
vulnerability of further devolving power and control of implementation to lower 
levels was that of the existence of policy. This finding implies that a crucial 
missing element had been left out of educational development planning 
conducted by GOB with strong donor influence. The feasibility of 
decentralisation in 1992 had theoretical merit but would be technically difficult 
to achieve in rolling out to the district level as determined in this study. This 
issue will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
Interestingly, these observations confirm the four factors introduced in 
chapter one that affect the success or failure of decentralisation policy.
❖ central political leaders and bureaucracies commitment and support;
❖ behaviour, attitudes, and culture which are conducive to decentralisation;
❖ good and appropriate design and organisation of decentralisation programs;
❖ allocation of adequate finances, human and physical resources 
(Rondinelli, Nellis et al. 1984:46-7)
What do these observations tell us about the nature of decentralisation? It 
may be too early to tell but some indicators can be generalised. These were 
presented in Chapter Seven but are repeated below:
❖ The very existence of education ‘policy’ should be questioned in a 
decentralisation initiative;
❖ Geographical representation does not necessarily equal true 
decentralised reform;
❖ Decentralisation reform requires institutional and cultural readiness;
♦♦♦ Symptomatic solutions for development sometimes neglect root 
problems—decentralisation should not fall prey to this temptation.
The following section elaborates the above indicators through an 
examination of the second and third research questions. The second research
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question addresses policy constraints while the third question relates practice to 
theoretical statements.
2) What were the policy constraints?
In chapter three, public policy was defined as a complex pattern of 
interdependent collective choices including the decision not to act. Policy-making 
was characterised as an organisational and political process. These definitions 
imply several things about policy and its formulation. First, the development of 
policy is not a random act but rather a more systematic process. Also implied is 
that an ‘organisation’ facilitates the process in a shared or cooperative manner. 
The Balochistan case provides ample evidence opposite to these definitions. This 
evidence begins to explain the policy constraints found in Balochistan.
As noted before, this study determined that policy-making in the province 
had been virtually non-existent prior to 1997. Such responses as those given by 
both provincial officers and the World Bank support this claim. In fact the World 
Bank considered Balochistan as a ‘policy vacuum’ and that primary education 
‘policy’ had been established there in an ‘ad hoc’ fashion determined by program 
objectives. A formal or systematic process for policy formulation had not been 
established in the province. Also, respondents believed that coordination did not 
exist in the way the GOP interacted with the GOB to facilitate a process for 
mapping out provincial education policy.
Ironically, USAID recommended as its fundamental goals for primary 
education development in 1989 the need to strengthen institutional capacity in 
Balochistan and the need to formulate and implement policy. The World Bank 
recognised later in 1996 that poor quality of education was a result of the weak 
institutional capacity in the province and the lack of structure and staff for basic 
policy-making and day-to-day management. What is interesting is that both of 
these external agencies only supported institutional strengthening as far as the 
development of the Directorate for Primary Education was concerned. The 
formal process of policy-making at the provincial level or at the Directorate itself 
had never been formally introduced nor established per the initial goal. As we
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have stated in this study, donors may choose to influence the policy development 
and implementation in two ways. First, development aid is ‘tied’ to various 
conditionalities that specify how development is to proceed. Alternatively, 
donors can try to influence the thinking of policy-makers through policy 
dialogue. We found that both mechanisms had been used in Balochistan. It was 
revealed that donors, in fact, bore greater influence in decision-making than 
federal and provincial institutions.
Hence, policy constraints in Balochistan had more to do with donors, given 
their influence, than the provincial government. In reality, donor plans became 
the surrogate for policy as recognised through the annual workplans for the 
Directorate for Primary Education. Without a formal policy process in place, 
administrative reform through decentralisation would be hard-pressed to 
survive. The answer to the third research question attempts to explain further 
‘why’ decentralisation reforms in Balochistan could not survive.
3) What does this experience tell us about both theory of
decentralisation and its application to education in a developing 
country with a strong centralist tradition?
General theories about the nature of decentralisation can be applied in the 
context of education administration in this study. As previously pointed out, it 
was not the objective at the outset either to examine outcomes of education or to 
compare outcomes among various markets. Rather this study examined the 
education system as a function of the public policy process. This is important to 
bear in mind in the application of theory to the education sector as done in this 
section.
Figure 8.1 is a graphic representation of the dynamics of management 
reform in Balochistan. It is featured here to help understand the application of 
decentralisation in a developing country with a strong centralist tradition, as 
was the case in Pakistan. This figure is also used to highlight important aspects 
of theory with the process of the reform as investigated first hand. Key elements 
of the education system and of the education process are represented.
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Two concentric circles are used to identify the space divisions or 
administrative levels identified throughout the thesis- the ‘centre’ and the 
‘districts’. The inner circle represents the central sphere of control that existed 
through the Primary Education Directorate. Spatially, the outer circle represents 
the local or district level. This level is represented by key institutions that had a 
local role in the management of schools in Balochistan: district education offices, 
communities, NGOs and schools. The arrows moving away from the centre are 
representative of the idealism that existed in early government and donor plans 
to decentralise power, authority and control to the district level. As the evidence 
in this study suggest, instead of being extended or devolved, power, authority 
and control were, in fact, wielded by central institutions. Recall that the 
Typology Matrix for Balochistan in Chapter Seven identified the locus of control 
for all aspects of administration to be centralised.
Figure 8.1 Dynamics of Management Reform in Balochistan
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The tension between the circles is shown through two sets of forces. The forces 
emanating from the centre theoretically were functions of administration that 
district representatives needed in order to manage education locally. Forces that 
directly countered decentralisation were discussed in Chapter Seven. These were 
highlighted in the discussion of organisational variables of task, structure, 
procedure, personnel and culture. It was argued that good management is an 
important tool to reach the goals of efficiency and productivity (Schartau 1993). The 
forces that impeded decentralisation and subsequently ‘good management’ in 
Balochistan are represented in the figure as the barriers to power, authority and 
control.
The dynamics of management reform in Balochistan as graphically represented 
bring life to Schaeffer’s arguments and other critics’ theories on the nature of 
decentralisation in the literature. First, this study supports the notion that 
organisations are ‘inherently centrist’ by the very nature of their co-ordination role. 
The Primary Education Directorate (PED) was established because the work in 
administering primary education was being neglected and needed organisational 
representation. Similar to Schaeffer’s hypothesis, PED became centralised through 
its own development of personnel structures, its distribution of power and by the 
way it was centrally situated in the provincial capital. The spatial orientation of 
PED and the district offices shown in Figure 8.1 ‘emphasises the political 
significance of centrality. Headquarters and branches are the visible statement of 
the centralising process which organisation of itself inevitably tends to mean’ 
(Schaffer 1984:47-48).
Secondly, the assessment of the primary education management system in 
Balochistan revealed that, as Schaeffer (1982b) discussed, issues of central control, 
financial dependence and administrative weakness continued to ‘debilitate’ 
schemes of administrative reform because these issues were not addressed in ‘local 
organisations to which responsibilities and powers are to be decentralised’ (p.462). 
These local organisations in Balochistan included the district offices, NGOs, 
communities and schools. Functional analyses of these local institutions revealed 
that district officers did not have control over their own budgets and personnel that
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not only weakened their administrative role, but also hampered their ability to 
provide quality supervision to dispersed schools and students.
Observations made in the districts of Bar khan and Jaffarabad revealed that 
local education committees had relatively little power in the management of local 
schools. This finding is consistent with Moser’s (1983) definition of ‘authentic 
participation’ that it can only occur when there is a redistribution of ‘power’ and 
that this implies ‘strong’ participation with structural change as its objective (p.4). 
PTSMCs, VECs, WVECs had been established not to compete with district officers 
in the management of local schools, but to help. Their help, however, became 
limited as the lack of financial resources for school maintenance, teachers’ salaries, 
and other resources led to a dependence on PED, which in turn promoted 
centralisation further. This finding is also compatible with Smith’s (1986) 
argument that the composite units of society represented in theory, as ‘locals’, 
communities and beneficiaries etc. are often secondary factors in the 
decentralisation equation. Questions of access and exclusion complicate often 
oversimplified, idealistic notions of participatory and community development 
(p.463). The establishment of community organisations in rural Balochistan was 
not a particularly unproductive measure (Thomas 1996). However, their 
dependence on PED for sustainability contradicts any claim that there was 
authentic participation.
Finally, Balochistan’s experience with decentralisation from 1992 to 1997 
raises an interesting question within the context of the literature advocating 
decentralisation. In chapter one, we saw Rondinelli’s (1983) list of outcomes or 
‘desirable effects’ of decentralisation. The language used by Rondinelli to spell out 
these effects of decentralisation implicitly suggests that some force has assumed the 
role of manipulating administration. Phrases such as ‘seeks to redistribute 
authority’, ‘giving more political power to citizens’, ‘allowing services to be provided 
by community groups’, and ‘distributes investments in educational services and 
facilities more widely among cities and towns’ are illustrative. Other phrases 
introduced by Rondinelli include (1983:14-16):
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Delegates greater authority:
De-bureaucratises:
❖ Opens the flow:
❖ Promotes implementation:
♦♦♦ Allows for greater representation:
❖ Induces capability:
♦> Unburdens central managers:
❖ Creates a condition:
❖ Institutionalises participation: and
❖ Offsets the control.
In decentralised reforms, there will be winners and losers of power but more 
importantly and with greater implications for power, the language above suggests 
that some force is driving the decision-making and, in fact, deciding the allocation 
of responsibility. There is no escaping this phenomenon but we have to ask what 
that force is and what potential benefits does the source derive from making the 
decisions. The Balochistan experience tells us that power brokers in a centralist 
environment-will not voluntarily or readily give up privileges of authority. The 
evidence is clear that even when donors exert a certain amount of flag-waving to 
influence decentralisation, central leaders who lack commitment will not threaten 
their own role and representation in the making of appropriation decisions through 
supporting drastic administrative reforms.
8.2 Research-based Conclusions
Evaluation of Research
First we look at what this research has accomplished. The design was a 
qualitative, process analysis that drew together data collection methods to analyse 
the phenomena of decentralisation. The examination of the Balochistan experience 
has allowed us to take a closer look at a process of education administration in a 
developing country from the top policy making authority all the way down to the 
provincial and district level implementation units. This is unique not only to the 
Balochistan experience but also to the literature on management reform of primary 
education administration It has also allowed us to analyse general definitions of 
decentralisation against a backdrop of a centralised administrative environment.
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Control patterns, as analysed through management reform, are shaped by 
diverse sources that cannot be well understood by any one perspective alone. One 
advantage of comparative analysis as opposed to a case study of any one system or 
any one type of institution in a country is that it brings out more clearly the 
diversity of forces at work. We would argue, however, that singular cases are 
necessary to explore a particular force in greater depth. Some assert that evidence 
from one situation is not generaliseable to other situations. However, advice from 
case studies are useful feedback to planning institutions in that particular region 
to be, in fact, sensitive to local social control issues. Lauglo and McLean (1985) 
argue that outcomes of decentralisation policy for education should be analysed. A 
study of the consequences of such policies, of the implications of specific proposals 
in particular cases, may throw fight on the feasibility of general decentralisation 
arguments and on the social, economic and political conditions in which they are 
introduced (p.2). It is hoped that to some degree this study has accomplished this.
Future Directions
Finally, we conclude with some insights for future study. We can no longer 
assume that centralised governments are amorphous bodies, which single— 
handedly pull powers, control and authority to itself. When the literature speaks of 
polarities, it generalises about governments that they are singular centralising 
forces. The tendency is to reify abstractions. What we have learned from this study 
is that by breaking down the policy and implementation process in Balochistan, we 
have been able to isolate those blockages to reform that were responsible for 
centralisation. Future decentralisation studies should thwart the temptation to 
generalise in such a way.
Also, we need more studies to critically analyse donor-stimulated development. 
By combining process with outcome studies in education and by using data from 
local contexts, a richer understanding could be derived concerning the feasibility of 
external assistance. More local cases should be studied and compiled. Area 
experiences could then be shared, and possibly categorised. These findings could be 
useful for the designing of more specific guidelines for defining the process of 
decentralisation. This study was not comparative involving different countries’
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experiences; rather it was specific to Pakistan. Perhaps, more in-depth cases 
developed across areas could be used to find out what conditions hamper or impede 
decentralisation reforms.
To lay a foundation for research issues of education policy development and 
implementation particularly in a framework of decentralisation, it is worthwhile to 
note the merits of such a strategy and to assess the myths associated with the 
language surrounding the topic. As more and more implementation efforts are 
concluding and new ones beginning, analyses as to the outcomes of these projects 
are extremely critical to the field for valuable input into the development of sound 
theory and policy.
In 1962, Mr. Henry Kissinger was sent on a Mission to Pakistan for U.S. 
President John F. Kennedy. Kissinger, then a Harvard Professor said impatiently 
when being briefed on the region, T wouldn’t recognise the Balochistan problem if 
it hit me in the face’ (cited in Kalb and Kalb 1974:64). Apparently, Kissinger’s 
oversight of development issues in Balochistan is endemic in the world today. The 
development ‘problems’ of Balochistan have been around since long before 
Pakistan’s partition from India without much success in their redress. The 
complexity of these problems may be behind the difficulty with which both the 
Government of Pakistan and outside donors have experienced in implementing 
change policies. Our greatest challenge could be in mastering the art of education 
through learning and reflecting on past initiatives in order not to make oversights 
of critical importance.
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Appendix I
Case Study Protocols: Guides to Field Analyses
❖ Jaffarabad
❖ Barkhan
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Case Study Protocol24
JAFFARABAD
I. Overview
A. Background Information
The over-arching research project is a process study designed to answer the 
question how have the ‘centre’ and ‘local’ institutions concerned with managing 
primary education developed the capacity to manage in a decentralised policy 
framework and what is the process. The design is qualitative, employing such 
methods as observation, project document review, and semi-structured interviews.
Mr. Randy L. Hatfield is currently a Ph.D. Candidate at the London School of 
Economics in the Social Policy and Administration Department where he developed 
his research proposal. Upon successful completion of the proposal and review by 
the department, Mr. Hatfield has begun his field research. With the assistance of 
Mr. Aamir Mirza of the Balochistan Education Foundation, this team is conducting 
case studies on two education districts within a multiple-case design.
B. Rationale for Case Selection
Jaffarabad has been selected as one case in a multiple case study research 
approach. The rationale for its selection follows:
❖ Reports from PED project staff that Jaffarabad has shown success in local 
management and collaboration among local institutions involved with primary 
education administration.
❖ Jaffarabad represents a ‘summer zone’ district in contrast to a ‘winter zone’
district.
❖ Jaffarabad has been included in many ‘pilot’ capacity building initiatives;
❖ Jaffarabad shows signs of economic stability with agriculture as a major source
of income. Also, fairly good infrastructure is evident in terms of roads and 
communication.
❖ Jaffarabad is highly populated for Balochistan.
24 This protocol is for the data collection from a single case and is not intended to serve the entire project.
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C. Substantive Research Issues
The primary research questions are:
1) How successful was the attempt to decentralise education administration in 
Balochistan?
2) What were the policy constraints?
3) What does this experience tell us about both the theory of decentralisation 
and its application to education in a developing country with a strong 
centralist tradition?
Sub-questions are:
-Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over the past seven years of intensive 
donor support? If so, to what extent? (Successes? Failures?)
-What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making authority have 
been legally and informally transferred from the centre to the 
district/community/school level?
-Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are 
discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is the quantity 
of the budget handled locally?
-What level of authority do local bodies have over subordinate field officers, 
ministerial and other staff, i.e. teachers in terms of staff appointments, promotion, 
discipline?
-Which of Donald Winkler’s designated education functions are controlled from the 
centre and which are controlled at the local level? Are they mutually exclusive or is 
there any overlap?
Identify the locus of control for the following functions of education administration: 
School organisation; curriculum and teaching methods; examination and 
supervision; Teacher recruitment; finance of recurrent expenditure; and school 
construction and finance.
-What was the state of primary education management across the functions listed 
above when the project began? Has the nature of management changed in the past 
seven years? If so, how?
-Has the community support process of opening girls schools in Balochistan 
positively leveraged or altered the nature of the management of education and the 
services provided?
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C. Relevant Readings
Balochistan Planning and Development District Profile: Jaffarabad
SCOPE Six-Month Progress Reports on PTSMCs in Jaffarabad
Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan
Balochistan Gazetteer, Vol. I & II
Miscellaneous Project Documents and Reports
II. Field Procedures
A. Gaining Access
Through a permission letter from Director of Primary Education and the
Additional Secretary (Planning), a research visa was granted to researcher for
conducting research on primary education management in Balochistan.
During any introductions that the team makes of itself in the field, it will:
• Clearly establish the purpose of the research and its contribution toward 
the Ph.D. degree at the London School of Economics;
• Establish that the nature of the research is independent of the Government 
of Balochistan and that findings will not be submitted to PED for formal 
scrutiny;
• Guarantee the anonymity of the sources that are interviewed/approached;
• Not be responsible for leveraging any results to problems voiced from 
respondents.
B. Tentative Itinerary
18 Feb. WEDNESDAY Depart Quetta for Dera Allah Yar
Activity: Upon arrival, meet with DEO (Male)
Find accommodations and settle in. Plan next days 
interviews/observations. Meet with DEO (M) and SCOPE to plan 
week meetings
19 Feb. THURSDAY District Education Office (Male) & Schools
Activity: Interview Field Office Staff and Ministerial staff; Observe DEO office
operations and staff interactions. Meet with headteachers of both 
CSP and Government Schools and observe teacher methodology and 
student attendance, and observe school maintenance.
20 Feb. FRIDAY District Education Office (Female)
Activity: Interview Field Office Staff and Ministerial staff
Observe DEO office operations and staff interactions
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21 Feb. SATURDAY SCOPE Office Visit, Dera Allah Yar
Activity: Interview NGO staff and observe NGO office operations and staff
interactions. Go alongside staff on any project visits
22 Feb. SUNDAY PTSMC/VEC/WVECs
Activity: Meet with members of the committees
23 Feb. MONDAY Visit Schools and Return to Quetta
C. Resources Needed
Supplies needed for this study include:
• Hardbound Blank Registers (2)
• 2 Recorders
• Blank Cassettes (8+)
• 200 Speed, 36 exposure color film (2 rolls)
• writing utensils and laptop computer
• Bottles of Mineral Water (7)
• Double "AA" Batteries
Vital Resources Needed:
• Field Accommodations
• Vehicle and Driver
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III. Case Study Questions25
A. Protocol Questions26
LEVEL 1: Questions asked for specific interviewees
DEO Office
Has anyone from PED communicated to your office that policy was underway to 
devolve more authority and responsibility to you and your staff?
What is your current capacity to manage all of the responsibilities listed in the 
guide book? How could you best achieve them or is it impossible?
Who hires, fires, transfers, and appoints teachers? What is the process for doing 
each of these? How is it done? Any formal documents you are aware of that dictate 
this process?
Can you give a list of all the people working in your offices including teachers? Are 
all posts filled? Are there enough people to accomplish all of the work?
What funds (budgets) besides salaries do you manage? Who in your office actually 
deals with finances? Have they received any formal training for dealing with the 
finances?
Are any government finances provided for building maintenance and office 
supplies? Any development funds at your disposal? How much control do you have 
over district finances? Can you give the Rupee amount you are responsible for 
managing from month to month or per year?
How much of a budget are you given to work with? Are these funds disbursed 
regularly? On a receipt basis? Salaries--how does the money get allocated, 
disbursed?
Who physically distributes books and school materials to the schools in your 
district?
Who repairs broken furniture and replaces it to schools? Who hauls the stuff away?
25Questions are posed to the investigator, not to a respondent. The questions, in essence, 
are reminders to the investigator regarding the information that needs to be collected and 
why. In some instances, the specific questions also may serve as prompts in asking 
questions during a case study interview; however, the main purpose of these questions is to 
keep the investigator on track as data collection proceeds.
^Distinguishing among levels of questions is crucial when a single case is part of a 
multiple-case study.
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Whose responsibility is it to make repairs in the school?
Do you have any other jobs to support yourself besides the government post?
Do you have legal authority for hiring/firing/transferring all teachers in your 
district?
How do policies, responsibilities and duties get communicated to your office from 
PED, the Secretariat and the Minister of Education? If by a memo or letter, do you 
have examples? If by word, who is the messenger? Is there any follow up on 
whether not these new policies are being implemented?
Are any of your powers and authorities shared with VECs, PTSMCs, teachers? 
What degree of authority do you have over CSP schools? High, Medium or Low?
NGOs
What is your business? (Mission)
-What role do you play in supporting the management and administration of 
education?
-What percentage of your budget, time, and energy (human resources) is put 
on primary education and management of tasks within this sector?
Can you provide an organisation chart of your NGO?
Who are your major funding sources? Do you feel that these agencies dictate how 
you spend your time and energy or do you fully plan and implement your activities?
Who plans your activities and who manages your budget?
Who is your customer?
Who are you most accountable to: Politicos, Board, PED, people, other?
What does the customer consider valuable?
What have been your results?
What is your plan?
What is your NGOs definition of capacity building? How do you build capacity with 
VECs, PTSMCs, parents? (Provide evidence)
PTSMCs
What responsibilities do you have for managing the schools in your district? (Role)
How many meetings do you organise per month? How many members attend the 
meetings on average? Who are the members?
What do you normally talk about in the meetings? How do problems get solved and 
new plans get initiated? Give example.
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Do PTSMCs want to take responsibility for managing school affairs? What has 
been the experience since the formation of the committee? Can anyone give a brief 
history? What is the process for managing?
Have you performed duties above and beyond those that were initially decided? 
What other roles has your committee played in working with the schools besides 
those set out by the NGO or by PED?
What is your relationship of PTSMCs with teachers? With DEOs? With parents?
Are you feeling any pressure from political parties? Parents? Teachers Unions? 
Maliks or Mullahs?
How do you communicate with DEOs, NGOs, PED, parents, others? How many 
times per month? In your opinion how important is communication with these 
institutions?
Are you involved in any way with District Education planning? Have you received 
any training from outside to assist you in your school related duties?
VEC/WVECs
What responsibilities do you have for managing the schools in your district? (Role) 
How many meetings do you organise per month? How many members attend the 
meetings on average? Who are the members?
What do you normally talk about in the meetings? How do problems get solved and 
new plans get initiated? Give example.
Do VECs want to take responsibility for managing school affairs? What has been 
the experience since the formation of the committee? Can anyone give a brief 
history? What is the process for managing?
Have you performed duties above and beyond those that were initially decided? 
What other roles has your committee played in working with the schools besides 
those set out by the NGO or by PED?
What is your relationship of VECs with teachers? With DEOs? With parents?
Are you feeling any pressure from political parties? Parents? Teachers Unions? 
Malik’s or Mullah’s?
How do you communicate with DEOs, NGOs, PED, parents, others? How many 
times per month? In your opinion how important is communication with these 
institutions?
Are you involved in any way with District Education planning? Have you received 
any training from outside to assist you in your school related duties?
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In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district? 
Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of 
children to both CSP and Government Schools?
School Headmasters/Mistresses. Teachers
The Community support process stipulates the specific responsibilities of the 
community in regard to school administration. Are these responsibilities being 
carried out? And if so, By whom?
Do you ever receive visits from DEOs, ASDEOs, LCs and if so how many times per 
month or year?
What is your relationship with NGOs, PTSMCs, VECs, WVECs? Do they provide 
any assistance in the day-to-day management of the classes? How often are you in 
contact with these committee members?
Are you currently serving on any committee or political party?
Students/Parents
How do you feel about the education provided by your child's school?
What kinds of responsibilities or tasks could you manage to assist the teacher and 
school?
Are you confident about the teachers ability and their training?
Other questions.
LEVEL 2: Questions asked specific to the individual case
Jaffarabad has been noted as a successful district in terms of management of 
education especially in decentralisation of teacher training. Would you agree? Who 
are the partners involved in creating the successes noted at the Directorate? What 
support has Jaffarabad received over the years in terms of management training 
and other kinds of training that have benefited primary education?
What motivates people in Jaffarabad to be interested in literacy and education? 
Stable Economy?
How are the cluster training programs (mentoring programs) organised? How did 
this program originate?....from the Directorate?
Would you agree with the assessment that Teacher Training in Jaffarabad is fairly 
decentralised? Are the finances provided along with the responsibilities of 
coordination?
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What about other areas? Construction, Curriculum Development, Administration?
LEVEL 3: Questions asked across multiple cases
All questions in levels 1,4,5,6 apply to this level.
LEVEL 4: Questions asked of an overall study-calling on
information beyond the multiple cases and including other 
literature that may have been reviewed.
Have you ever heard anything about the process of decentralisation? Can you 
explain this concept?
What is Balochistan's Policy (if one exists) on education administration?
LEVEL 5: Normative questions about policy recommendations and
conclusions, going beyond the narrow scope of the study
In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district? 
Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of 
children to both CSP and Government Schools?
What is your business? (Mission)
-What role do you play in supporting the management and administration of 
education?
-What percentage of your budget, time, and energy (human resources) is put 
on primary education and management of tasks within this sector?
LEVEL 6: Questions asked to all interviewees
Have you ever heard anything about the process of decentralisation?
In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in you district? 
Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of 
children to both CSP and Government Schools?
Can you provide an organisation chart of your organisation?
Do you receive any outside trainings or other administrative support? How often? 
What is the process for getting training?
What is or should be the Government's responsibility in supporting education?
Do the people want more responsibilities for education at the local level or are they 
satisfied with the way the power is now balanced?
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Case Study Questions
Sources of Data: DEO Officers, SCOPE Employees, PTSMCs, VECs; 
WVECs Sample Strategies: Interviews, Files, Photos, Drawings, Anecdotes, 
Observations, Other
TASK Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over the past five years of 
intensive donor support from 1992 to 1997?
What was the state of primary education management across Winkler’s 
functions of education when the project began? Has the nature of 
management changed from 1992 to 1997?
Evidence
STRUCTURE What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making 
authority have been legally and informally transferred from the centre to 
the district/community/school level? (Rondinelli 1981; Mawhood 1983)
Evidence
PROCEDURE Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is the 
quantity of the budget handled locally? (Midgleyl986; Mawhood 1983)
Evidence
PERSONNEL A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. This includes quantity of finances handled; number and 
qualifications of the staff employed; power to decide over expenditure; 
power to vary revenues; decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion 
and discipline (Mawhood 1983:9). What level of authority do local bodies 
have over subordinate field officers, ministerial and other staff, i.e., 
teachers appointments, promotion and discipline?
Evidence
CULTURE Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors. Most important among these is commitment of local 
officials to decentralising development, the quality of local leadership, the 
attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which 
traditional customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralised 
administrative arrangements. (Rondinelli, 1983:200). To what extent did 
these factors play out in Balochistan? Was decentralisation observable 
through the behavioural patterns of participation, the means of access for 
individuals to the bureaucracy (Mawhood 1983:xii).
Evidence
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IV. Guide for Case Study Report
A. Background27
Jaffarabad is an agricultural district of the Province and irrigated by major canals: 
Pat Feeder, Uch, Desert (Shahi), and Khirthar. People depend on agricultural 
production of rice, wheat, cotton, pulses, and various vegetables that are the major 
crops of the area. Due to non-availability of proper marketing facilities, however, 
the people are not able to utilise their production for the best price in the market.
Water logging is degrading the farmlands of Jaffarabad. About .15 million hectares 
of Eastern Jaffarabad and most of the land at the end of the Khair Canal are 
effected by water logging.
Jaffarabad is a district in Balochistan that borders the Sindh and covers a territory 
of 3,100 square kilometres. The population of the district is estimated at 356,288.28 
There are two sub-Divisions:
• Usta Mohammed
• Dera Allah Yar (Jhat Pat)
There are three sub-Tehsil’s:
• Gandakha
• Panhwar
• Sunehri
In addition, there are 28 Union Councils.
Feudals are primarily in control of the area of Jaffarabad District and are sheltered 
by tribalism. Farmers are not in a position to compete given that they are more or 
less the servants of Feudals as is the tradition of society. This tradition is an 
obstacle for any attempt to change behaviour. The poverty of this area is due to the 
lower status of non-Feudals. Balochi, Brahui, and Sindhi are the major languages.
Out of the districts located in Nasirabad Division, Jaffarabad is one education 
district where, at least on the male side, most of the male officer posts are filled 
and clusters have been designed to organise education activities. Because of the 
hard work of prior and current officers, Jaffarabad has been targeted as a pilot 
district by the Directorate of Primary Education in its development initiatives. 
Because of the DEO (M) dedication and commitment, noticeable progress has been 
made. 618 schools have been divided into 93 clusters. These units are visited by 
field staff on the 25th of every month at the cluster centres. In these cluster centre
27Adapted from ‘Six and a Half Progress Review Report: Parent, Teacher, School 
Management Committee of District Jaffarabad’ by Naik Parveen, Society for Community 
Organization and Promotion of Education.
28provincial Health Department Statistics, January 1995
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meetings, teachers debate on each educational problem which they face. Solutions 
to these problems are developed. Further consultations with the DEO can be made 
if immediate necessary actions should be taken. Due to these accomplishments, 
reports have been made that indicate drop-out rates have been controlled, teacher 
absenteeism has decreased, and good communication lines between schools and 
district headquarters have been established.
Structure of DEO Offices in Jaffarabad:
(Male)
1 District Education Officer
2 SDEOs
-Jaffarabad 
-Usta Mohammed 
4 ADEOs
-2 Jaffarabad 
-2 Usta Mohammed 
26 Learning Coordinators 
-15 Jaffarabad 
-11 Usta Mohammed
(Female)
1 DEO
3 LCs
-2 Jaffarabad 
-1 Usta Mohammed
Number of Schools in Jaffarabad29
Primary Schools Middle Schools High Schools Total
Boys 519 30 19 558
Girls 174 04 03 181
123 PTSMCs have been formed in addition.
29Data updated according to BEMIS April 1997 Census.
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Case Study Protocol30
BARKHAN
I. Overview
A. Background Information
The over-arching research project is a process study designed to answer the 
question how have the ‘centre’ and ‘local’ institutions concerned with managing 
primary education developed the capacity to manage in a decentralised policy 
framework and what is the process. The design is qualitative, employing such 
methods as observation, project document review, and semi-structured interviews.
Mr. Randy L. Hatfield is currently a Ph.D. Candidate at the London School of 
Economics in the Social Policy and Administration Department where he developed 
his research proposal. Upon successful completion of the proposal and review by 
the department, Mr. Hatfield has begun his field research. With the assistance of 
Mr. Aamir Mirza of the Balochistan Education Foundation, this team is conducting 
case studies on two education districts within a multiple-case design.
B. Rationale for Case Selection
Barkhan has been selected as one case in a multiple case study research approach. 
The rationale for its selection follows:31
❖ Barkhan District belongs to the smaller districts in the province and has a 
relatively small population. The estimated population growth rate is higher 
than the one of the province as a whole. The population density is about twice 
the density in the province as a whole;
❖ Barkhan scores low on the indicators related to agricultural production. The 
absolute value of agricultural production and the value per hectare are the fifth 
lowest in Balochistan;
❖ The District holds a position in the middle with regard to the pupils/teachers 
ratio in primary schools, while the enrolment figures are relatively good for 
boys and bad for girls;
❖ Reports from PED project staff that Barkhan has shown little success in local 
management and collaboration among local institutions involved with primary 
education administration.
1 This protocol is for the data collection from a single case and is not intended to serve the 
entire project.
2These district indicators are reported in "Barkhan: A District Profile," prepared by the 
Balochistan Provincial Planning and Development Department, August 1997.
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❖ The coverage of the population by water supply schemes belongs to the lowest 
in Balochistan;
❖ Barkhan represents a □ winter zoneD district in contrast to a □ summer zoneD 
district.
❖ Fairly poor infrastructure is evident in terms of roads and communication.
C. Substantive Research Issues 
The primary research questions are:
1) How successful was the attempt to decentralise education administration in 
Balochistan?
2) What were the policy constraints?
3) What does this experience tell us about both the theory of decentralisation 
and its application to education in a developing country with a strong 
centralist tradition?
Sub-questions are:
-Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over the past seven years of intensive 
donor support? If so, to what extent? (Successes? Failures?)
-What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making authority have 
been legally and informally transferred from the centre to the 
district/community/school level?
-Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are 
discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is the quantity 
of the budget handled locally?
-What level of authority do local bodies have over subordinate field officers, 
ministerial and other staff, i.e. teachers in terms of staff appointments, promotion, 
discipline?
-Which of Donald Winkler’s designated education functions are controlled from the 
centre and which are controlled at the local level? Are they mutually exclusive or is 
there any overlap?
-Identify the locus of control for the following functions of education 
administration: School organisation; curriculum and teaching methods; 
examination and supervision; Teacher recruitment; finance of recurrent 
expenditure; and school construction and finance.
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-What was the state of primary education management across the functions listed 
above when the project began? Has the nature of management changed in the past 
seven years? If so, how?
-Has the community support process of opening girls schools in Balochistan 
positively leveraged or altered the nature of the management of education and the 
services provided?
C. Relevant Readings
Balochistan Planning and Development District Profile: Barkhan
LAFAM Six-Month Progress Reports on PTSMCs in Barkhan
Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan
Balochistan Gazetteer, Vol. I & II
Misc. Project Documents and Reports
II. Field Procedures
A. Gaining Access
Through permission letter from Director of Primary Education and Additional 
Secretary (Planning), research visa was granted to researcher for conducting 
research on primary education management in Balochistan.
During any introductions that the team makes of itself in the field, it will:
❖ clearly establish the purpose of the research and its contribution toward the 
Ph.D. degree at the London School of Economics;
❖ establish that the nature of the research is independent of the Government of 
Balochistan and that findings will not be submitted to PED for formal scrutiny;
❖ guarantee the anonymity of the sources that are interviewed/approached;
❖ not be responsible for leveraging any results to problems voiced from 
respondents.
B. Tentative Itinerary
27 Feb. FRIDAY Depart Quetta for Loralai
Activity: Upon arrival, meet with LAFAM person;
Find accommodations and settle in.
Plan next day’s interviews/observations.
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28 Feb. SATURDAY LAFAM Office
Activity: Interview NGO staff and observe NGO office operations and staff
interactions. Go alongside staff on any project visits
District Education Office (Female)
Activity: Interview Field Office Staff and Ministerial staff
Observe DEO office operations and staff interactions
1 March SUNDAY LAFAM & DEO (F) Follow-up Meetings
Travel to Barkhan
2 March MONDAY District Education Office (M)
Activity: Interview Field Office Staff and Ministerial staff
Observe DEO office operations and staff interactions
3 March TUESDAY PTSMC/VEC/WVECs & Schools
Activity: Meet with members of the committees, teachers and students
Visit Schools (CSP and Government)
4 March WEDNESDAY Follow-up Meetings and Return to Quetta
C. Resources Needed
Supplies needed for this study include:
• 1 Recorder
• Blank Cassettes (4+)
• 200 Speed, 36 exposure color film (2 rolls)
• writing utensils and laptop computer
• Bottles of Mineral Water (7)
• Double "AA" Batteries
Vital Resources Needed:
• Field Accommodations
• Vehicle and Driver
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III. Case Study Questions32
A. Protocol Questions33
LEVEL 1: Questions asked for specific in tervie wees
DEO Office
Has anyone from PED communicated to your office that policy was underway to 
devolve more authority and responsibility to you and your staff?
What is your current capacity to manage all of the responsibilities listed in the 
guide book? How could you best achieve them or is it impossible?
Who hires, fires, transfers, and appoints teachers? What is the process for doing 
each of these? How is it done? Any formal documents you are aware of that dictate 
this process?
Can you give a list of all the people working in your offices including teachers? Are 
all posts filled? Are there enough people to accomplish all of the work?
What funds (budgets) besides salaries do you manage? Who in your office actually 
deals with finances? Have they received any formal training for dealing with the 
finances?
Are any government finances provided for building maintenance and office 
supplies? Any development funds at your disposal? How much control do you have 
over district finances? Can you give the Rupee amount you are responsible for 
managing from month to month or per year?
How much of a budget are you given to work with? Are these funds disbursed 
regularly? On a receipt basis? Salaries--how does the money get allocated, 
disbursed?
Who physically distributes books and school materials to the schools in your 
district?
Who repairs broken furniture and replaces it to schools? Who hauls the stuff away? 
Whose responsibility is it to make repairs in the school?
Do you have any other jobs to support yourself besides the government post?
32Questions are posed to the investigator, not to a respondent. The questions, in essence, 
are reminders to the investigator regarding the information that needs to be collected and 
why. In some instances, the specific questions also may serve as prompts in asking 
questions during a case study interview; however, the main purpose of these questions is to 
keep the investigator on track as data collection proceeds.
^Distinguishing among levels of questions is crucial when a single case is part of a 
multiple-case study.
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Do you have legal authority for hiring/firing/transferring all teachers in your 
district?
How do policies, responsibilities and duties get communicated to your office from 
PED, the Secretariat and the Minister of Education? If by a memo or letter, do you 
have examples? If by word, who is the messenger? Is there any follow up on 
whether not these new policies are being implemented?
Are any of your powers and authorities shared with VECs, PTSMCs, teachers? 
What degree of authority do you have over CSP schools? High, Medium or Low?
NGOs
What is your business? (Mission)
-What role do you play in supporting the management and administration of 
education?
-What percentage of your budget, time, and energy (human resources) is put 
on primary education and management of tasks within this sector?
Can you provide an organisation chart of your NGO?
Who are your major funding sources? Do you feel that these agencies dictate how 
you spend your time and energy or do you fully plan and implement your activities?
Who plans your activities and who manages your budget?
Who is your customer?
Who are you most accountable to: Politicos, Board, PED, people, other?
What does the customer consider valuable?
What have been your results?
What is your plan?
What is your NGOs definition of capacity building? How do you build capacity with 
VECs, PTSMCs, parents? (Provide evidence)
PTSMCs
What responsibilities do you have for managing the schools in your district? (Role)
How many meetings do you organise per month? How many members attend the 
meetings on average? Who are the members?
What do you normally talk about in the meetings? How do problems get solved and 
new plans get initiated? Give example.
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Do PTSMCs want to take responsibility for managing school affairs? What has 
been the experience since the formation of the committee? Can anyone give a brief 
history? What is the process for managing?
Have you performed duties above and beyond those that were initially decided? 
What other roles has your committee played in working with the schools besides 
those set out by the NGO or by PED?
What is your relationship of PTSMCs with teachers? With DEOs? With parents?
Are you feeling any pressure from political parties? Parents? Teachers Unions? 
Malik’s or Mullah’s?
How do you communicate with DEOs, NGOs, PED, parents, others? How many 
times per month? In your opinion how important is communication with these 
institutions?
Are you involved in any way with District Education planning? Have you received 
any training from outside to assist you in your school related duties?
VEC/WVECs
What responsibilities do you have for managing the schools in your district? (Role) 
How many meetings do you organise per month? How many members attend the 
meetings on average? Who are the members?
What do you normally talk about in the meetings? How do problems get solved and 
new plans get initiated? Give example.
Do VECs want to take responsibility for managing school affairs? What has been 
the experience since the formation of the committee? Can anyone give a brief 
history? What is the process for managing?
Have you performed duties above and beyond those that were initially decided? 
What other roles has your committee played in working with the schools besides 
those set out by the NGO or by PED?
What is your relationship of VECs with teachers? With DEOs? With parents?
Are you feeling any pressure from political parties? Parents? Teachers Unions? 
Malik’s or Mullah’s?
How do you communicate with DEOs, NGOs, PED, parents, others? How many 
times per month? In your opinion how important is communication with these 
institutions?
Are you involved in any way with District Education planning? Have you received 
any training from outside to assist you in your school related duties?
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In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district? 
Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of 
children to both CSP and Government Schools?
School Headmasters/Mistresses. Teachers
The Community support process stipulates the specific responsibilities of the 
community in regard to school administration. Are these responsibilities being 
carried out? And if so, By whom?
Do you ever receive visits from DEOs, ASDEOs, LCs and if so how many times per 
month or year?
What is your relationship with NGOs, PTSMCs, VECs, WVECs? Do they provide 
any assistance in the day-to-day management of the classes? How often are you in 
contact with these committee members.
Are you currently serving on any committee or political party?
Students/Parents
How do you feel about the education provided by your child's school?
What kinds of responsibilities or tasks could you manage to assist the teacher and 
school?
Are you confident about the teachers ability and their training?
Other questions.
LEVEL 2: Questions asked specific to the individual case
Barkhan has been noted as a severely challenged district in terms of management 
of education in decentralisation. Would you agree? What are the challenges of 
collaboration and management?
What support has Barkhan received over the years in terms of management 
training and other kinds of training concerned with primary education?
Explain the Kacchi/Kaider Teacher training program that is being conducted in 
Barkhan. Is it working?
Are the people of Barkhan interested in literacy and education? If not, why?
What about other areas? Construction, Curriculum Development, Administration?
310
LEVEL 3: Questions asked across multiple cases
All questions in levels 1,4,5,6 apply to this level.
LEVEL 4: Questions asked of an overall study-calling on
information beyond the multiple cases and including 
other literature that may have been reviewed.
Have you ever heard anything about the process of decentralisation? Can you 
explain this concept?
What is Balochistan's Policy (if one exists) on education administration?
LEVEL 5: Normative questions about policy recommendations and
conclusions, going beyond the narrow scope of the study
In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district? 
Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of 
children to both CSP and Government Schools?
What is your business? (Mission)
-What role do you play in supporting the management and administration of 
education?
-What percentage of your budget, time, and energy (human resources) is put 
on primary education and management of tasks within this sector?
LEVEL 6: Questions asked to all interviewees
Have you ever heard anything about the process of decentralisation?
In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in you district? 
Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of 
children to both CSP and Government Schools?
Can you provide an organisation chart of your organisation?
Do you receive any outside trainings or other administrative support? How often? 
What is the process for getting training?
What is or should be the Government's responsibility in supporting education?
Do the people want more responsibilities for education at the local level or are they 
satisfied with the way the power is now balanced?
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Case Study Questions
Sources of Data: DEO Officers, LAFAM Employees, PTSMCs, VECs; 
WVECs Sample Strategies: Interviews, Files, Photos, Drawings, Anecdotes, 
Observations, Other
TASK Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over the past five years of 
intensive donor support from 1992 to 1997?
What was the state of primary education management across Winkler’s 
functions of education when the project began? Has the nature of 
management changed from 1992 to 1997?
Evidence
STRUCTURE What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making 
authority have been legally and informally transferred from the centre to 
the district/community/school level? (Rondinelli 1981; Mawhood 1983)
Evidence
PROCEDURE Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is the 
quantity of the budget handled locally? (Midgleyl986; Mawhood 1983)
Evidence
PERSONNEL A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. This includes quantity of finances handled; number and 
qualifications of the staff employed; power to decide over expenditure; 
power to vary revenues; decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion 
and discipline (Mawhood 1983:9). What level of authority do local bodies 
have over subordinate field officers, ministerial and other staff, i.e. 
teachers appointments, promotion and discipline?
Evidence
CULTURE Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors. Most important among these is commitment of local 
officials to decentralising development, the quality of local leadership, the 
attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which 
traditional customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralised 
administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200). To what extent did 
these factors play out in Balochistan? Was decentralisation observable 
through the behavioural patterns of participation, the means of access for 
individuals to the bureaucracy. (Mawhood 1983:xii)
Evidence
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IV. Guide for Case Study Report 
A. Background34
Barkhan District is located in the Zhob Division of Balochistan. It has only one 
tehsil called Barkhan. Barkhan typically has a very warm climate in the 
summer.
In this district, the Waderas have a strong hold over the people. Their problems 
are solved on the will of Waderas. Due to severe poverty in the district, the 
people serve the Waderas. This environment causes people to fight with each 
other and to complain. These problems seem to be the result of a lack of 
education. Due to a lack of employment, generally, people have a lot of free time, 
which can stifle any work/initiative that is being implemented.
Agriculture is very nominal in Barkhan. Even the cattle industry which depends 
on grazing areas is not possible due to lack of irrigation. Only the area of 
Baghan is agrarian due to the civilisation of people in that area more so than in 
any other area of Barkhan.
It was the observation of the Facilitator of the mentioned PTSMC report that 
the people of Barkhan were more interested in getting schools built for personal 
use than a sincere motivation to improve education in that District. It was also 
indicated that the people became selfish and began using the school buildings 
for guest rooms and storerooms due to their greediness. In several instances, it 
was learned that people built up schools of four rooms/Pucca that in reality only 
had an enrolment of five to ten students. In Rakhny, schools are running 
relatively well. With the increased enrolment of boys, resources became scarce 
such as teachers and rooms. Only on political basis did the communities get 
their school buildings.
Teachers have generally not been cooperative with the formation of the PTSMCs. 
The unions played an active roll in discouraging teacher participation in the 
development of the PTSMCs in that they came to know that the PTSMC 
program was an open threat to illegal work in education. The Union (GTA) 
misguided the teachers and parents time to time to fail the PTSMC program 
and threaten the facilitator for not doing the work of the PTSMC. Some parents 
and teachers, however, had a deep interest in improving education through 
PTSMC development. So there has been some clear evidence of interest in the 
people for a desire to change the education standards of their area.
The following problems were experienced in trying to establish PTSMCs by the 
Facilitator:
• In May, the GTA Union distributed a circular to all teachers urging non­
cooperation with the formation of the PTSMCs.
• People were using the schools for personal use.
• The GTA union also threatened education officers including LCs to not to
34Adapted from Six Month Progress Report of District Barkhan by Khair Muhammad, 
Facilitator, LAFAM.
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go along with the facilitator in the development of the PTSMC.
• Schools were closed in some areas due to absence of teachers.
• Some teachers were still drawing salary even though they were absent 
from the classroom. In other words, there was no punishment for lack of 
attendance.
• Books were not being delivered on time.
Structure of DEO Offices in Barkhan:
Field Officers in Barkhan
DEOs SDEOs ADEOs LCs
Male 1 1 1 5
Female - 1 - 1
Total 1 2 1 6
Number of Schools in Barkhan35
Primary
Schools
Middle
Schools
High
Schools
Total
Boys 285 15 6 306
Girls 50 2 1 53
55 PTSMCs have been formed in addition.
35Data updated according to BEMIS April 1997 Census.
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Appendix II
Respondents
Semi-Structured Interviews 
“Centre”
Post/Title Recorded? Date
Interviewed
Former Director, PED ✓ 13/10/97
Additional Secretary of Education 21/10/97
Chief Technical Advisor (BPEP) ✓ 06/10/97 & 
9/2/98
Technical Advisor for Curriculum and Instructional 
Materials
✓ 30/10/97
Technical Advisor for Teacher Training & Supply ✓ 22/10/97
In-charge, In-Service Teacher Training (PED) ✓ 23/10/97
Technical Advisor for Construction ✓ 3/11/97
Additional Director, PED 11/2/98
Former Director, Bureau of Curriculum and Extension 28/10/97
Principal, Provincial Institute of Teacher Training 
(PITE)
✓ 29/10/97
Additional Director, PED 11/2/98
Finance Administrator, BPEP ✓ 30/10/97
Managing Director, SCSPEB 27/10/97
Field Director, SCSPEB 27/10/97
Task Manager, World Bank 7/10/98
Additional Director, Planning 3/12/97
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Semi-Structured Interviews 
“District”
Post/Title Recorded? Date Interviewed
DEO (F) Loralai ✓ Feb. 98
DEO & SDEO (M) Barkhan ✓ Feb. 98
SDEO (F) Barkhan ✓ Feb. 98
GTA (Union) President, Barkhan ✓ Feb. 98
DEO (F) Jaffarabad ✓ March 98
DEO (M) Jaffarabad ✓ March 98
LAFAM Representatives ✓ Feb. 98
SCOPE Representatives ✓ Feb. 98
SDEO Usta Moh’d/Jaffarabad ✓ Feb. 98
SDEO Dera Allah Yar/Jaffarabad ✓ Feb. 98
Deputy Director March 98
Teachers Barkhan March 98
VEC Member, Loralai ✓ Feb. 98
VEC/WVEC Members 
Abdul Latif Umrani
✓ Feb. 98
VEC/PTSMC/Teachers Jaffarabad Feb. 98
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Appendix III 
Steps in the Community Support Process
The NGO works with community members to identify a middle school or 
secondary school female graduate from the village or at a walking distance from 
the village.
1. The NGO verifies her residence in the village;
2. The NGO verifies her school certificates through the District Education
Officer’s office;
3. The NGO tests the potential teacher’s proficiency in Urdu and
mathematics;
4. The NGO and potential teacher conduct a household survey of the village
to:
> Count the number of households;
> Count the number of families;
> Count the number of school age girls; and
> Discuss with each family the meaning and importance of education for girls.
5. The NGO and community members form a village education committee 
(VEC) with 5 to 7 members according to the following rules:
> 75% of parents must elect members;
> No two members of the same family can be VEC members;
> No blood relatives of the teacher can be VEC members;
> VEC members must have at least one school age girl.
6. The VEC provides a temporary building for the school and starts the 
school on a probationary basis. The NGO provides training to the VEC on 
how to fulfil its roles and responsibilities.
7. The VEC requests the District Education Officer to formally sanction the 
girls’ school;
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8. The VEC and the Government sign a contract specifying each party’s
responsibilities in establishing and monitoring the school;
9. The VEC decides on a suitable location for a permanent school and
arranges to transfer ownership of the land (free of charge) to the 
Department of Education;
10. The VEC nominates the teacher for participation in a mobile female 
teacher-training course;
11. Upon successful completion of a three-month probationary period the 
teacher is given a regular appointment by the government and supplies 
are sent to the school;
12. The VEC and the government monitor the school on at least a monthly
basis; and
13. The VEC holds an annual community meeting to discuss progress of the
school and other issues.
Source: Thomas, 1996
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